Jana Schultz

In this paper, I will first add some thoughts on Cambron-Goulet and Côté-Remy’s analysis of the tension in Plotinus’ and Porphyry’s philosophy between the concept of the soul as genderless and the conceptual link between the soul becoming vicious and the soul becoming effeminate. I will argue that—despite of the emancipatory impulses in their philosophies—both Plotinus and Porphyry stick to conceptual connections which are constitutive for patriarchic discourses, especially to the conceptual link between being human, being male and being rational which makes women “the other.” In the second part of my paper, I will discuss the question of whether the emphasis Plotinus and Porphyry put on the universal nature of the soul helps to explain why they suppress the hierarchy between souls born in male bodies and souls born in female bodies which Plato develops in the Timaeus. I will argue that there is nothing in Plotinus’ conception of the universal nature of soul which principally excludes a hierarchy between the souls of men and the souls of women, so that his emphasis of the universal nature of soul cannot explain his passing over the hierarchy of Plato’s Timaeus.

In his commentary on Plato’sParmenidesProclos describes the maternal and paternal contributions to reproduction as of equal value: The paternal seed furnishes potential λόγοι, the mother actualises them and so causes the reversion of the offspring. However, the definition of the mother as actualising cause is linked to the particular circumstances of conception in the sphere of nature. In general, Proclus bases his concept of femininity on the idea of a shared, but not equal activity by paternal and maternal causes. In the metaphysical sphere the maternal cause is distinguished by its inspiring activity, that is, it provokes the procession of powers that are permanently anchored in the father and so it enables the begetting of the offspring as an entity separate from the father. This activity involves a loss of perfection, which is the basis for a difference in value between the activities of the maternal and paternal causes.

Diotima, the priestess of Plato’s Symposium, is an important reference for Proclus’ thinking about the role of women in philosophical and religious practices. This character does not just offer Proclus an example for women’s ability to attain the same level of virtue than men, but she is also a model for the joint work of philosophical and religious practices. Thereby she stands for practices which are orientated on the human condition and therefore depend on intermediary entities as demons, and for practices which transcend both the human condition and the intermediary entities. Most interesting in Proclus’ presentation of Diotima as a priestess and a philosopher is that he does not present her to fulfill these roles by masculinizing her soul through a sole focus on the intelligible entities – as for example Porphyry advises his wife Marcella – but by using the female element in her soul, i.e. the circuit of the Different, as an intermediate through which she can get in touch with the demons and – through them – also with higher entities. The ideal which Diotima incorporates is therefore not becoming masculine but harmonizing the male and female elements within the soul.

In his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides Proclos describes the maternal and paternal contributions to reproduction as of equal value: The paternal seed furnishes potential λόγοι, the mother actualises them and so causes the reversion of the offspring. However, the definition of the mother as actualising cause is linked to the particular circumstances of conception in the sphere of nature. In general, Proclus bases his concept of femininity on the idea of a shared, but not equal activity by paternal and maternal causes. In the metaphysical sphere the maternal cause is distinguished by its inspiring activity, that is, it provokes the procession of powers that are permanently anchored in the father and so it enables the begetting of the offspring as an entity separate from the father. This activity involves a loss of perfection, which is the basis for a difference in value between the activities of the maternal and paternal causes.

In his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides Proclos describes the maternal and paternal contributions to reproduction as of equal value: The paternal seed furnishes potential λόγοι, the mother actualises them and so causes the reversion of the offspring. However, the definition of the mother as actualising cause is linked to the particular circumstances of conception in the sphere of nature. In general, Proclus bases his concept of femininity on the idea of a shared, but not equal activity by paternal and maternal causes. In the metaphysical sphere the maternal cause is distinguished by its inspiring activity, that is, it provokes the procession of powers that are permanently anchored in the father and so it enables the begetting of the offspring as an entity separate from the father. This activity involves a loss of perfection, which is the basis for a difference in value between the activities of the maternal and paternal causes.

Within the Platonic (or Neoplatonic) dualistic conception of body and soul the difference between maleness and femaleness might appear to be a difference which only concerns the body, that is a difference which is not essential for determining who (or what) a certain human is. One might argue that, since humans are essentially their souls and souls are genderless, men and women are essentially equal. As my paper shows, though, Plato's and Proclus’ writings set out two ways of conceptualizing human souls themselves as ‘sexed’ and of doing this in a way that female souls are determined to be inferior to male souls. By Plato's account, souls are indeed genderless in terms of their essence, but they attain maleness through virtuous and femaleness through vicious activities. Proclus, by contrast, conceptualizes souls as essentially ‘male’ or ‘female’. A soul in whose essence the Different predominates is female, while a soul in whose substance the Same predominates is male. And since the attainment and preservation of virtue depend on the strength of the Same, female souls are not vicious by Proclus’ account, but they bear a higher risk of becoming vicious.