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6 Plessner and the Mathematical- Physical PerspectiveIn Jos Mul (ed.), Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology: Perspectives and Prospects, Amsterdam University Press. pp. 129-148. 2014.
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6Is materialism right to claim that the world of everyday-life experience - the phenomenal world - is nothing but an illusion produced in physical reality, notably in the brain? Or is Merleau-Ponty right when he defends the fundamental character of the phenomenal world while rejecting physical realism? Jasper van Buuren addresses these questions by exploring the nature of the body proper in Merleau-Ponty and Plessner, arguing that physical and phenomenal realism are not mutually exclusive but com…Read more
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8Der Realismus als notwendige FiktionIn Roman Yos, Frank Müller, Sebastian Edinger & Thomas Ebke (eds.), Mensch Und Gesellschaft Zwischen Natur Und Geschichte: Zum Verhältnis von Philosophischer Anthropologie Und Kritischer Theorie, De Gruyter. pp. 329-336. 2016.
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9Buytendijk und die Philosophische AnthropologieInternationales Jahrbuch für Philosophische Anthropologie 2 (1). 2011.
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8Is materialism right to claim that the world of everyday-life experience – the phenomenal world – is nothing but an illusion produced in physical reality, notably in the brain? Or is Merleau-Ponty right when he defends the fundamental character of the phenomenal world while rejecting physical realism? I address these questions by exploring the nature of the body proper in Merleau-Ponty and Plessner, arguing that physical and phenomenal realism are not mutually exclusive but complementary. The ar…Read more
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17Is materialism right to claim that the world of everyday-life experience – the phenomenal world – is nothing but an illusion produced in physical reality, notably in the brain? Or is Merleau-Ponty right when he defends the fundamental character of the phenomenal world while rejecting physical realism? I address these questions by exploring the nature of the body proper in Merleau-Ponty and Plessner, arguing that physical and phenomenal realism are not mutually exclusive but complementary. The ar…Read more
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9The philosophical–anthropological foundations of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscienceContinental Philosophy Review 49 (2): 223-241. 2016.Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not…Read more
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27The Difference between Moral Sources and HypergoodsInternational Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2): 171-186. 2016.In Sources of the Self Charles Taylor makes clear that both hypergoods and moral sources are essential to the moral life. Although hypergoods and moral sources are not the same thing, Taylor’s descriptions of these concepts are quite similar, and so their distinction requires interpretation. I propose that we interpret the difference on the basis of another distinction that is central to Taylor’s thinking: that between immanence and transcendence. Whereas a moral source transcends us, a hypergoo…Read more
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40The philosophical–anthropological foundations of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscienceContinental Philosophy Review 49 (2): 223-241. 2015.Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |