Berkeley, CA, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
  • 2008. Practical reason
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  15
    The Rational Foundations of Ethics
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157): 509-512. 1989.
  • Freedom: A Coherence Theory
    Ethics 104 (3): 624-625. 1994.
  •  9
    The Moral Nexus
    Princeton University Press. 2019.
  •  35
    Margaret Gilbert: Rights and Demands: A Foundational Inquiry
    Journal of Philosophy 117 (1): 55-59. 2020.
  •  50
    Trust, anger, resentment, forgiveness: On blame and its reasons
    European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3): 537-551. 2019.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
  • Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections
    In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford University Press. 2003.
  •  179
    An Anti-Philosophy of the Emotions?
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 469-477. 2000.
    Philosophical work on the emotions can take a variety of forms, among which the following three are perhaps most common. There are, first, studies that attempt to analyse the nature of emotions in general, identifying the features that distinguish them from psychological states of other kinds, and their connections with such phenomena as rationality, perception, experience, memory, action, and the like. Second, there are works that focus on particular emotions or classes of emotion, such as guil…Read more
  •  198
    Comment on Raz
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1): 1-5. 2005.
    No abstract
  •  30
    Moralische Gründe: Aus der Sicht des Handelnden
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (1). 2001.
    In den heutigen Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften herrscht eine Vorstellung von Handlungsgründen, die von dem englischen Moralphilosophen Bernard Williams als „Internalismus„ bezeichnet worden ist. Dieser Vorstellung zufolge hängt die Beantwortung der Frage, was eine gegebene Person P Grund hat zu tun, letztendlich von P’s Motivationsprofil ab, insbesondere von P’s Wünschen und Dispositionen; normative Handlungsgründe sind demnach als subjektiv bedingt zu verstehen. Mein Anliegen in diesem Aufsa…Read more
  •  128
    Reasons, Values and Agent‐Relativity
    Dialectica 64 (4): 503-528. 2010.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's buck‐passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason‐giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons and values. I start by acknowledging t…Read more
  •  117
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3): 680-681. 2002.
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments offers an account of moral responsibility. It addresses the question: what are the forms of capacity or ability that render us morally accountable for the things we do? A traditional answer has it that the conditions of moral responsibility include freedom of the will, where this in turn involves the availability of robust alternative possibilities. I reject this answer, arguing that the conditions of moral responsibility do not include any condition of al…Read more
  •  12
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185): 541-544. 1996.
  •  15
    Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments
    Ethics 106 (4): 850-853. 1994.
  •  14
    Replies
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (3): 429-442. 2017.
  •  58
    Replies
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3). 2002.
    My commentators have given me much to think about, and I am grateful to them for their serious engagement with my work. Their many objections coalesce primarily around the following issues, which I shall address in turn: the normative approach; praiseworthiness; practical reason and moral reasons; physical possibility; the exercise of general powers; nomic necessity and revisionism about blame; ultimate responsibility and control.
  • Normativity and the Will. Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (4): 820-822. 2006.
  •  5
    I—Duties of Love
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 175-198. 2012.
    A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The …Read more
  •  291
    How to Argue about Practical Reason
    Mind 99 (395): 355-385. 1990.
    How to Argue about . Bibliographic Info. Citation. How to Argue about ; Author(s): R. Jay Wallace; Source: Mind , New Series, Vol.
  •  1
    This dissertation is a critical study of rationalism in ethics: the view that acting morally is a requirement of rationality, and that all agents consequently have reason to be moral. The study attempts first to reconstruct the essential elements of the rationalist approach in ethics, and then to identify the most critical obstacles in the way of that approach. By way of reconstruction, it is argued that the rationalist in ethics needs to construe rationality as a set of ideal principles or norm…Read more
  •  7
    T. L. S. Sprigge, "The Rational Foundations of Ethics" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 39 (57): 509. 1989.
  •  1051
    Virtue, Reason, and Principle
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4): 469-495. 1991.
    A common strategy unites much that philosophers have written about the virtues. The strategy can be traced back at least to Aristotle, who suggested that human beings have a characteristic function or activity, and that the virtues are traits of character which enable humans to perform this kind of activity excellently or well. The defining feature of this approach is that it treats the virtues as functional concepts, to be both identified and justified by reference to some independent goal or e…Read more