•  226
    Naturalized Metaphysics
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5): 673-685. 2010.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  177
    Structural realism and Davidson
    Synthese 162 (1). 2008.
    Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall. I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meani…Read more
  •  103
    Styles for philosophers of science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4): 649-656. 2012.
    In this paper I discuss the bearing of Hacking’s ideas about Scientific Styles on traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning rationality and realism. I argue that a kind of deflationary position with regard to realism debates is a natural consequence of Hacking’s claim that styles are self-authenticating. I then go on to argue, using an example of van Fraassen’s, that Hacking should allow a methodological role for realism debates and hence they are not idle, as he has claimed, a…Read more
  •  82
    Causal compatibilism -- what chance?
    Erkenntnis 63 (1): 119-132. 2005.
    Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and m…Read more
  •  78
    Understanding Naturalism
    Routledge. 2006.
    Many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers describe themselves as naturalists. But what do they mean by that term? Popular naturalist slogans like, "there is no first philosophy" or "philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences" are far from illuminating. "Understanding Naturalism" provides a clear and readable survey of the main strands in recent naturalist thought. The origin and development of naturalist ideas in epistemology, metaphysics and semantics is explained through the works …Read more
  •  58
    William James
    The Philosophers' Magazine 28 (28): 80-81. 2004.
  •  44
    Styles of thinking: The special issue
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4): 595-598. 2012.
  •  35
    Hilary Putnam
    The Philosophers' Magazine 13 52-52. 2001.
  •  12
    Talking about Causing Events
    The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 9. 2014.
    Questions about the nature of the relationship between language and extralinguistic cognition are old, but only recently has a new view emerged that allows for the systematic investigation of claims about linguistic structure, based on how it is understood or utilized outside of the language system. Our paper represents a case study for this interaction in the domain of event semantics. We adopt a transparency thesis about the relationship between linguistic structure and extralinguistic cogniti…Read more
  •  9
    Às vezes o naturalismo é apresentado como uma visão de mundo geral. Na maioria das vezes quando o naturalismo é assim apresentado, ele é identificado com o fisicalismo: a visão de que tudo é físico ou em algum sentido dependente do que é físico. Mas o fisicalismo enfrenta um problema muito sério e bastante conhecido, o dilema de Hempel. O problema pode ser colocado do seguinte modo: quando dizemos que tudo é físico, o que fazemos é utilizar o termo “físico” como é concebido pelo fisicalismo. Sig…Read more
  •  5
    William James
    The Philosophers' Magazine 28 80-81. 2004.
  •  1
    Hilary Putnam
    The Philosophers' Magazine 13 52-52. 2001.