•  153
    Population and Having Children Now
    Journal of Practical Ethics 5 (2): 49-61. 2017.
    This paper aims to state the obvious – the commonsense, rational approach to child-producing. We have no general obligation to promote either the “general happiness” or the equalization of this and that. We have children if we want them, if their life prospects are decent – and if we can afford them, which is a considerable part of their life prospects being OK – and provided that in doing so we do not inflict injury on others. It’s extremely difficult to do this latter, but affording them, in r…Read more
  •  464
    Resolving the Debate on Libertarianism and Abortion
    Libertarian Papers 8 267-272. 2016.
    I take issue with the view that libertarian theory does not imply any particular stand on abortion. Liberty is the absence of interference with people’s wills—interests, wishes, and desires. Only entities that have such are eligible for the direct rights of libertarian theory. Foetuses do not; and if aborted, there is then no future person whose rights are violated. Hence the “liberal” view of abortion: women (especially) may decide whether to bear the children they have conceived. Birth is a go…Read more
  • David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (review)
    Philosophy in Review 7 269-272. 1987.
  •  9
    Silverstein on egoism and universalizability
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3). 1969.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  • J.R. Lucas, On Justice (review)
    Philosophy in Review 2 27-29. 1982.
  •  251
    Utilitarianism and formalism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1): 58-72. 1965.
    No abstract
  •  150
    Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today’s World
    The Journal of Ethics 8 (4): 305-348. 2004.
    This article argues that there is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the world, apart from the special case where some become wealthy by theft or fraud. The nearest thing we have to a rational morality for all has to be built on the interests of all, and they include substantial freedoms, but not substantial entitlements to others' assistance. It is also pointed out that the situation of the world's poor is not that of victi…Read more
  •  6
    Pacifism: A Comment on Beehler's Note
    Dialogue 11 (4): 588-591. 1972.
  •  12
    Charles Taylor., The Ethics of Authenticity
    International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2): 147-148. 1994.
  •  44
    Reply to Dworkin
    Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1): 41. 1983.
    My main complaint about Dworkin's papers on equality was that he had not said much by way of arguing for it. His intriguing response to this request provides a good start, and I shall confine this brief, further comment to what he says on that basic subject. Space considerations, alas, require me to ignore the other parts of his discussion. Dworkin distinguishes what he calls the “abstract egalitarian thesis” from his particular version of equalitarianism, equality of resources. His strategy is …Read more
  •  90
    Is pacifism consistent?
    Ethics 78 (2): 148-150. 1968.
  •  675
    The nature and value of rights
    Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (4): 243-260. 1970.
  •  1
    Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (review)
    Philosophy in Review 5 382-385. 1985.
  •  25
    On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (sup1): 195-211. 1986.
    (1986). On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 195-211
  • Rights and Utilitarianism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 5 (n/a): 137. 1979.
  •  2
    Have We A Right to Non-discrimination?
    In D. Poff & W. Waluchow (eds.), Business Ethics in Canada, . pp. 183-199. 1987.
  • Critical Notice
    Mind 81 (322). 1972.
  •  8
    Future people and us
    In Richard I. Sikora & Brian M. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations, White Horse Press. pp. 38--60. 1978.
  •  27
    The "Invisible Hand"
    Journal of Business Ethics 46 (3). 2003.
    The argument of the "Invisible Hand" is that the system of free enterprise benefits society in general even though it is not the aim of any particular economic agent to do that. This article proposes an analysis of why this is so. The key is that the morality of the market forbids only force and fraud; it does not require people to do good to others. Nevertheless, when all transactions are voluntary to both parties, that is exactly what we can expect to happen. This is both because the sum of th…Read more
  •  29
    Etica E Politica 5 (2): 1-14. 2003.
    This essay addresses the on-going controversy between supporters of minimal government, or minarchists, and supporters of no government, or anarchists. Both lay claim to the Libertarian principle, which holds that the only justification for the use of force is to deal with aggressive force initiated by someone else. Both agree that force is justified in dealing with aggressors. The only question is, who wields it, and how? The essay explains, briefly, the role of private property in all this. Pr…Read more
  • Addressing Some Critics
    Reason Papers 23 109-116. 1998.
  •  45
    Aesthetics, Charity, Utility, and Distributive Justice
    The Monist 56 (4): 527-551. 1972.
    As I sit down to begin this essay, the strains of “Tristan und Isolde” are still ringing in my ears; meanwhile, another dozen or so Pakistanian refugees have died for lack of sufficient food, shelter, or medical attention, probably, during the time it will have taken to compose this paragraph. The Isolde in that performance commanded, probably, a fee of four or five thousand dollars; each member of the audience paid, on the average, perhaps ten dollars to see the performance. This works out, pro…Read more
  •  38
    When, if ever, do we aggregate? And why?: Jan Narveson
    Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 48-75. 2009.
    Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as equal to oneself in…Read more
  •  11
    Professor Filice’s Defense of Pacifism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 17 483-491. 1992.
  •  1
    Drugs and Responsibility
    In S. Luper-Foy C. Brown (ed.), Drugs, Morality, and the Law, Garland. pp. 3--24. 1994.