•  8
    Dignity’s constitution: a reply
    Jurisprudence 11 (2): 298-308. 2020.
    I am deeply grateful to Nicole Roughan for overseeing this symposium and to Alon Harel, Stephen Riley, Julian Sempill, Alec Stone Sweet, and Ionna Tourkochoriti for their insightful engagements wit...
  •  9
    The Principles of Constitutional Reform
    Kantian Review 24 (4): 631-651. 2019.
    In legal orders around the world, commitments to democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism are increasingly eroding. Although political and constitutional theorists often lament this trend, they invariably adopt frameworks that are indifferent to these commitments. My aims in this article are both critical and constructive. As a critical matter, I will expose the indifference of the leading political and constitutional theories to the emergence, maintenance and refinement of liberal democratic…Read more
  •  23
    If there is one point on which defenders and critics of the doctrine of proportionality agree, it is that Dworkin's rights as trumps model stands as a radical alternative to the doctrine. Those who are sympathetic to proportionality reject the rights as trumps model for failing to acknowledge that there are conditions under which a right may be justifiably infringed. In turn, those who regard rights as trumps reject the doctrine of proportionality for failing to take rights seriously. This paper…Read more
  •  55
    Kant on Citizenship and Universal Independence
    Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33. 2008.
    Kant's political philosophy draws a distinction between 'passive' citizens who are merely protected by the law and 'active' citizens who may also contribute to it. Although the distinction between passive and active citizens is often dismissed by scholars as an 'illiberal and undemocratic' relic of eighteenth century prejudice, the distinction is found in every democracy that distinguishes between mere inhabitants -- such as tourists and guestworkers -- and enfranchised citizens. The purpose o…Read more
  •  40
    Permissive Laws and the Dynamism of Kantian Justice
    Law and Philosophy 33 (1): 105-136. 2014.
    If Kant’s theory of justice is known for one thing, it is for offering a vision of a perfectly just society that is utterly disconnected from the imperfect societies that we occupy. The purity of Kant’s account has attracted criticism from those who claim that if a theory of justice is to be practical, it must offer more than a vision of a perfectly just society. It must also explain how existing societies mired in injustice are to be brought into ever-closer conformity with the ideal that justi…Read more
  •  50
    The Juridical Significance of Kant's 'Supposed Right to Lie'
    Kantian Review 13 (1): 141-170. 2008.
    In his ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ Kant makes the astonishing claim that one is not entitled to lie even to save a friend from a murderer. This claim has been an embarrassment for Kant's defenders and an indication of Kant's excessive rigour for his detractors. Responses to SRL fall into three main groups. The first of these groups, that of Kant's critics, claim that SRL demonstrates that Kant's ethical views are so rigorous that they become abhorrent in practice. The second g…Read more
  • In an age of constitutional revolutions and reforms, theory and practice are moving in opposite directions. As a matter of constitutional practice, human dignity has emerged in jurisdictions around the world as the organizing idea of a groundbreaking paradigm. By reconfiguring constitutional norms, institutional structures and legal doctrines, this paradigm transforms human dignity from a mere moral claim into a legal norm that persons have standing to vindicate. As a matter of constitutional th…Read more
  •  24
    What can Kant Teach Us about Legal Classification?
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (1): 203-232. 2010.
    In Dimensions of Private Law, Professor Stephen Waddams describes the obstacles that an adequate classification of private law must overcome. The purpose of this essay is to offer a theoretical account of legal classification that explains how these obstacles can be overcome and what the resulting classification of private law might look like. I begin with the catalogue of obstacles that Waddams presents and argue that, because they are rooted in misconceptions about the classificatory project, …Read more