James P. Sterba

In this unique work, James P. Sterba argues that traditional ethics has yet to confront the three significant challenges posed by environmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism. He maintains that while traditional ethics has been quite successful at dealing with the problems it faces, it has not addressed the possibility that its solutions to these problems are biased in favor of humans, men, and Western culture. In Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism, Sterba examines each of these challenges. In the case of environmentalism, he argues that traditional ethics must incorporate conflict resolution principles that favor nonhumans over humans in a significant range of cases. In terms of feminism, he maintains that traditional ethics should rule out gendered family structures and implement an ideal of androgyny. In regard to multiculturalism, he contends that traditional ethics must endorse an ethics that is secular in character and that can survive an extensive comparative evaluation of both Western and non-Western moral ideals and cultures. The only textbook devoted to this topic, Three Challenges to Ethics is an engaging text for introductory courses in ethics and moral problems and is also interesting and provocative reading for scholars and general readers.

Marxist social contract theory gives rise to an unwelcome dilemma for would-Be contractarians. For either the state of nature choice situation confronting the parties to the social contract will be defined to include or to exclude the knowledge of the general facts of class conflict. But if, On the one hand, The state of nature choice situation is defined to include such knowledge (particularly the knowledge of the fundamental conflict between the proletariat and capitalist classes), Then it could be argued that no agreement would be reached, And hence, No conception of justice would be chosen at all. And if, On the other hand, The state of nature choice situation is defined to exclude such knowledge, Then it could be argued that only an inadequate conception of justice tailored to the interests of the most advantaged classes would be chosen. What the author shows in this paper is that whatever the effectiveness of this dilemma when employed against various classical social contract theories, It cannot be employed with similar effect against a social contract theory that utilizes a rawlsian veil of ignorance

Professor Hill delivered these comments as part of the International Society for Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental Virtue Ethics, held at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, April 2000, in Albuquerque, NM Philip Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics” appears in Environmental Ethics 23(2001), 3-17. Geoffrey Frasz’s paper “What is Environmental Virtue Ethics That We Should Be Mindful of It?” is published as part of this special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary World.

As with the first edition, Utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian viewpoints are all well represented here, and this second edition features updated sections throughout—including eighteen new readings—and an entirely new section on multiculturalism. Presents students with a unique focus on three main challenges to ethics: feminism, environmentalism, and multiculturalism Pedagogical focus on the 'big questions' motivates student interest Collects readings on all key traditional theoretical and practical questions in ethics

Biocentrists are criticized (1) for being biased in favor of the human species, (2) for basing their view on an ecology that is now widely challenged, and (3) for failing to reasonably distinguish the life that they claim has intrinsic value from the animate and inanimate things that they claim lack intrinsic value. In this paper, I show how biocentrism can be defended against these three criticisms, thus permitting biocentrists to justifiably appropriate the salutation, “Let the life force (or better the ethical demands of life) be with you.”

Contemporary philosophers offer three kinds of justification for morality. Some, following plato, claim that morality is justified by self-interest. Others, following hume as he is frequently interpreted, claim that morality is justified in terms of other-regarding interests, wants or intentions that people happen to have. And still others, following kant, claim that morality is justified in terms of the requirements of practical reason. In "the moral point of view" published in 1958 and in a series of articles continuing to the present, kurt baier has defended this third sort of justification for morality. In this paper, after years of respectful opposition, i join forces with baier and argue that only a justification of this third sort can be fully adequate and then only when it is developed in a certain way. I begin by showing what is wrong or defective in the other justifications. Then i consider attempts by baier and others to elaborate the third sort of justification. Drawing upon their work, i present a justification based on the requirements of practical reason that succeeds in demonstrating that the rational egoist acts contrary to reason.

I begin with an account of what is deserved in human ethics, an ethics that assumes without argument that only humans, or rational agents, count morally. I then take up the question of whether nonhuman living beings are also deserving and answer it in the affirmative. Having established that all individual living beings, as well as ecosystems, are deserving, I go on to establish what it is that they deserve and then compare the requirements of global justice when only humans are taken into account with the requirements of global justice when all living beings are taken into account.

In this paper, I argue that even a libertarian ideal of liberty, which initially seems opposed to welfare rights, can be seen to require a right to a basic needs minimum that extends to distant peoples and future generations and is conditional upon the poor doing whatever they reasonably can to meet their own basic needs, including bringing their population growth under control. Given that, as I have argued elsewhere, welfare liberal, socialist, communitarian and feminist political ideals can be easily seen to support this same right to a basic needs minimum, showing how a libertarian ideal of liberty supports the right should go a long way toward solving the problem of what all people, whether near or distant, present or future, deserve, which is the basic problem of global justice.

Philosophers who hold that religious considerations should play some role in public debate over fundamental issues have criticized Rawls’s ideal of public reason for being too restrictive in generally ruling out such considerations. In response, Rawls has modified his ideal so as to explicitly allow a role for religious considerations in public debate (others, such as Robert Audi, have also offered accounts of public reason along similar lines). Nevertheless, some critics of Rawls’s ideal of public reason, such as Nicholas Wolterstorff, remain unsatisfied. In this paper, I will argue that once Rawls’s ideal of public reason is correctly interpreted, it will be possible to reconcile that ideal with much of the role its critics want religion to have in public debate

Libertarianism has long been known for its opposition to a right to welfare, In this paper, I will oppose this view of libertarianism, maintaining that the libertarian’s own ideal of liberty requires just such a right to welfare. I begin by showing that there are conflicts of negative liberty between the rich and the poor. I then argue that when these conflicts are evaluated by the “ought “ implies “can” principle, the liberty of the poor has priority over the liberty of the rich, and it is this priority that provides the grounds for a right to welfare. Along the way, I argue that there are not two interpretations of libertarianism - an ideal based versionand a rights-based version - but only one and this interpretation supports a right to welfare.

Does feminism give a much-needed voice to women in a patriarchal world? Or is the world not really patriarchal? Has feminism begun to level the playing field in a world in which women are more often paid less at work and abused at home? Or are women paid equally for the same work and not abused more at home? Does feminism support equality in education and in the military, or does it discriminate against men by ignoring such issues as male-only draft registration and boys lagging behind in school? The only book of its kind, this volume offers a sharp, lively, and provocative debate on the impact of feminism on men. Warren Farrell--an international best-selling author and leader in both the early women's and current men's movements--praises feminism for opening options for women but criticizes it for demonizing men, distorting data, and undervaluing the family. In response, James P. Sterba--an acclaimed philosopher and ardent advocate of feminism--maintains that the feminist movement gives a long-neglected voice to women in a male-dominated world and that men are not an oppressed gender in today's America. Their wide-ranging debate covers personal issues, from love, sex, dating, and rape to domestic violence, divorce, and child custody. Farrell and Sterba also look through their contrasting lenses at systemic issues, from the school system to the criminal justice system; from the media to the military; and from health care to the workplace. A perfect book to get students thinking and debating, Does Feminism Discriminate Against Men? A Debate is ideal for courses in gender studies, sociology, psychology, economics, feminist philosophy, and contemporary moral issues. It is also compelling reading for anyone interested in the future of men and women.