Jack Dobson

So far aesthetics has played a limited role in our understanding of business activity, focused mainly on evaluating product quality and the character qualities (virtues) of the firm that produced them We draw on Heidegger’s fuller account of aesthetic value to show how a firm—like a work of art – can disclose the way human projects and technologies are already at work in a given context. In this way, we show that firms play an essential role in human self-understanding—a role that Heidegger assigns primarily to works of art. We then apply the Heideggerian approach to the contemporary turn to artisanal products such as personalized handcrafts, craft beer and the “third wave” coffee movement.

This paper begins from the context of virtue ethics theory as applied to business ethics. We note that the concept of a practice therein lacks the full richness of the Aristotelian concept of virtue. In essence, when applied to business in the virtue ethics literature, the practice loses its reflective quality. It becomes beholden to, and irredeemably interdependent with, the economic institution (i.e., the for-profit firm) that houses the practice. Furthermore, the conventional practice of virtue ethics lacks the self-reflective ability to challenge and overcome this interdependence. As a solution to this problem, we suggest tapping into a relatively recent stream in the business ethics literature, namely the application of aesthetics. We integrate aesthetics into virtue ethics in the form of a reflective practice. This reflective practice can be defined as one which embraces the firm as pure phenomenon. It opens a space or clearing that enables business practitioners to reflect and act within a broadened perceptual and conceptual understanding of the ‘true’ nature and purpose of business.

In this paper I argue that the real and only victims of insider trading are those being wrongfully prosecuted under the current broad interpretation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. The term ‘insider trading’ has no clear legal definition and thus lends itself to prosecutorial overreach. I argue that such overreach characterizes the numerous insider trading investigations and prosecutions currently being pursued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Rather than any valid application of securities law, these prosecutions reflect political opportunism and the influence of powerful special interests within the securities industry. I conclude by advocating that Rule 10(b)-5 be applied as originally intended, namely to deter active securities fraud and price manipulation only.

This paper draws on the work of Alain Badiou and Martin Heidegger to construct a postructural theory of the firm. The ideal firm is conceived as a technology that facilitates a technology-free void/site of potential. For actors within this firm to be ethical requires their achievement of human subjecthood through aesthetic fidelity to the site-induced events. Heidegger’s concerns regarding the enframing effects of technology and his recognition of the truth-revealing qualities of art, are incorporated here into a theory of the firm as an idealized, technology facilitated, aesthetic void-of-potential revealing. Authentic human being thus implies that firms-as-technology ‘get out of the way’. This theory of the firm is further revealed through Badiou’s concept of event-driven human flourishing. We embrace Badiou’s ‘ethics-of-truths’ in which fidelity to the trace of an event creates human subjecthood. We consider implications of our theory-of-the-firm for social media firms such as Alphabet and Facebook.

The article begins with a brief history of aesthetic theory. Particular attention is given to the postructuralist ‘aesthetic return’: the resurgence of interest in aesthetics as an ontological foundation for human being-in-the-world. The disordered individual-as-emergent-artist-and-artifact, who is at the centre of this ‘aesthetic return’, is then translated into the ‘dis’-organization that is the firm. The firm is thus defined in terms of its primal sensory impact on the world. It invokes a myriad of aesthetic relations between its disorganized self and others: its essence resides within these relations; its power of being is determined by its ability to project a unified aesthetic ideal – a ‘mirror fantasy’. The firm thus emerges as a style: where style is defined as an organizing – a sculpting – of aesthetic chaos. In order to achieve a grand style, the firm projects itself through time as a unified aesthetic ideal; as an ongoing work of art. The article concludes with a discussion of how this aesthetic theory of the firm relates to other accepted theories of the nature and purpose of business organizations.

This paper begins by summarizing and distilling MacIntyre’s sweeping critique of modern business. It identifies the crux of MacIntyre’s critique as centering on the fundamental Aristotelian concepts of internal goods and practices. MacIntyre essentially follows Aristotle in arguing that by privileging external goods over internal goods, business activity – and certainly modern capitalistic business activity – corrupts practices. Thus, from the perspective of virtue ethics, business is morally indefensible. The paper continues with an evaluation of MacIntyre’s arguments. The conclusion is drawn that MacIntyre’s critique, although partially valid, does not vitiate modern business as he claims. In short, modern business need not of necessity be antithetical to individuals’ pursuit of internal goods within practices.

This paper begins by summarizing and distilling Macintyre's sweeping critique of modern business. It identifies the crux of Macintyre's critique as centering on the fundamental Aristotelian concepts of internal goods and practices. Maclntyre essentially follows Aristotle in arguing that by privileging external goods over internal goods, business activity -and certainly modern capitalistic business activity -corrupts practices. Thus, from the perspective of virtue ethics, business is morally indefensible. The paper continues with an evaluation of Macintyre's arguments. The conclusion is drawn that Macintyre's critique, although partially valid, does not vitiate modern business as he claims. In short, modern business need not of necessity be antithetical to individuals' pursuit of internal goods within practices.

