• In this paper I explore the contours of a picture of normative epistemology that speaks centrally to the question of how to inquire rather than just the question of what to believe. What if normative epistemology were expanded to encompass inquiry in full? I argue that while a 'zetetic epistemology' builds on traditional normative epistemology in many appealing ways, it also faces some challenges.
  •  189
    The Epistemic and the Zetetic
    Philosophical Review 129 (4): 501-536. 2020.
    Call the norms of inquiry zetetic norms. How are zetetic norms related to epistemic norms? At first glance, they seem quite closely connected. Aren't epistemic norms norms that bind inquirers qua inquirers? And isn't epistemology the place to look for a normative theory of inquiry? While much of this thought seems right, this paper argues that the relationship between the epistemic and the zetetic is not as harmonious as one might have thought and liked. In particular, this paper argues that som…Read more
  •  60
    Correction to: Teleological epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 177 (1): 287-287. 2020.
    In Section 3 of the original version, the Weak Evidentialist Norm is given as follows: ‘For every S, p and t, S’s coming to know p at t is permissible’.
  •  179
    Checking again
    Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 84-96. 2019.
    At some point you really should stop.
  •  182
    Teleological epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 176 (3): 673-691. 2019.
    It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding. These are states it’s thought good to be in and it’s also said that we aim or want to be in them. It is then sometimes claimed that these sorts of thoughts about epistemic goods or values ground or explain our epistemic norms. For instance, we think subjects should follow their evidence when they form their beliefs. But why should they? Why not believe against the evidence or ig…Read more
  •  320
    Inquiry and Belief
    Noûs 53 (2): 296-315. 2019.
    In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.
  •  503
    Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 57. 2013.
    There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief,…Read more
  •  1118
    A discussion of L.A. Paul's 'Transformative Experience' from an Author Meets Critics session at the 2015 Pacific APA.
  •  570
    Suspended judgment
    Philosophical Studies 162 (2): 165-181. 2013.
    Abstract   In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third o…Read more
  •  162
    Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 568-583. 2018.
    In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.
  •  418
    Why Suspend Judging?
    Noûs 51 (2): 302-326. 2017.
    In this paper I argue that suspension of judgment is intimately tied to inquiry and in particular that one is suspending judgment about some question if and only if one is inquiring into that question.
  •  278
    Question‐directed attitudes
    Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1): 145-174. 2013.
    In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.