•  2232
    Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief
    The Monist 96 (3): 349-376. 2013.
    Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant becau…Read more
  •  1570
    Procreative Ethics and the Problem of Evil
    In Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan & Vernon Richard (eds.), Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and Parenting, Oxford University Press. pp. 65-86. 2015.
    Many people think that the amount of evil and suffering we observe provides important and perhaps decisive evidence against the claim that a loving God created our world. Yet almost nobody worries about the ethics of human procreation. Can these attitudes be consistently maintained? This chapter argues that the most obvious attempts to justify a positive answer fail. The upshot is not that procreation is impermissible, but rather that we should either revise our beliefs about the severity of glo…Read more
  •  759
    Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving
    Bioethics 28 (6): 313-319. 2014.
    Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to …Read more
  •  698
    Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2): 436-466. 2014.
    Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be…Read more
  •  694
    The Explanatory Challenge of Religious Diversity
    with Jon Marsh
    In Helen De Cruz & Ryan Nichols (eds.), Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 61-83. 2016.
    The challenge from religious diversity is widely thought to be one of the most important challenges facing religious belief. Despite this consensus, however, many epistemologists think that standard versions of the challenge fail because they threaten to implicate many seemingly reasonable yet highly controversial non-religious beliefs. In light of this we develop an alternative, less discussed, diversity challenge that does not generalize. This challenge concerns why so much religious diversity…Read more
  •  651
    On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where it Leads.
    In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207. 2017.
    This chapter examines a common objection to the philosophy of religion, namely, that it has not sufficiently embraced the injunction of Socrates to follow the argument where it leads. Although a general version of this charge is unfair, one emerging view in the field, which I call religious Mooreanism, nonetheless risks running contrary to the Socratic injunction. According to this view, many people can quickly, easily, and reasonably deflect all known philosophical challenges to their core reli…Read more
  •  459
    What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but…” Reasoning?
    In David Wasserman & Adam Cureton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Disability-positive philosophers often note a troubling tendency to dismiss what disabled people say about their well-being. This chapter seeks to get clearer on why this tendency might be troubling. It argues that recent appeals to lived experience, testimonial injustice, and certain challenges to adaptive-preference reasoning do not fully explain what is wrong with questioning the happiness of disabled people. It then argues that common attempts to debunk the claim that disabled people are hap…Read more
  •  37
    One Child: Do We Have a Right to More?, written by Sarah Conly (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (1): 101-104. 2019.