Jack James

Despite distinguishing two very different notions of what time may be, the A and B theories of time inherently share an assumption in definition which has excluded a third field of possible explanation from being recognised and explored. In order to prove this rather grandiose proposition I will introduce a distinction between theories of resulting time and theories of non-resulting time. The clear articulation of why of this distinction is valid will be established by the method of reduction with regards to the construction and evolution of the definition of time in the physics of Aristotle and Einstein. This method reveals precisely the assumption in definition that has been made and carried forth in the defining of time in B theory, and also what has been forgone, being non-resulting theories of time. After such analysis and illustration of the proposed distinction with regards to B theory, it will be obvious that A theories of time dually share the assumption in definition. Thus having established that this distinction is very much real and that nearly all work in the philosophy and physics of time has thus far fallen into theories of resulting time, I will then demonstrate why new theories of non-resulting time could at the very least ‘quasi-solve’ some of the irreconcilable conflictions that have arisen within opposing theories of resulting time, using as example the A theorists/Presentist’s conflict with Special Relativity.

The reputations of scientists among their contemporaries depend not only on accomplishment, but also on interactions affected by influence and personality. The historical lore of most fields of scientific endeavor preserve these reputations, often through the identification of founders, innovators, and prolific workers whose contributions are considered fundamental to progress in the field. Historians frequently rely on the historical lore of scientists to guide their studies of the development of ideas, exhibiting justifiable caution in reassessing reputations in the light of current knowledge. However, the transmission of historical lore can obscure the relative importance of accomplishment, influence and personality in shaping contemporary reputations, leaving the historian to either accept reputations at face value or attempt to reconstruct the context in which they were created. The science of taxonomy, because of its rules of priority, leaves a relatively accurate record of historical accomplishment through the persistence of taxa in catalogues and faunal guides. These records allow the modern historian an unbiased means to assess the relative accomplishments of historical figures and therefore a means to critically reassess reputations independent of personality and influence. In the historical lore of North American ichthyology, Louis Agassiz at Harvard and Spencer Baird at the Smithsonian emerge as central figures in the early development of the field during the mid-1800s, contributing not only through the quality and quantity of their science, but also through their roles as institutional leaders and mentors to workers who followed. Charles Girard, originally a student of Agassiz's and later a coworker with Baird, receives little notice in the history of ichthyology, and his reputation is that of a minor player in the initial description of the North American fish fauna, and one whose work appears to have been flawed or even careless when compared to his contemporaries. However, a review of both contemporary and modern taxonomic works reveals that Girard's productivity far exceeded that of either Agassiz or Baird. Furthermore, an examination of the tendency of Girard and his contemporaries to introduce synonymous names into the literature, which might reflect careless or uncritical work, suggests that Girard was among the more accomplished workers of his era, including Agassiz and Baird. Girard's low ranking in the folklore of North American ichthyology, therefore, can not be attributed to discernible shortcomings in his scientific work, but rather to a public and private campaign of criticism waged by Agassiz after Girard's departure from Harvard. While Agassiz's dispute with Girard stemmed from their personal interactions, he expressed them as criticisms of Girard's work, and thus helped shape Girard's scientific reputation as it has been transmitted through the lore of ichthyology. This case study reveals how scientific reputation may not always rest on accomplishment, but can be influenced by personal interactions obscured by time but nonetheless important to history.