•  164
    Moral obligation, accountability, and second-personal reasons (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1): 237-245. 2010.
  •  24
    Responsibility and Normative Moral Theories
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 603-625. 2018.
    Stephen Darwall and R. Jay Wallace have independently argued that morality is essentially interpersonal by appealing to necessary connections between morality and responsibility. According to Darwall, morality is grounded in fundamentally second-personal accountability relations. On Wallace's view, a normative moral theory must say that agents’ attitudes towards the moral properties of their actions are reasons for responsibility reactions, which only relational moral theories can do. If either …Read more
  •  16
    Responsibility and Judgment
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2): 736-760. 2016.
    I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View. According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the reasons that…Read more
  • The Permissibility of the Atonement as Penal Substitution
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7 239-270. 2016.
  •  31
    Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation
    Faith and Philosophy 34 (3): 272-297. 2017.
    I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that …Read more
  •  33
    Forgiveness and Reconciliation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3): 531-545. 2020.
    I argue that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing. A victim is open to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing in vir...
  •  22
    I argue that it is in the philosophers’ best interest to rule Kallipolis because that life is the best available to them. Although the life of pure contemplation of the Forms would make them happiest, I make the case that, on Plato’s view, this life is not an option for them because of the essential psychological connections that he posits between the individual and the city. To make this argument, I first draw on Plato’s city/soul analogy to explore why it is in reason’s best interest to rule t…Read more
  •  9
    Entwining Thomistic and Anselmian Interpretations of the Atonement
    Faith and Philosophy 37 (4): 516-535. 2020.
    In Atonement, Eleonore Stump develops a novel and compelling Thomistic account of the atonement and argues that Anselmian interpretations must be rejected. In this review essay, after summarizing her account, we raise worries about some aspects of it. First, we respond to her primary objection to Anselmian interpretations by arguing that, contrary to Stump, love does not require unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Second, we suggest that the heart of Anselmian interpretations—that reconcil…Read more
  •  44
    Accountability and the thoughts in reactive attitudes
    Philosophical Studies 176 (12): 3121-3140. 2019.
    As object-directed emotions, reactive attitudes can be appropriate in the sense of fitting, where an emotion is fitting in virtue of accurately representing its target. I use this idea to argue for a theory of moral accountability: an agent S is accountable for an action A if and only if A expresses S’s quality of will and S has the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons. For the sake of argument, I assume that a reactive attitude is fitting if and only if its constituent thoughts ar…Read more
  •  297
    A common objection to particular views of attributability is that they fail to account for weakness of will. In this paper, I show that the problem of weakness of will is much deeper than has been recognized, extending to all views of attributability on offer because of the general form that these views take. The fundamental problem is this: current views claim that being attributionally responsible is a matter of exercising whatever capacity that they take to be relevant to attributability; how…Read more