•  928
    Voittiko Messi vai Voittiko Barcelona? Jalkapallojoukkueiden olemisen tavasta
    In Jussi Antti Saarinen & Mikael Vilhelm Melan (eds.), Sokrateen syöksypusku –jalkapallon filosofiaa, Docendo. pp. 54-69. 2014.
    Title in English: Did Messi win or did Barcelona? On the mode of being of soccer teams.
  •  783
    Why Realists Need Tropes
    Metaphysica 17 (1): 69-85. 2016.
    We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by trope…Read more
  •  540
    Quantity Tropes and Internal Relations
    with Markku Keinänen and Antti Keskinen
    Erkenntnis 84 (3): 519-534. 2019.
    In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantit…Read more
  •  522
    This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to u…Read more
  •  362
    According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive id…Read more
  •  335
    Persistence of Simple Substances
    Metaphysica 11 (2): 119-135. 2010.
    In this paper, we argue for a novel three-dimensionalist solution to the problem of persistence, i.e. cross-temporal identity. We restrict the discussion of persistence to simple substances, which do not have other substances as their parts. The account of simple substances employed in the paper is a trope-nominalist strong nuclear theory, which develops Peter Simons' trope nominalism. Regarding the distinction between three dimensionalism and four dimensionalism, we follow Michael Della Rocca's…Read more
  •  276
    In this paper, we argue that formal ontological relations avoid Bradley's reductio of relations, including his famous relation regress.
  •  238
    In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual ex…Read more
  •  225
    Metametafysiikkaa kategorioilla ja ilman
    Ajatus 73 225-253. 2016.
    Title in English translation: Metametaphysics - with and without Categories. A comment paper on An Introduction to Metametaphysics by Tuomas Tahko. Ehdotan artikkelissa uutta olevan ja sen muodon välistä erottelua. Erottelun avulla voidaan antaa täsmällinen käsitys ontologisen kategorian käsitteestä ja metafysiikan tutkimuskohteesta. Argumentoin myös, että metafysiikan epistemologiaa ja semantiikkaa sekä metafyysistä selitttämistä pitää lähestyä kategorianäkökulmasta. Artikkeli on kommentti Tuom…Read more
  •  214
    Hume on Spatial Properties
    In Guigon Ghislain & Rodriguez-Pereyra Gonzalo (eds.), Nominalism About Properties: New Essays, Routledge. pp. 79-94. 2015.
    I defend a reading of David Hume’s nominalism that he comes close to Keith Campbell's contemporary trope theory in the specific case of spatial properties. I argue that Hume's view should be construed as classifying spatial properties as Campbellian tropes (particular properties): abstract, particular, determinate and qualitatively simple properties. This has implications for reconstructing Hume's answer to the problem of universals. I argue that Hume’s account of objects resembling each other i…Read more
  •  191
    Muisti (edited book)
    Tampere University Press. 2013.
    Proceedings of the annual congress of the Finnish Philosophical Association in 2013. Theme: memory.
  •  171
    Kaila's Reception of Hume
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 89 147-162. 2012.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft
  •  162
    What are Tropes, Fundamentally? A Formal Ontological Account
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 94 129-159. 2018.
    In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) of tropes and substances, which I have defended elsewhere, using my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental ontological form is generically identical to a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an…Read more
  •  152
    Taxonomy of Relations: Internal and External
    In Daniele Bertini & Damiano Migliorini (eds.), Relations. Ontology and Philosophy of Religion, Mimesis International. pp. 93-121. 2018.
    In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological relation…Read more
  •  144
    Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1): 57-71. 2015.
    According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of str…Read more
  •  142
    A Third Type of Distinction in the Treatise
    Hume Studies 38 (1): 55-78. 2012.
    In this paper, I resolve a potential contradiction between two of Hume’s central tenets: that complex perceptions consist of simple perceptions and that distinct things are separable. The former implies that a complex perception is not separable from its constituent simple perceptions, as a change in its constituents destroys its identity. The latter entails that the complex perception is separable from these simple perceptions, since it is distinct from them. This is a contradiction. I resolve …Read more
  •  103
    The handout of my talk at the Nordic Network in Metaphysics webinar on Friday 2/10/2020
  •  103
    Hume's Scepticism and Realism
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2): 283-309. 2012.
    In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas H…Read more
  •  101
    In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature , Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of …Read more
  •  81
    Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist
    Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2): 143-161. 2012.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a sceptical argument against the senses advanced by Hume that forms a decisive objection to the Metaphysically Realist interpretations of his philosophy – such as the different naturalist and New Humean readings. Hume presents this argument, apparently starting with the primary/secondary qualities distinction, both in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 4 (Of the modern philosophy) (1739) and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Section …Read more
  •  81
    Hume on the Unity of Determinations of Extension
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1). 2019.
    We do not fully understand Hume’s account of space if we do not understand his view of determinations of extension, which is too much ignored a topic. In this paper, I argue for an interpretation that determinations of extension are unities in Hume’s view: single beings in addition to their components. This realist reading is reasonable on both textual and philosophical grounds. There is strong textual evidence for it and no textual reason to reject it. Realism makes perfect sense of the metaphy…Read more
  •  59
    In this article, I make a philosophical comparison between Hobbes' and Hume's s conceptions of imagination. The article should not be taken as an examination of Hobbes' real effect on Hume's thinking. That is a historical problem I do not address. In addition to being philosophically comparative, the article is expli- cative. Since the subject matter is so broad, I have been compelled to confine myself to the explicative level in my examination. I unfold Hume's conception of imagination, take Ju…Read more
  •  58
    Humen teoria avaruuden ymmärtämisestä
    In Valtteri Viljanen, Helena Siipi & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Ymmärrys, Uniprint. pp. 67-75. 2012.
    Title in English: Hume's Theory of Understanding Space
  •  57
    Hume as a Trope Nominalist
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1): 55-66. 2012.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume's solution to a problem that contemporary metaphysicians call “the problem of universals” would be rather trope-theoretical than some other type of nominalism. The basic idea in different trope theories is that particular properties, i.e., tropes are postulated to account for the fact that there are particular beings resembling each other. I show that Hume's simple sensible perceptions are tropes: simple qualities. Accordingly, their similarities are explained by…Read more
  •  54
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is …Read more
  •  53
    Kontekstualistinen vastaus Agrippan argumentille
    In Ahti Pietarinen, Sami Pihlström & Pilvi Toppinen (eds.), Usko, Juvenes Print. pp. 93-98. 2009.
    Title in English: : A Contextualist Answer to Agrippa's Argument
  •  52
    Humen syyn määritelmä
    In Heta Gylling, Ilkka Niiniluoto & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Syy, Suomen Filosofinen Yhdistys. 2007.
    Title in English: Hume's Definition of Cause. Esitän artikkelissa tulkintani Humen kuuluisista kahdesta määritelmästä ”syylle”. Väitteeni on, että Hume ei esitä kahta erillistä määritelmää, joiden suhde olisi ongelmallinen, vaan syyn kahden oleellisen aspektin määritelmät. Yhdistänkin lopuksi määritelmät yhdeksi Humen syyn määritelmäksi. Artikkelini on luonteeltaan tulkitseva ja väittävä. Tarkoituksenani on tulkita erästä kausaliteetin klassikkoa mahdollisimman tarkasti ja siten estää tiettyjä t…Read more
  •  44
    In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality means that the PSP has a firm foundation in …Read more