My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes Sure, a little bit.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Lean toward: Platonism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept another alternative Accept: the existence of voluntary actions for which we are properly assessed is compatible with determinism. Lean toward: hard (near-)determinism for certain modes of moral assessment that libertarians and most compatibilists seem to want.
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism Deism is still a live option for me.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Lean toward: rationalism ...in a fairly weak, limited form.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: invariantism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: non-Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Lean toward: externalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral realism Assuming that "moral" is construed broadly. I am tempted by anti-realism about specific moral categories like duty and obligation, which some think of as essential to *morality*.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: naturalism But I may have a more capacious view of what could count as naturalism than most people who so self-identify.
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism Again, it matters how broadly 'moral' is construed. I accept internalism about at least some kinds of value judgments.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Agnostic/undecided
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept another alternative Accept: eudaimonism. Lean toward: specifically virtue-ethical eudaimonism.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: biological view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept more than one
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Lean toward: Millian
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Agnostic/undecided
Time: A-theory and B-theory Lean toward: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Lean toward: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Other Skeptical of metaphysical possibility as distinct from logical and nomological possibility.