•  5
    The possibility of practical reason
    Michigan Publishing. 2000.
    The Possibility of Practical Reason explores the foundational questions of moral psychology: How can any of our behavior qualify as acting for a reason? How can any considerations qualify as reasons for us to act? David Velleman argues that both possibilities depend on there being a constitutive aim of action―something that makes for success in action as such. These twelve essays―five of which were not included in the previous edition, two of them previously unpublished―discuss topics such as fr…Read more
  •  2
    New model publishing
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 11-12. 2001.
  •  5
    17. Well-Being and Time
    In John Martin Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of death, Stanford University Press. pp. 327-362. 1993.
  •  39
    New model publishing
    The Philosophers' Magazine 14 (14): 11-12. 2001.
  •  725
    How to endure
    Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242). 2011.
    The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in term…Read more
  •  75
    Comments on John Martin Fischer’s Our Stories (review)
    Philosophical Studies 158 (3): 515-521. 2012.
    I comment on the three main themes in Our Stories: the harm of death, the narrative structure of life, and the value of immortality. I begin with a subsidiary theme, namely, the use of narrative examples in philosophy.
  •  7
    Beyond price: essays on birth and death
    Open Book Publishers. 2015.
    In nine lively essays, bioethicist J. David Velleman challenges the prevailing consensus about assisted suicide and reproductive technology, articulating an original approach to the ethics of creating and ending human lives. He argues that assistance in dying is appropriate only at the point where talk of suicide is not, and he raises moral objections to anonymous donor conception. In their place, Velleman champions a morality of valuing personhood over happiness in making end-of-life decisions,…Read more
  •  27
    Comments on Hagop Sarkissian's "Well Functioning Daos and Moral Relativism"
    Philosophy East and West 72 (1): 247-252. 2022.
    Every author cares about being understood, but for reasons that Hagop Sarkissian has explained, I can be expected to care more than most. I'm delighted to say that Sarkissian has understood my book thoroughly and provided an accurate and charitable summary. I am also delighted to learn from him how closely my view echoes strains of classical Confucianism.I was especially interested by Sarkissian's characterization of my view as implying that "morals do indeed seem to collapse to mores, or perhap…Read more
  •  16
    Michael Bratman’s planning, time, and self-governance
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (9): 913-925. 2021.
  •  96
    On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy
    Princeton University Press. 2020.
    A moral philosopher’s meditations on some of life’s most important questions We’ve all had to puzzle over such profound matters as birth, death, regret, free will, agency, and love. How might philosophy help us think through these vital concerns? In On Being Me, renowned moral philosopher J. David Velleman presents a concise, accessible, and intimate exploration into subjects that we care deeply about, offering compelling insights into what it means to be human. Each of Velleman’s short, persona…Read more
  •  136
  •  12
    7. What Happens When Someone Acts?
    In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Cornell University Press. pp. 188-210. 1993.
  •  45
    Michael Bratman’s planning, time, and self-governance
    Tandf: Inquiry 1-13. forthcoming.
    .
  •  450
    Is Motivation Internal to Value?
    In Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.), Preferences, W. De Gruyter. 1998.
    The view that something's being good for a person depends on his capacity to care about it – sometimes called internalism about a person’s good – is here derived from the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In the course of this derivation, the limits of internalism are discussed, and a distinction is drawn between two senses of the phrase "a person's good".
  •  10
    Georg Konrad Morgen (1909–1982) war von 1941 bis 1945 Richter in der SS-und Polizeigerichtsbarkeit. Er ermittelte gegen hochrangige SS-Offiziere wegen Korruption; ab Juni 1943 ermittelte er auch wegen Verbrechen in den Konzentrationslagern (Buchenwald, Dachau, Auschwitz). Im November 1943 konnte sich Morgen persönlich von den Vernichtungsanlagen in Auschwitz-Birkenau überzeugen. Nach eigenen Angaben versuchte er im Rahmen seiner Möglichkeiten als SS-Richter gegen diese Verbrechen vorzugehen. So …Read more
  •  75
    Konrad Morgen: The Conscience of a Nazi Judge recounts the wartime career of Georg Konrad Morgen (1909–1982), a judge who prosecuted crimes committed by members of the SS in Nazi concentration camps, including Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz. In 1943, Morgen discovered the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau. He tried to throw sand in the works by prosecuting concentration camp officials for lesser crimes. He charged the chief of the Auschwitz Gestapo with for 2,000 murders, and ev…Read more
  •  19
    Symposium on How We Get Along: Responses to Critics
    Abstracta 8 (S7): 31-38. 2014.
  •  583
    Motivation by Ideal
    Philosophical Explorations 5 (2): 89-103. 2002.
    I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things. * This is the third in a series of four papers on narrative self-conceptions and their role in moral motivation. In the first paper, “The Self as Narrator” (to appear in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. Joel Anderson and John Christman), I explore the motivational role of narrative self-conceptions, drawing on Dani…Read more
  •  1
    Practical Reflection
    Ethics 102 (1): 117-128. 1991.
  •  3
    So It Goes
    Studies in Social Justice 1-23. 2006.
    Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explaining the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another — namely, …Read more
  •  311
    Beyond Price
    Ethics 118 (2): 191-212. 2008.
  •  162
    II. The Gift of Life
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3): 245-266. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  53
    I. The Identity Problem
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3): 221-244. 2008.
  •  1550
    Doxastic deliberation
    with Nishi Shah
    Philosophical Review 114 (4): 497-534. 2005.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue that the second half of this claim, according…Read more
  •  45
    Willing the Law J. David Velleman
    In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 27. 2004.
  •  1292
    Family History
    Philosophical Papers 34 (3): 357-378. 2005.
    Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.