•  132
    Epistemological Practice and the Internalism/Externalism Debate
    Facta Philosophica 7 (2): 283-291. 2005.
    The dialogue between internalists who maintain a belief is a case of knowledge when that which justifies the belief is within the agent's first-person perspective and externalists who maintain epistemic justification can be in part, or entirely, outside the agent's first-person perspective has been part of the epistemological literature for some time with one side usually attempting to show how the other side is mistaken. Edward Craig argues the internalist/externalist debate is flawed from the…Read more
  •  115
    Intuitions are funny things. Intuitions would seem to be these fluid, temporary mental states that we form minute by minute. On the face of it, they would seem to have no real value. But, when we ask whether a particular theory is true, we usually turn to our intuitions. This is nowhere more prevalent than in moral theorizing. When we attempt to show that a particular moral theory is mistaken, we usually present cases that yield counterintuitive results for the theory. For example, take th…Read more
  •  97
    The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions
    Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1): 197-204. 1999.
    It is all too common in philosophy to claim that a particular philosophical theory is mistaken because it fails to coincide with most philosophers' or normal inquirers' intuitions as represented in a particular case or counterexample. This suggests, as Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust point out, that our intuitions provide a sort of evidential basis for particular theories. Yet, the question remains as to whether this assessment is correct, and, if it is, whose intuitions (either those trained within…Read more
  •  82
    Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2): 193-211. 2004.
    Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what the concept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problemat…Read more
  •  61
    The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, and the Morality of Bluffing
    Contemporary Philosophy (5&6): 55-60. 2003.
    Bluffing is essentially nothing more than a type of deception. But, despite its morally questionable foundation, it is not only permissible in certain contexts, but sometimes encouraged and/or required (e.g., playing poker). Yet, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to bluff in other contexts – particularly everyday situations. In this paper, I look at László Mérő’s argument – one based in game theory and Kantian ethics – to the end that bluffing is morally permissible in ever…Read more
  •  47
    Epistemological Expertise and the Problem of Epistemic Assessment
    Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (1): 125-133. 2007.
    How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson needs to be in a posi…Read more
  •  35
    Reproductive Reasons and Procreative Duty
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (1): 67-74. 2013.
    Debates on procreative liberty usually surround the issue of whether it is permissible to not bring a child into existence. However, some argue that, under certain conditions, there is an obligation to bring a child (or even as many children as possible) into existence. This position, I will call the procreative duty stance, is argued for in two general ways—obligations arising from the extinction of the human species and obligations arising from personal reasons which override the reluctance of…Read more
  •  31
    Review of "Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 15 (2): 359-363. 2014.
    Book review of Nicholas Agar's Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits
  •  25
    While there are numerous questions that the having of children raise, there is one that philosophers should be particularly concerned with – “What is the good reason for the having of children?” Recently, Jeff Mitchell has given a deontological answer to this question (Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, NO. 5 & 6, Sept/Oct & Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 42-46). His answer is based on the moral function of the having of children. He claims that parenthood is a “moral calling” and that one should heed th…Read more
  •  22
    Issue Introduction
    Essays in Philosophy 13 (1): 1-5. 2012.
    Introduction to a volume on Philosophical Methodology. Edited by James McBain
  •  22
    Philosophical Stances and Epistemic Levels
    Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2): 39-41. 2015.
  •  21
    Epistemological Expertise and the Problem of Epistemic Assessment
    Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (1): 125-133. 2007.
    How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson needs to be in a posi…Read more
  •  6
    Review of "The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility" (review)
    Essays in Philosophy 17 (1): 256-262. 2016.
  •  1
    Shockingly Limited
    In Luke Cuddy (ed.), BioShock and Philosophy, Wiley. 2015.
    At the end of BioShock Infinite, Booker is faced with the challenge of not allowing the tragedy to befall Columbia. There has to be a way, he believes, to prevent the rise of Father Comstock, the imprisonment and abuse of Elizabeth, and the creation of a Columbia that persecutes people for both religious and racial reasons. Booker's action is predicated on the necessity of Booker becoming Comstock. Elizabeth takes Booker back to Father Comstock's creation and it is revealed that Comstock's comin…Read more