•  7
    Polygene Risk Scores
    Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1). 2023.
    This paper explores the interpretation and use of polygenic risk scores (PRSs). We argue that PRSs generally do not directly embody causal information. Nonetheless, they can assist us in tracking other causal relationships concerning genetic effects. Although their purely predictive/correlational use is important, it is this tracking feature that contributes to their potential usefulness in other applications, such as genetic dissection, and their use as controls, which allow us, indirectly, to …Read more
  •  12
    Polygene risk scores and randomized experiments
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.
    We explore Madole & Harden's (2022) suggestion that single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)/trait correlations are analogous to randomized experiments and thus can be given a causal interpretation.
  • Agency and Interventionist Theories
    In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press. 2009.
  •  2
    Explanation
    In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell. 2002.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The DN Model The SR Model The Causal Mechanical Model Unificationist Models Conclusion and Directions for Future Work.
  •  30
    Photon consciousness: Fact or fancy? (review)
    with André de Klerk, Gail Kahler, Kathrine Leber, Peter Pompei, Daniel Schultz, and Sharon Stern
    Foundations of Physics 2 (2-3): 241-244. 1972.
    An experiment designed to test the highly speculative hypothesis of photon consciousness was executed. It was found that, within the accuracy attainable with the apparatus, there is no empirical justification for the hypothesis
  •  15
    The Schuster-Blackett (S-B) conjecture, which supposes the relationshipM/J=βG 1/2 /2c between the magnetic dipole moments (M) of celestial objects and their angular momenta (J), where G is the Newtonian constant of gravitation, c the speed of light, and β a dimensionless constant of order unity, is examined in the context of the evolution of pulsar gyromagnetic ratios. It is demonstrated that the evolution of pulsar gyromagnetic ratios is not consistent with the strong form of the S-B conjecture…Read more
  •  47
    Mach's principle, the equivalence principle and gravitation: A rejoinder to Newburgh
    with Wolfgang Yourgrau
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3): 264-270. 1973.
  •  54
    Electrogravitational induction and rotation
    Foundations of Physics 12 (5): 467-478. 1982.
    The Faradayan hypothesis of inductive coupling of the electromagnetic and gravitational fields is briefly discussed. An experiment designed to test the hypothesis wherein samples are spun to see if any electrogravitational charge is induced is described. Results of the experiment are reported. They imply the induction of a charge density ρ* for spinning samples that behaves as ρ*=βρma, where ρm is the mass density of an element of matter experiencing an acceleration a, and β is the coupling coef…Read more
  •  66
    Critical notice: Causality by Judea Pearl
    Economics and Philosophy 19 (2): 321-340. 2003.
    This is a wonderful book; indeed, it is easily one of the most important and creative books I have ever read on the subject of causation and causal inference. Causality is impressive on many levels and should be of great interest to many different audiences. Philosophers will find of particular interest Pearl's defense of what might be described as a broadly manipulationist or interventionist treatment of causation: Causal claims have to do with what would happen under ideal, suitably surgical e…Read more
  •  223
    Hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) provide an account of Bayesian inference in a hierarchically structured hypothesis space. Scientific theories are plausibly regarded as organized into hierarchies in many cases, with higher levels sometimes called ‘paradigms’ and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. Therefore, HBMs provide a useful model for scientific theory change, showing how higher‐level theory change may be driven by the impact of evidence on lower levels. HBMs capt…Read more
  •  61
    Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
    with Guy Grinfeld, David Lagnado, Tobias Gerstenberg, and Marius Usher
    Frontiers in Psychology 11 1069. 2020.
    How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor -- the robustness of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome -- influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase with robustn…Read more
  •  82
    What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account
    Philosophy of Science 69 (S3). 2002.
    This paper presents a counterfactual account of what a mechanism is. Mechanisms consist of parts, the behavior of which conforms to generalizations that are invariant under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible in principle to change the behavior of one part independently of the others. Each of these features can be captured by the truth of certain counterfactuals.
