Jeanine Diller

Some philosophers claim that the Judaeo-Christian God not only does not exist but could not exist. In support, they offer over various arguments to show that one or more of the properties commonly associated with this God are inconsistent. One such argument, for instance, says it is impossible to be perfectly just and merciful, since one is merciful precisely by being unjust in favor of those to whom one shows mercy. ;I suggest that the logical problems in question result from assuming a popular view of God's nature---that God is the being, if any, who is supremely perfect . I develop an alternative view on which God is the being, if any, who satisfies a relational role specified by the texts of the tradition---the being who, in particular, accounts for the existence of the world, miracles and religious experiences; is worthy of awe, trust and love; and warrants worship and prayer. I argue that a being does not need the perfections to do these jobs and so escapes inconsistency

In his recent trilogy, J. L. Schellenberg presents a new religious option: to have beliefless faith in a general object of religious concern that he thinks is referenced at the core of most sectarian religions UUU’. After explaining what UUU is more fully, I argue that the claim that UUU exists should not be, as Schellenberg says, the only focus for philosophy of religion. Still, I argue that such a claim is a good basis for a new form of religion, especially if it is modified in a couple of ways

Bishop’s main claims are: (I) that James’ criteria on the admissibility of faith leaps need the addition of two moral criteria to be complete; (II) that a Kantian, at least, could not admissibly leap toward God, classically understood, and (III) that a Kantian, and anyone else, could admissibly leap toward God, understood his way. Here I will affirm (I) with a qualification; deny (II); affirm (III); and close with some reservations about Bishop’s novel model of God. This paper was delivered at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God

I offer a solution to an old puzzle about how God can be both just and merciful at the same time—a feat which seems required of God, but at the same time seems impossible since showing mercy involves being more lenient than justice demands. Inspired by two of Jesus’ parables and work by Feinberg, Johnson and Smart, I suggest that following a “principle of merciful justice”—that persons ought to receive what they deserve or better—delivers mercy and justice simultaneously, certainly in cases of distributions of goods, and even in cases of distribution of harms as well, if we can accept some qualifications