István Bodnár

Aristotle asserts at 1073b10-13 that he intends to give in Metaphysics XII.8 a definite conception about the multitude of the divine transcendent entities, which function as the movers of the celestial spheres. In order to do so, he describes several celestial theories. First Eudoxus’s, then the modifications of this theory propounded by Callippus, and finally his own suggestion, the introduction of yet further spheres which integrate the celestial spheres into a single overarching scheme. For this, after explaining the spheres providing the component motions of each planet, Aristotle introduces so-called rewinding spheres (anelittousai), which perform contrary revolutions to the ones performed by the spheres carrying the planet

Saving the appearances (sôzein ta phainomena) often features as a programmatic description of the aim and objective of ancient astronomical theory. The paper, after an expository section, discusses some earlier proposals for what such a programme presupposes. After this, through a survey of the usage in Plato and Aristotle of some key terms—among them the verb sôzein—describing the relationship of an account to what it is an account of, submits that the phrase in this semantic framework could express the crucial property of an account that it is faithful to the phenomena, and it does not overrule or discard them.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 139-141 [Access article in PDF] Helen S. Lang. The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics: Place and the Elements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 324. £40. This is an unsuccessful book. Some of the reasons for its failure are complex, others are more simple. I cannot address all, but shall simply discuss the fundamental claims about four large topical units—about nature, place, void and elemental motion—indicating why they are untenable.Discussing the celebrated definition of nature in Physics II.1, Lang contends that in it the verb kineisthai should be taken in the passive voice, that nature should be understood as a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest, and not just blandly as a principle of motion and rest. Since Aristotle asserts in Book VIII of the Physics that the elements contain a passive principle of motion (255b30f), Lang's contention would mean that the elements in this respect do not differ from other natural entities. This is highly unlikely, given the systematic contrast of self-moving composite natural entities and simple, unarticulated elemental natures at 255a5-18. Lang goes so far as to assert [End Page 139] that "kineisthai is always passive, not middle (or reflexive), in both Plato and Aristotle" (42). Fortunately, we need not accept this on her word: although kineisthai can be both passive and middle, in some instances (notably in aorist and future), passive and middle forms are different. Accordingly, Lang's claim must be rejected on the basis of the very first passage she helpfully quotes as an "additional example" in n.24 on p.42: Physics VII.1 242a37f employs the middle voice future, kinesétai, and not the passive form, kinethésetai. The passage, teeming with different forms of the verb kineisthai, describes an entity which contains the principle of motion in itself, which moves naturally. This indisputably shows that Lang's contention is wrong.Lang, contrary to the well-entrenched scholarly consensus, claims that place is not the first (=innermost) extremity or first unmoved boundary of the containing body, but the extremity of the first body, i.e., of the celestial sphere. (The transposition of the qualification "first" happens in several, non-conclusive installments, see e.g. 99f, or 106f.) This transposition, however, runs counter to several of Aristotle's stipulations about place. Lang's all-encompassing extremity can only be the common (koinos) place of everything there is, whereas Aristotle is keen on finding the proper or particular (idios) place, a location which contains nothing but the entity itself (209a32-b1). The entirety of the discussion in Physics IV.4-5 attests that it is this latter place which Aristotle defines here: the first place is neither smaller, nor bigger than the thing in place (211a1f, a23-29, a31-33, etc.). Aristotle repeatedly stresses that the extremities of the contained body and its container are "in the same" (211a33f, b11f). This remark surely would be out of place about the remote extremity of the first containing body. It is also repeatedly set out that the direction of explanation is bottom-up, and not top-down, as Lang's all-encompassing universal place would require: it is by being in a particular locus that we can be said to be in (the sphere of) air, and by this in the heaven (209a33-b1, 211a23-26).Lang's proposal is not just theoretically unappealing. The traditional should not be rejected recklessly, without an attentive discussion. After all, it "apparently beg[a]n immediately with Theophrastus," as Lang rather uncannily admits (105), and it was Theophrastus, and not Lang, who studied and worked for decades with Aristotle.A key assertion of the chapter on void also rests on a grave philological blunder. Lang argues that interpreters switched from Aristotle's expression "that through which" (to di' hou) to "medium," thereby surrendering the original net of notions, in which the natural activity of the element impeded the progression of the...

Anaximander is the first philosopher whose theory of the heavens is preserved in broad outlines. According to the sources the celestial bodies are huge rings of compressed air around the earth, each visible only where it is perforated by a tubular vent through which the fire contained in it can shine. Greatest and farthest of them is the sun, next comes the moon and under them there is the ring of the stars. It is a common practice to put and answer the following questions: ‘…why he should have placed the stellar circles or rings closer to the earth than are the sun and the moon.’ ‘…why these lower rings of stellar ρ do not obscure the brighter but more distant bodies.’

Aristotelian natures – internal principles of motion and rest – provide a rich account of the goal-directed behaviour of natural entities. What such natures cannot account for, on their own, are cases of teleology across natures, where an entity, due to its nature, furthers the goals of another entity. Nevertheless, Aristotle admits such teleological configurations among natures: most notably Politics I.8 1256b15-20 claims that plants are for the sake of animals and animals are for the sake of humans. The paper first scrutinizes two recent attempts– by Mohan Matthen and David Sedley – at an explanation of such teleology across natures. The fundamental move these proposals make is that they claim that the universe has a nature of its own. Accordingly, teleology across natures could be explained as the operation of this single cosmic nature. But the introduction of a cosmic nature contravenes fundamental strictures of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Hence the third section of the paper formulates an alternative proposal, that the teleological interaction across different natures is underpinned by the self-benefittingactivityofindividualnaturalentities,whichareable to use the natural processes of their environment to their own advantage

The paper is about a chreia—a one-liner used as a grammatical exercise sentence—that presents Pythagoras as proscribing an expression from admissible linguistic usage. This injunction is funny, because it can be construed as Pythagoras railing against the use of a particular variant form of an adjective—and also as against the use of items denoted by that adjective. In the paper I add to this line of interpretation the further point that the chreia also claims that in this latter construal the injunction was Pythagoras’s signature insight, making him the philosopher that he was.

Timaeus after assigning four regular solids – tetrahedra, octahedra, icosahedra and cubes – to fire, air, water and earth, respectively, submits at 57d–e that different kinds of gaseous, liquid or solid materials, and their interactions and intertransformations require that the four solids occur in different sizes. The paper discusses two different strategies for the generation of these differences in size: the traditional one, which allows that the triangles that are the fundamental building blocks of these solids do occur in different sizes, and the one proposed by Cornford, which suggests that triangles of exactly the same size may form different structures, and these can give rise to solids of different sizes. Considerations are drawn from descriptions of some specific interactions , from the account of sight , and physiology . All in all, these considerations seem to favour the traditional account. After this, in a final section I suggest that the specific claims Timaeus makes about the status of his account about the elements – certainty for the assignment of tetrahedra to fire, octahedra to air, and icosahedra to water, whereas the half-equilateral triangle as the fundamental building block of these solids is introduced in a tentative manner, explicitely stressing that this detail is revisable – makes it unsurprising that he does not discuss in detail how solids – and triangles and squares – of different sizes are constructed