•  109
    Literally Like a Different Person: Context and Concern in Personal Identity
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (4): 387-404. 2015.
    It is not the case that there is only one literal sense of “same person.” When presented in different contexts, “she is/is not the same person” can have different answers concerning the same entity or set of entities across the same period of time. This is because: Persons are composed of many parts, and different parts have different persistence conditions. This follows from a reductionist view of the self. When we ask about sameness of persons, or “personal identity,” we are asking because of …Read more
  •  71
    Knowledge, Understanding, and Pedagogy
    Teaching Philosophy 37 (3): 321-342. 2014.
    One can have a justified, true belief without much understanding of the proposition believed. This would be a low-value form of knowledge; for example, knowing that it is true that E = mc2 without understanding what it would mean for these things to be equal. Pedagogically, we seek to instill not bare knowledge of the JTB variety, but a form of knowledge that includes the ability to rephrase a claim, relate it to other claims, draw conclusions from it, and make practical use of it. This would be…Read more