University of Glasgow
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1989
Portland, Oregon, United States of America
  •  9
    Determinism, Death, and Meaning
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Determinism is usually presented as the empirical and contingent thesis that every event has a causally necessitating condition. However, Stephen Maitzen holds it as an a priori and necessary truth...
  •  1
    Hume's moral sentimentalism
    In Angela Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), _The Humean Mind_, Routledge. 2019.
  •  95
    The recognition of nothingness
    Philosophical Studies 177 (9): 2585-2603. 2020.
    I describe a distinctive kind of fear that is generated by a vivid recognition of one’s mortal nature. I name it ‘existential shock’. This special fear does not take our future annihilation as any kind of harm, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. One puzzling feature of existential shock is that it is experienced as disclosing an important truth, yet attempts to specify this revelatory content bring us back to familiar facts about one’s inevitable death. But how can I discover something that I alrea…Read more
  •  4
    Quine on Translation and Meaning
    Cogito 10 (3): 199-204. 1996.
  •  11
    The Structure of Medical Revolutions
    Cogito 2 (1): 27-29. 1988.
  • Olson, ET-The Human Animal
    Philosophical Books 39 58-60. 1998.
  •  57
    Finger-scratchin’ good
    The Philosophers' Magazine 15 (15): 19-20. 2001.
  • PENELHUM, T.-Themes in Hume
    Philosophical Books 44 (1): 64-64. 2003.
  •  17
    Identity, relation r, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 263-267. 1996.
    This paper offers a challenge to Derek Parfit's thesis that one ought to have no preference between these two otherwise identical situations: 1. I continue to go on living as before, and 2. I do not survive, but am replaced by a duplicate, psychologically continuous to my present self (i.e. an R‐related duplicate). I point out that virtually all psychologically normal persons regard some inanimate objects as being ‘irreplaceable’ (such that no copy could adequately substitute). I then propose th…Read more
  •  40
  •  76
    Recent work on personal identity
    Philosophical Books 34 (4): 193-206. 1993.
  •  237
    Personal identity and mental content
    Philosophical Psychology 10 (3): 323-33. 1997.
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do no…Read more
  •  5
    Finger-scratchin’ good
    The Philosophers' Magazine 15 19-20. 2001.
  •  104
    There cannot be two omnipotent beings
    with Jason Hagen
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 64 (1). 2008.
    We argue that there is no metaphysically possible world with two or more omnipotent beings, due to the potential for conflicts of will between them. We reject the objection that omnipotent beings could exist in the same world when their wills could not conflict. We then turn to Alfred Mele and M.P. Smith’s argument that two coexisting beings could remain omnipotent even if, on some occasions, their wills cancel each other out so that neither can bring about what they intend. We argue that this a…Read more
  •  42
    Quine on translation and meaning
    Cogito 10 (3): 199-204. 1996.
  •  57
    Identity, survival, and sortal concepts
    Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159): 183-194. 1990.
  •  5
    Book reviews (review)
    Mind 102 (406): 349-353. 1993.
  •  110
    What matters in survival?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 255-61. 1993.
    I examine Derek Parfit’s claim that it doesn’t matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable val…Read more
  •  95
    Split brains and single minds
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 11-18. 1991.
    This paper challenges the widely held theory that split-brain patients have ‘two-minds’ and can thus be described as being two distinct persons. A distinction is made between the singularity of mind and the coherence of mind. It is stressed that ‘a single mind’ is not something posited to explain coherence among mental contents, but is merely a mark that such coherence holds to a certain degree. However, there is no sharp dividing line regarding what counts as a single mind. It is argued that me…Read more
  •  15
    Hume on morality
    Routledge. 2000.
    David Hume (1711-76) is one of the greatest figures in the history of British philosophy. Of all of Hume's writings, the philosophically most profound is undoubtedly his first, A Treatise on Human Nature. Hume on Morality introduces and assesses: Hume's life and the background of the Treatise ; the ideas and text in the Treatise ; and Hume's continuing importance to philosophy. James Baillie provides us with a map to Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, focusing on Hume's theory of the passions and mo…Read more
  •  53
    The Case for Dualism
    Philosophical Books 32 (2): 113-114. 1991.
  •  67
    New Problems for Religious Pluralism
    Philo 13 (1): 5-17. 2010.
    John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism posits the same ineffable spiritual reality, ‘the Real,’ as the source of all major religious traditions. He offers pluralism as the best explanation of salvific parity, the thesis that these religions are equally effective vehicles for salvation. Most criticisms of Hick have focused on the explanans, arguing that the Real cannot play any explanatory role due to its ineffability. I raise two difficulties for the explanandum, the thesis of salvific parity…Read more
  •  16
    Contemporary analytic philosophy
    Prentice-Hall. 2003.
    This self-contained anthology collects some of the most influential primary source contributions to contemporary analytic philosophy, together with introductions and commentaries for each selection. It traces the development of a few central themes in analytic philosophy, in sufficient detail—from philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein. Logical Empiricism. Ordinary Language Philosophy. Quine. Truth, Meaning, and In…Read more
  •  12
    What Matters in Survival?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3): 255-261. 1993.
    I examine Derek Parfit's claim that it doesn't matter whether he survives in the future, if someone survives who is psychologically connected to him by “Relation R.” Thus, were his body to perish and be replaced by an exact duplicate, both physically and psychologically identical to him, this would be just as good as “ordinary” survival. Parfit takes the corollary view that replacement of loved ones by exact duplicates is no loss. In contrast, Peter Unger argues that we place nontransferable val…Read more
  •  14
    Split Brains and Single Minds
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 11-18. 1991.
    This paper challenges the widely held theory that split-brain patients have ‘two-minds’ and can thus be described as being two distinct persons. A distinction is made between the singularity of mind and the coherence of mind. It is stressed that ‘a single mind’ is not something posited to explain coherence among mental contents, but is merely a mark that such coherence holds to a certain degree. However, there is no sharp dividing line regarding what counts as a single mind. It is argued that me…Read more
  •  11
    Problems in Philosophy
    Philosophical Books 36 (4): 262-265. 1995.
  •  18
    Identity, Consciousness and Value
    Philosophical Books 33 (1): 42-44. 1992.