•  200
    Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas
    Philosophical Review 119 (4): 411-447. 2010.
    Currently, the most popular views about how to update de se or self-locating beliefs entail the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem.2 Another widely held view is that an agent‘s credences should be countably additive.3 In what follows, I will argue that there is a deep tension between these two positions. For the assumptions that underlie the one-third solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem entail a more general principle, which I call the Generalized Thirder Principle, and there …Read more
  •  31
    Weighing Lives
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 663-666. 2007.
  •  28
    Weighing Lives
    Philosophical Review 116 (4): 663-666. 2007.
  •  33
    On Losing Disagreements: Spencer’s Attitudinal Relativism
    with Mark Schroeder
    Mind 125 (498): 541-551. 2016.
  •  78
    Repeatable Artwork Sentences and Generics
    In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects, Oxford University Press. pp. 125. 2013.
    We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses that…Read more
  •  1332
    Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2): 259-288. 2014.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a propo…Read more
  •  1081
    Reversibility or Disagreement
    Mind 122 (485): 43-84. 2013.
    The phenomenon of disagreement has recently been brought into focus by the debate between contextualists and relativist invariantists about epistemic expressions such as ‘might’, ‘probably’, indicative conditionals, and the deontic ‘ought’. Against the orthodox contextualist view, it has been argued that an invariantist account can better explain apparent disagreements across contexts by appeal to the incompatibility of the propositions expressed in those contexts. This paper introduces an impor…Read more