Jean Kazez

_The Weight of Things_ explores the hard questions of our daily lives, examining both classic and contemporary accounts of what it means to lead 'the good life'. Looks at the views of philosophers such as Aristotle, the Stoics, Mill, Nietzsche, and Sartre as well as contributions from other traditions, such as Buddhism Incorporates key arguments from contemporary philosophers including Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Nozick, John Finnis, and Susan Wolf Uses examples from biography, literature, history, movies and media, and the news Gives a fresh perspective on the hard questions of our daily lives An engaging read; an excellent book for both students and general readers

The objective list account of wellbeing is usually taken to say that the same set of goods is relevant to wellbeing for any person, regardless of age. Coupled with reasonable assumptions about how goods are distributed over the lifespan, that leads to a picture of wellbeing as higher in midlife and lower in childhood and old age. I argue that a stage-relativized objective list theory is more plausible, after exploring several ways to understand the concept of a life stage. On the stage-relativized view, lists of goods that define wellbeing vary in the sense that there are shifting thresholds and subcategories relevant to different stages of life, but also because there are goods that count at one stage and count less or not at all at others. After exploring the list of goods for old age, I argue that the old age form of wellbeing can be welcomed even if the goods it offers are not superior to midlife goods.

John Stuart Mill famously maintained that “animal pleasures” – like enjoying good smells and tastes – are lower quality than the pleasures tied to higher cognition, like the pleasure of enjoying an opera or understanding a mathematical proof. This downgrading is particularly common in the ethical literature about eating animals. Peter Singer, James Rachels, Gary Francione, Alastair Norcross and dozens of other ethicists make quick work of defending vegetarianism by presuming that “gustatory pleasure” is trivial. But is it?