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1131Utilitarianism: For and AgainstCambridge University Press. 1973.Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams off…Read more
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997Free will, praise and blameMind 70 (279): 291-306. 1961.In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such a way that it will fit in the m…Read more
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552Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a plain person's free will"Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 20-75. 2005.REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; T…Read more
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540
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212Critical noticeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1). 1955.Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5
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190Further remarks on sensations and brain processesPhilosophical Review 70 (July): 406-407. 1961.
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182Ruth Anna Putnam and the fact-value distinctionPhilosophy 74 (3): 431-437. 1999.This article is a defence of the Fact-Value distinction against considerations brought up by Ruth Anna Putnam in three articles in Philosophy, especially her ‘Perceiving Facts and Values’ January 1998. I defend metaphysical realism about facts and anti-realism about values against Putnam' intermediate position about both and I relate the matter to the logic of imperatives. The motivations of scientists or historians to select fields of investigation are irrelevant to the objectivity of their hyp…Read more
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141Metaphysical illusionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2). 2006.The paper begins by considering David Armstrong's beautiful paper 'The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism', which conjectures how we get the illusion that there are non-physical qualia. There are discussions of other metaphysical illusions, that there is a passage of time, that we have libertarian free will, and that consciousness is ineffable (which last also relates to Armstrong), and of their possible explanations. Moral: avoid appeal to so called intuition or phenomenolog…Read more
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122The Natural Philosophy of Time, by G. J. Whitrow (review)Philosophical Review 72 (3): 405-407. 1963.
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105Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to dr Pitcher and mr JoskeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 252-54. 1960.This Article does not have an abstract
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101Nicholas Maxwell, the comprehensibility of the universe: A new conception of scienceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 907-911. 2000.
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96Causal Theories of TimeThe Monist 53 (3): 385-395. 1969.This paper expresses certain qualms about causal theories of time, Such as have been put forward by h. Mehlberg and adolf gruenbaum. These qualms arise from doubts about the clarity of the notion of causality. It is suggested that a metalinguistic concept of causality cannot occur within the object language of physics, And that any non-Metalinguistic concept of causality leads to more difficulties than do the concepts of physical geometry which a causal theory of time is supposed to elucidate
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94A form of metaphysical realismPhilosophical Quarterly 45 (180): 301-315. 1995.This essay defends a view which is near enough to Putnam's characterization of metaphysical realism for it to be called by the same name. Indeterminacy of reference is conceded, in the sense that there may be multiple reference relations, but it is denied that this implied belief in unknowable noumena. It is enough for metaphysical realism as conceived here, that there be at least one reference relation. The essay also argues against defining truth epistemically. Even a Peircean ideal theory mig…Read more