In recent years, the US, UK, and Continental Europe have pursued board gender diversity through markedly different means. Several European countries have imposed mandatory quotas, whereas the UK and US are relying on the endogenous mechanisms of social pressure and shareholder proposals respectively. Despite their obvious allure as a means of bringing about rapid change, evidence is mounting that European board gender diversity quotas may yield various deleterious side effects; and quotas may not be as successful in their core aim of promoting gender diversity as initial broad statistical measures indicated. In this paper we critique the European quota regime, and consider US shareholder proposals as an alternative change mechanism for improving gender diversity in corporate boards. We note the lack of shareholder representative democracy in Europe and conclude with the policy recommendation that, rather than extending quotas, European governments should focus on empowering shareholders.

The article begins with a brief history of aesthetic theory. Particular attention is given to the postructuralist ‘aesthetic return’: the resurgence of interest in aesthetics as an ontological foundation for human being-in-the-world. The disordered individual-as-emergent-artist-and-artifact, who is at the centre of this ‘aesthetic return’, is then translated into the ‘dis’-organization that is the firm. The firm is thus defined in terms of its primal sensory impact on the world. It invokes a myriad of aesthetic relations between its disorganized self and others: its essence resides within these relations; its power of being is determined by its ability to project a unified aesthetic ideal – a ‘mirror fantasy’. The firm thus emerges as a style: where style is defined as an organizing – a sculpting – of aesthetic chaos. In order to achieve a grand style, the firm projects itself through time as a unified aesthetic ideal; as an ongoing work of art. The article concludes with a discussion of how this aesthetic theory of the firm relates to other accepted theories of the nature and purpose of business organizations.

This paper identifies the ultimate justification for business activity as an aesthetic justification. Aesthetics, loosely defined as the appreciation of beauty, subsumes both ethics and economics within an holistic justificatory mechanism for business decisions. Five essential qualities of aesthetic judgment are identified: disinterest, subjectivity, inclusivity, contemplativity, and internality. The quality of aesthetic judgment, exercised by the individual through the organization, will determine the extent to which business activity enhances quality of life.

A great deal has been written in recent years about the justification, if any, for the current levels of executive compensation. The folk consensus is that the current levels of executive compensation are unjustifiably high from both a moral and an economic perspective. In the case of the former, the compensation level is unfair and unjust. And in the case of the latter, the compensation level is not in the broader interests of other stakeholders or of firm-value maximization.In this paper I counter this folk wisdom. I argue that executive compensation is a facet of the Stockholder Model, in which the primary objective of the firm is taken to be the maximization of shareholder wealth, and as such any moral critique of executive compensation is by default a critique of the Stockholder Model. Thus a necessary and sufficient condition for a moral defense of executive compensation is a moral defense of the Stockholder Model. I provide such a defense. Once the Stockholder Model is accepted then any moral or economic defense of executive compensation rests on its compatibility with shareholder wealthmaximization. I argue that the current levels of executive compensation are consistent with the overarching corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization. Thus the current levels of executive compensation are both morally and economically justified.

This paper challenges Alasdair MacIntyre’s assertion that the modern firm — such as Google, Unilever, or Microsoft — is inimical to human flourishing within an Aristotelian framework. The paper begins by questioning MacIntyre’s rendering of utopian communities. It then addresses four specific criticisms of the modern firm to be found throughout MacIntyre’s oeuvre, namely compartmentalisation, myopia, inequality, and loss of community. Arguments are made to the effect that these criticisms do not vitiate the institutional role of the modern firm in an Aristotelian context. The paper concludes with an invocation of the modern firm as institutional ideal within an evolving utopian vision of human flourishing. This is a utopian vision in which the modern firm plays a constructive, not corruptive, institutional role.

In recent years, the US and the EU have pursued markedly different agendas in the pursuit of board gender diversity. The EU has taken a more pro-active governmental approach of mandated quotas, whereas the US is relying largely on the endogenous mechanism of shareholder diversity proposals. Despite their obvious allure as a means of bringing about rapid change, evidence is mounting that board gender diversity quotas may yield various deleterious side effects; and quotas may not be as successful in their core aim of promoting gender diversity as initial broad statistical measures indicate. In this paper we critique the expanding EU quota regime, and consider US shareholder proposals as an alternative change mechanism for improving gender diversity in corporate boards. As an alternative to quotas, diversity resolutions are often dismissed as ineffective because the vast majority fail to formally pass (with a failure rate close to 95%). However, on closer inspection, this ‘failure’ actually results in success. Contrary to the conventional ‘folk’ wisdom -- in the quest to promote gender diversity on corporate boards, the endogenous (US) mechanism of board diversity proposals has, to date, resulted in similar increases in gender diversity as the exogenous (EU) mechanism of government-mandated gender quotas. Furthermore, the former mechanism is more consistent with recent ‘third-wave’ feminist theory. We conclude with the policy recommendation that, rather than quotas, the EU should focus on removing the regulatory barriers that inhibit shareholder democracy.

In recent years, the US, UK, and Continental Europe have pursued board gender diversity through markedly different means. Several European countries have imposed mandatory quotas, whereas the UK and US are relying on the endogenous mechanisms of social pressure and shareholder proposals respectively. Despite their obvious allure as a means of bringing about rapid change, evidence is mounting that European board gender diversity quotas may yield various deleterious side effects; and quotas may not be as successful in their core aim of promoting gender diversity as initial broad statistical measures indicated. In this paper we critique the European quota regime, and consider US shareholder proposals as an alternative change mechanism for improving gender diversity in corporate boards. We note the lack of shareholder representative democracy in Europe and conclude with the policy recommendation that, rather than extending quotas, European governments should focus on empowering shareholders.