•  109
    About being a bat
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1): 26-49. 1986.
  •  107
    Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
    Philosophy of Science 52 (September): 451-69. 1985.
    Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psyc…Read more
  •  99
    The right stuff
    Synthese 70 (March): 349-72. 1987.
  •  92
    Content: Covariation, control, and contingency
    Synthese 100 (2): 241-90. 1994.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically s…Read more
  •  91
    Sensation and scientific realism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3): 471-482. 1986.
  •  83
    Mental misrepresentation
    Philosophy of Science 57 (September): 445-58. 1990.
    An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two…Read more
  •  77
    Saving psychological solipsism
    Philosophical Studies 61 (March): 267-83. 1991.
  •  65
    The mundane mental language: How to do words with things
    Synthese 59 (June): 251-294. 1984.
  •  56
    Sensuous content
    Philosophical Papers 15 (November): 131-54. 1986.
    No abstract
  •  53
  •  44
    “God” is a term than which none greater can be used
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1). 1981.
  •  42
    About Being a Bat
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (n/a): 26. 1985.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  36
    It's hard to believe
    Mind and Language 5 (2): 122-48. 1990.
  •  35
    Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas
    New Scholasticism 55 (2): 159-177. 1981.
  •  28
    A theory of perception
    American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1): 63-70. 1981.
  •  27
    A New Model for Metaphor
    Dialectica 37 (4): 285-301. 1983.
    Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for under…Read more
  •  22
    Abailard's theory of universals
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1): 27-38. 1982.
  •  21
    On what might be
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 313-322. 1980.
  •  21
    Mental images and cognitive theory
    American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3): 237-47. 1984.
  •  18
    The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language
    Cambridge University Press. 1989.
    Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content u…Read more
  •  16
    Coincidental Cognitive Content
    Critica 15 (45): 75-103. 1983.
  •  16
    The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162): 106-109. 1991.
  •  15
    A New Way up from Empirical Foundations
    Synthese 49 (3). 1981.
  •  15
    Representation and Reality
    Review of Metaphysics 45 (2): 426-428. 1991.
    This is Putnam at his critical best; he is once again directing the shape of the philosophy of mind for years to come. Putnam scouts with dissatisfaction the prevailing functionalist/computationalist theory of mental states, a view he himself originated more than thirty years ago. Here he despairs of any reductionist theory of mental states, denying that there are naturalistically specifiable natures comprehending mental states of the same kind, although he continues to allow that token mental s…Read more
  •  10
    On What Might Be
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 313-322. 1980.
  •  6
    Connectionism and conditioning
    In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 167--197. 1991.
  • Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.