•  148
    Schroeder and Whiting on Knowledge and Defeat
    Logos and Episteme 7 (2): 231-238. 2016.
    Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do n…Read more
  •  78
    Dispossessing Defeat
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Higher‐order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher‐order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self‐doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not so.…Read more
  •  72
    This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.
  •  44
    Whose purposes? Biological teleology and intentionality
    Synthese 195 (10): 4507-4524. 2018.
    Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biolog…Read more
  •  42
    Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1): 80-98. 2017.
    In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity…Read more
  •  42
    Recommending beauty: semantics and pragmatics of aesthetic predicates
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2): 198-221. 2018.
    The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form ‘x is beautiful’ as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker’s recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancin…Read more
  •  33
    Relativism and the expressivist bifurcation
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4): 357-378. 2018.
    Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss h…Read more
  •  32
    Inferentialism, degrees of commitment, and ampliative reasoning
    with Rodríguez Xavier de Donato and Bonilla Jesús Zamora
    Synthese 1-19. forthcoming.
    Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a practice-based characterization of scientific inference. We want to explore whether Brandom’s pragmatist–inferentialist framework can suitably accommodate several types of ampliative inference common in scientific reasoning and explanation. First, we argue that Brandom’s view of induction in terms of merely permissive inferences is inadequate; in order to overcome the shortcoming of Brandom’s proposal, we put forward an alternative conception of in…Read more
  •  29
    The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (1): 21-34. 2017.
    There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, …Read more
  •  25
    A Defence of the Indispensability of Metaphor
    Philosophical Investigations 42 (3): 241-263. 2019.
  •  23
    Collective Actors without Collective Minds An Inferentialist Approach
    with Jesús Zamora-Bonilla
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1): 3-25. 2015.
    We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or r…Read more
  •  21
    No Reasons to Believe the False
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3): 703-722. 2019.
  •  20
    Extreme Betting
    Ratio 32 (1): 32-41. 2019.
  •  19
    Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution
    with Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, and Manuel Heras–Escribano
    Res Philosophica 96 (4): 409-430. 2019.
    The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such…Read more
  •  11
    Pragmatism and Semantic Particularism
    Disputatio 8 (43): 219-232. 2016.
    Pragmatist views inspired by Peirce characterize the content of claims in terms of their practical consequences. The content of a claim is, on these views, determined by what actions are rationally recommended or supported by that claim. In this paper I examine the defeasibility of these relations of rational support. I will argue that such defeasibility introduces a particularist, occasion-sensitive dimension in pragmatist theories of content. More precisely, my conclusion will be that, in the …Read more
  •  9
    Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1). 2018.
    Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay : 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of…Read more
  •  6
    Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2). 2018.
    Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is…Read more