•  269
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution vicio…Read more
  •  246
    Reflective equilibrium and underdetermination in epistemology
    Acta Analytica 19 (32): 45-64. 2004.
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of j…Read more
  •  210
    A defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 315-324. 2009.
    One argument for reductive physicalism, the explanatory argument, rests on its ability to explain the vast and growing body of acknowledged psychophysical correlations. Jaegwon Kim has recently levelled four objections against the explanatory argument. I assess all of Kim's objections, showing that none is successful. The result is a defence of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
  •  167
    Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence
    Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1): 47-54. 1999.
    John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical consequence fails as an adequate philosophical analysis. Since then, Greg Ray (1996) has defended Tarski's analysis against Etchemendy's criticisms. Here, I'll argue that--even given Ray's defense of Tarski's definition--we may nevertheless lay claim to the conditional conclusion that 'if' Tarski intended a conceptual analysis of logical consequence, 'then' it fails as such. Secondly, I'll give some reasons to think that Tarsk…Read more
  •  111
    Damming the Swamping Problem, Reliably
    Dialectica 67 (1): 103-116. 2013.
    The swamping problem is the problem of explaining why reliabilist knowledge (reliable true belief) has greater value than mere true belief. Swamping problem advocates see the lack of a solution to the swamping problem (i.e., the lack of a value-difference between reliabilist knowledge and mere true belief) as grounds for rejecting reliabilism. My aims here are (i) to specify clear requirements for a solution to the swamping problem that are as congenial to reliabilism's critics as possible, (ii)…Read more
  •  87
    In the present commentary, I argue that Foster has attacked an uncharitable reconstruction of Etchemendy's argument against Tarski's account of the logical properties. I provide an alternative, more charitable reconstruction of that argument that withstands Foster's objections.
  •  63
    Review of "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution" (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017. 2017.
    Review of Bredo Johnsen's "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution" (OUP, 2017).
  •  25
    In 1955, Goodman set out to ‘dissolve’ the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudo‐problem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. This dissolution, which has enjoyed tremendous acceptance, essentially involved an application of what has since been called the method of reflective equilibrium. Largely in connection with naturalism in epistemology, the reflective equilibrium method has lately been the subject of considerable attention. I wi…Read more
  • Epistemic Norms and Epistemological Methods
    Dissertation, University of Missouri - Columbia. 2001.
    The target of much work in recent epistemology is the specification, in terms of non-normative properties, of the nature of epistemic norms like justification. I'll call this the target-problem of epistemology. The target-problem is the problem of giving normative epistemic properties purely descriptive, or naturalistic, accounts. The target-problem itself gives rise to a deeper problem and one I think needs to be answered prior to any solution to the target-problem: What methods are appropriate…Read more