  •  55
    Modeling interventions in multi-level causal systems: supervenience, exclusion and underdetermination
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4): 1-34. 2022.
    This paper explores some issues concerning how we should think about interventions (in the sense of unconfounded manipulations) of "upper-level" variables in contexts in which these supervene on but are not identical with lower-level realizers. It is argued that we should reject the demand that interventions on upper-level variables must leave their lower-level realizers unchanged– a requirement that within an interventionist framework would imply that upper-level variables are causally inert. I…Read more
  •  55
    Counterfactuals in the Real World
    In James Robert Brown, Shaoshi Chen, Robert M. Corless, Ernest Davis, Nicolas Fillion, Max Gunzburger, Benjamin C. Jantzen, Daniel Lichtblau, Yuri Matiyasevich, Robert H. C. Moir, Mark Wilson & James Woodward (eds.), Algorithms and Complexity in Mathematics, Epistemology, and Science: Proceedings of 2015 and 2016 Acmes Conferences, Springer New York. pp. 269-294. 2019.
    Following Jacques Hadamard, applied mathematicians typically investigate their models in the form of well-set problems, which actually consist of a family of applicational circumstances that vary in specific ways with respect to their initial and boundary values. The chief motive for investigating models in this wider manner is to avoid the improper behavioral conclusions one might reach from the consideration of a more restricted range of cases. Suitable specifications of the required initial a…Read more
  •  207
    Counterfactuals all the way down? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9437-9 Authors Jim Woodward, History and Philosophy of Science, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA Barry Loewer, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA John W. Carroll, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USA Marc Lange, Department of Philosophy, University of Nor…Read more
  •  12
    1. Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation Not a Sure Thing: Fitness, Probability, and Causation (pp. 147-171) (review)
    with Denis M. Walsh, Leah Henderson, Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Hannes Leitgeb, Richard Pettigrew, Brad Weslake, and John Kulvicki
    Philosophy of Science 77 (2): 172-200. 2010.
    Hierarchical Bayesian models provide an account of Bayesian inference in a hierarchically structured hypothesis space. Scientific theories are plausibly regarded as organized into hierarchies in many cases, with higher levels sometimes called ‘paradigms’ and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. Therefore, HBMs provide a useful model for scientific theory change, showing how higher-level theory change may be driven by the impact of evidence on lower levels. HBMs capture fea…Read more
  •  5
    Review: Laws and Causes (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4). 1990.
  •  11
    The past few decades have seen an explosion of research on causal reasoning in philosophy, computer science, and statistics, as well as descriptive work in psychology. In Causation with a Human Face, James Woodward integrates these lines of research and argues for an understanding of how each can inform the other: normative ideas can suggest interesting experiments, while descriptive results can suggest important normative concepts. Woodward's overall framework builds on the interventionist trea…Read more
  •  38
    Irreversible (One-hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation
    Philosophy of Science 89 (5): 889-898. 2022.
    This paper explores a distinction among causal relationships that has yet to receive attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or irreversible. We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on whether the causation involved is reversible.
  •  24
    Hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) provide an account of Bayesian inference in a hierarchically structured hypothesis space. Scientific theories are plausibly regarded as organized into hierarchies in many cases, with higher levels sometimes called ‘para- digms’ and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. Therefore, HBMs provide a useful model for scientific theory change, showing how higher-level theory change may be driven by the impact of evidence on lower levels. HBMs ca…Read more
  •  64
    Downward Causation Defended
    In Jan Voosholz & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Top-Down Causation and Emergence, Springer Verlag. pp. 217-251. 2021.
    This paper defends the notion of downward causation. I will seek to elucidate this notion, explain why it is a useful way of thinking, and respond to criticisms attacking its intelligibility. My account of downward causation will be in many respects similar to the account recently advanced by Ellis. The overall framework I will adopt is the interventionist treatment of causation I have defended elsewhere: X causes Y when Y changes under a suitable manipulation of X. When X is at a higher “level”…Read more