CUNY Graduate Center
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
Williamsport, Pennsylvania, United States of America
  •  101
    Relationalism and unconscious perception
    Analysis 76 (4): 426-433. 2016.
    Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationali…Read more
  •  62
    Implicit attitudes and awareness
    Synthese. forthcoming.
    I offer here a new hypothesis about the nature of implicit attitudes. Psy- chologists and philosophers alike often distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes by maintaining that we are aware of the latter, but not aware of the former. Recent experimental evidence, however, seems to challenge this account. It would seem, for example, that participants are frequently quite adept at predicting their own perfor- mances on measures of implicit attitudes. I propose here that most theorists in this a…Read more
  •  61
    Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg
    Philosophical Psychology 27 (6): 829-842. 2014.
    According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs?that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist?undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a prop…Read more
  •  54
    The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4): 446-468. 2015.
    According to a traditional view, perceptual experiences are composites of distinct sensory and cognitive components. This dual-component theory has many benefits; in particular, it purports to offer a way forward in the debate over what kinds of properties perceptual experiences represent. On this kind of view, the issue reduces to the questions of what the sensory and cognitive components respectively represent. Here, I focus on the former topic. I propose a theory of the contents of the sensor…Read more
  •  54
    Working Memory and Consciousness: the current state of play
    with Marjan Persuh and Eric LaRock
    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12. 2018.
    Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critic…Read more
  •  53
    Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious
    Philosophy Compass 9 (6): 392-401. 2014.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states that can occur nonconsciously. I close …Read more
  •  52
    A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1): 41-55. 2018.
    The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P1 at time T1 is numerically identical with a person P2 at a later time T2, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory face…Read more
  •  43
    Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, by Lynne Rudder Baker (review)
    Mind 124 (493): 317-321. 2015.
    A review of *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective* by Lynne Rudder Baker.
  •  43
    A defense of holistic representationalism
    Mind and Language 33 (2): 161-176. 2018.
    Representationalism holds that a perceptual experience's qualitative character is identical with certain of its representational properties. To date, most representationalists endorse atomistic theories of perceptual content, according to which an experience's content, and thus character, does not depend on its relations to other experiences. David Rosenthal, by contrast, proposes a view that is naturally construed as a version of representationalism on which experiences’ relations to one anothe…Read more
  •  42
    In his paper “There It Is” and his précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory functi…Read more
  •  42
    Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate?
    Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2): 632-635. 2012.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that …Read more
  •  27
    How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists
    Dialogue 56 (3): 503-526. 2017.
    According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power o…Read more
  •  18
    A fun piece discussing the challenges to and prospects of building machines that are able to produce and understand natural language.