Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States
  •  236
    Rorty on Realism and Constructivism
    Metaphilosophy 36 (3): 272-294. 2005.
    This article argues that we can and should recognize the mind dependence, epistemic dependence, and social dependence of theories of mind-independent reality, as opposed to Rorty, who thinks not even a constructivist theory of mind-independent reality can be had. It accuses Rorty of creating an equivocation or "dualism of scheme and content" between causation and justification based on various "Davidsonian" irrelevancies, not to be confused with the actual Davidson. These include the 'principle …Read more
  •  194
    Assessing Freeman’s Stakeholder Theory
    Journal of Business Ethics 87 (3). 2009.
    At least since the publication of the monumental Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984), the “stakeholder theory” originated by R. E. Freeman has engrossed much of the business ethics literature. Subsequently, some advocates have moved a bit too quickly and without proper definition or argument. They have exceeded Freeman’s intentions which are more libertarian and free-market than is often thought. This essay focuses on the versions of stakeholder theory directly authored or coauth…Read more
  •  143
    On “bettering humanity” in science and engineering education
    Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (2): 265-273. 2007.
    Authors such as Krishnasamy Selvan argue that “all human endeavors including engineering and science” have a single primary objective: “bettering humanity.” They favor discussing “the history of science and measurement uncertainty.” This paper respectfully disagrees and argues that “human endeavors including engineering and science” should not pursue “bettering humanity” as their primary objective. Instead these efforts should first pursue individual betterment. One cannot better humanity withou…Read more
  •  89
    Understanding Engineering Professionalism: A Reflection on the Rights of Engineers
    Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (1): 149-169. 2011.
    Engineering societies such as the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) and associated entities have defined engineering and professionalism in such a way as to require the benefit of humanity (NSPE 2009a, Engineering Education Resource Document. NSPE Position Statements. Governmental Relations). This requirement has been an unnecessary and unfortunate add-on. The trend of the profession to favor the idea of requiring the benefit of humanity for professionalism violates an engineer’s…Read more
  •  86
    Clearing Up the Egoist Difficulty with Loyalty
    Journal of Business Ethics 63 (1): 75-87. 2006.
    This paper seeks to analyze and to motivate a trend toward virtue ethics and away from deontology in the business ethics account of organizational loyalty. Prevailing authors appeal to “transcendent” values (deontology), skepticism (there is no loyalty), or Aristotelianism (loyalty is seeking mutual self-interest). I argue that the “Aristotelian” view clears up the “egoist” difficulty with loyalty. Briefly, critics feel we must “transcend,” “replace,” “overcome” and most especially sacrifice sel…Read more
  •  63
    A critique of positive responsibility in computing
    Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (2): 219-233. 2008.
    It has been claimed that (1) computer professionals should be held responsible for an undisclosed list of “undesirable events” associated with their work and (2) most if not all computer disasters can be avoided by truly understanding responsibility. Programmers, software developers, and other computer professionals should be defended against such vague, counterproductive, and impossible ideals because these imply the mandatory satisfaction of social needs and the equation of ethics with a kind …Read more
  •  57
    Moral Realism and Kantian Constructivism
    Ratio Juris 19 (4): 402-420. 2006.
    . This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont makes about “the validity of social norms” and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism
  •  29
    The Morality of Corporate Downsizing
    Business and Professional Ethics Journal 23 (3): 61-76. 2004.
  •  27
    Response to commentators of “a critique of positive responsibility”
    Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (1): 11-18. 2009.
    It has been claimed that (1) computer professionals should be held responsible for an undisclosed list of “undesirable events” associated with their work and (2) most if not all computer disasters can be avoided by truly understanding responsibility. Commentators of “A Critique of Positive Responsibility in Computing” argue that this is not Donald Gotterbarn’s view (Gotterbarn, JSEE 14(2):235–239, 2008) but that a critique of the view nevertheless raises significant moral issues within computing…Read more
  •  23
    Assessing Freeman’s Stakeholder Theory
    Journal of Business Ethics 87 (3): 401-414. 2009.
    At least since the publication of the monumental Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, the "stakeholder theory" originated by R. E. Freeman has engrossed much of the business ethics literature. Subsequently, some advocates have moved a bit too quickly and without proper definition or argument. They have exceeded Freeman's intentions which are more libertarian and free-market than is often thought. This essay focuses on the versions of stakeholder theory directly authored or coauthored by…Read more
  • Toward a Constructivist Theory of Realism
    Dissertation, Temple University. 2004.
    This dissertation does not argue for a particular theory of realism. It seeks to clear the ground for such a theory by clarifying the distinction between realism and reality. Realism is not reality. 'Realism' stands for theories that describe reality and how it exists mind-independently. I argue that much recent writing on realism misses the import of this distinction and proceeds "anti-philosophically." While some statements refer uncontroversially to an accepted state of affairs, others amplif…Read more