James B. Stump

Alexandre Koyré was one of the most prominent historians of science of the twentieth century. The standard interpretation of Koyré is that he falls squarely within the internalist camp of historians of science—that he focuses on the history of the ideas themselves, eschewing cultural and sociological interpretations regarding the influence of ideologies and institutions on the development of science. When we read what Koyré has to say about his historical studies , we find him embracing and championing this Platonic view of his work. Ultimately I think this interpretation of Koyré's history of science is lopsided and in need of correction. I claim, rather, that a careful reading of Koyré's work suggests that a tension exists between internal and external methodological considerations. The external considerations stem from Koyré's commitment to the unity of human thought and the influence he admits that the ‘transscientifiques’ have on the development of science. I suggest in conclusion then, that if we are to put a philosophical label on his work, rather than ‘Platonist’, as has been the custom, ‘Hegelian’ makes a better fit

The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by communities. It becomes much more difficult on this antiessentialism position to identify and dismiss pseudo‐science. I suggest we might find a way forward, though, by engaging a philosophical tradition that has largely been neglected in English‐speaking science and religion studies, and by articulating a theory of consensus along the lines of Oreskes (2019).

This dissertation examines the relationship between metaphysics and the interpretation of physical theories. It is argued that the interpreters of physical theory rely on accepted metaphysical theories for justification and inspiration; and that reciprocally, the acceptance of metaphysical theories is dependent upon the authority of a successful physical theory. Furthermore, this reciprocal influence---or dialectic---can be seen as a systematic occurrence throughout the development of physical theory. ;In Part One, the thesis is developed through a charitable reading and careful critique of the principal works of four twentieth century thinkers who have given attention to the relationship between metaphysics and physical science: Pierre Duhem, Emile Meyerson, E. A. Burtt, and Alexandre Koyre. A separate chapter is devoted to each thinker with the aim of determining how their interpretations are similar to and different from the theory being proposed. ;Part Two is devoted to a historical substantiation of the dialectic thesis. From roughly 1600 to 1850, the dialectic between metaphysics and the interpretation of physical theory is charted through seven stages under chapter headings of Matter, Force, and Energy. These stages include discussions of the reemergence of corpuscular ontology, Newton's Principia, force as basic ontology, equations of the conservation of force, the idea of the unity of nature as manifested in the conversion of natural forces, and the conservation of energy. Throughout these discussions, the influence of scientific developments on certain facets of the concepts of substance and causality is noted in the work of philosophers like Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. ;It is not maintained that the metaphysics of one stage was alone sufficient for the development of the interpretation of the physical theory of the next---or vice versa. Instead, the metaphysics and/or physical theory of a stage are constraining or regulating factors which govern but do not determine further development. Furthermore, the dialectic takes place within a context of other beliefs which further influences it. In conclusion, the perspectival character of rationality which emerges from the dialectic thesis is discussed