•  765
    When are thought experiments poor ones?
    with David Atkinson
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2): 305-322. 2003.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is m…Read more
  •  636
    Achilles, the Tortoise, and Colliding Balls
    with David Atkinson
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3). 2008.
    It is widely held that the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, introduced by Zeno of Elea around 460 B.C., was solved by mathematical advances in the nineteenth century. The techniques of Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor made it clear, according to this view, that Achilles’ difficulty in traversing an infinite number of intervals while trying to catch up with the tortoise does not involve a contradiction, let alone a logical absurdity. Yet ever since the nineteenth century there have been diss…Read more
  •  351
    This book contains a selection of papers from the workshop *Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy* held in October 2019 in Tilburg, the Netherlands. It is the first volume devoted to the role of women in early analytic philosophy. It discusses the ideas of ten female philosophers and covers a period of over a hundred years, beginning with the contribution to the Significs Movement by Victoria, Lady Welby in the second half of the nineteenth century, and ending with Ruth Barcan Marcus’s cel…Read more
  •  284
    This Open Access book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons a…Read more
  •  205
    Probability all the Way Up
    with David Atkinson
    Synthese 153 (2): 187-197. 2006.
    Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms.
  •  187
    Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited
    with David Atkinson
    Erkenntnis 69 (1): 93-108. 2008.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey co…Read more
  •  163
    Probability as a theory dependent concept
    with David Atkinson
    Synthese 118 (3): 307-328. 1999.
    It is argued that probability should be defined implicitly by the distributions of possible measurement values characteristic of a theory. These distributions are tested by, but not defined in terms of, relative frequencies of occurrences of events of a specified kind. The adoption of an a priori probability in an empirical investigation constitutes part of the formulation of a theory. In particular, an assumption of equiprobability in a given situation is merely one hypothesis inter alia, which…Read more
  •  158
    Infinitism Regained
    Mind 116 (463): 597-602. 2007.
    Consider the following process of epistemic justification: proposition $E_{0}$ is made probable by $E_{1}$ which in turn is made probable by $E_{2}$ , which is made probable by $E_{3}$ , and so on. Can this process go on indefinitely? Foundationalists, coherentists, and sceptics claim that it cannot. I argue that it can: there are many infinite regresses of probabilistic reasoning that can be completed. This leads to a new form of epistemic infinitism
  •  156
    Justification by Infinite Loops
    with David Atkinson
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (4): 407-416. 2010.
    In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This suggests that infinit…Read more
  •  143
    Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities
    with David Atkinson
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2): 183-193. 2009.
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties
  •  140
    Probability without certainty: foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach debate
    with David Atkinson
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3): 442-453. 2006.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C. I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguou…Read more
  •  134
    Grounds and limits: Reichenbach and foundationalist epistemology
    with David Atkinson
    Synthese 181 (1). 2011.
    From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by Lewis, defying Reichenbac…Read more
  •  130
    On poor and not so poor thought experiments. A reply to Daniel Cohnitz
    with David Atkinson
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1). 2007.
    We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, but rather to restrict ourselves …Read more
  •  101
    Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem
    with David Atkinson
    Studia Logica 89 (3): 333-341. 2008.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
  •  96
    Transitivity and Partial Screening Off
    with David Atkinson
    Theoria 79 (4): 294-308. 2012.
    The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well-known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. Tomoji Shogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive, this illustrates, but now in a different way, that…Read more
  •  94
    The Emergence of Justification
    with David Atkinson
    Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252): 546-564. 2013.
    A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges from the chain as a whole. Nowhere however is it ma…Read more
  •  94
    A case of confusing probability and confirmation
    Synthese 184 (1): 101-107. 2012.
    Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed
  •  90
    How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses
    with David Atkinson and Theo Kuipers
    Philosophy of Science 76 (1): 1-21. 2009.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence
  •  82
    The Need for Justification
    with David Atkinson
    Metaphilosophy 45 (2): 201-210. 2014.
    Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present essay sub…Read more
  •  79
    Lamps, cubes, balls and walls: Zeno problems and solutions
    with David Atkinson
    Philosophical Studies 150 (1). 2010.
    Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by A…Read more
  •  78
    Shaping your own life
    Metaphilosophy 37 (2). 2006.
    A distinction is made between imagination in the narrow sense and in the broad sense. Narrow imagination is characterised as the ability to "see" pictures in the mind's eye or to "hear" melodies in the head. Broad imagination is taken to be the faculty of creating, either in the strict sense of making something ex nihilo or in the looser sense of seeing patterns in some data. The article focuses on a particular sort of broad imagination, the kind that has to do with creating, not a work of art, …Read more
  •  76
    How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation
    with David Atkinson and Theo Kuipers
    Philosophy of Science 76 (1): 1-21. 2009.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
  •  75
    An Endless Hierarchy of Probabilities
    with David Atkinson
    American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 267-276. 2012.
    Suppose q is some proposition, and let P(q) = v0 (1) be the proposition that the probability of q is v0.1 How can one know that (1) is true? One cannot know it for sure, for all that may be asserted is a further probabilistic statement like P(P(q) = v0) = v1, (2) which states that the probability that (1) is true is v1. But the claim (2) is also subject to some further statement of an even higher probability: P(P(P(q) = v0) = v1) = v2, (3) and so on. Thus, an infinite regress emerges of pr…Read more
  •  72
    Galileo and prior philosophy
    with David Atkinson
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1): 115-136. 2004.
    Galileo claimed inconsistency in the Aristotelian dogma concerning falling bodies and stated that all bodies must fall at the same rate. However, there is an empirical situation where the speeds of falling bodies are proportional to their weights; and even in vacuo all bodies do not fall at the same rate under terrestrial conditions. The reason for the deficiency of Galileo’s reasoning is analyzed, and various physical scenarios are described in which Aristotle’s claim is closer to the truth tha…Read more
  •  63
    The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg
    with David Atkinson
    Studia Logica 94 (3): 347-353. 2010.
    We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investiga…Read more
  •  58
    Crosswords and Coherence
    Review of Metaphysics 63 (4): 807-820. 2010.
    A common objection to coherentism is that it cannot account for truth: it gives us no reason to prefer a true theory over a false one, if both theories are equally coherent. By extending Susan Haack's crossword metaphor, the authors argue that there could be circumstances under which this objection is untenable. Although these circumstances are remote, they are in full accordance with the most ambitious modern theories in physics. Coherence may perhaps be truth conducive.
  •  53
    The meaning of mental terms and the status of mental entities are core issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that the old Reichenbachian distinction between abstracta and illata might shed new light on these issues. First, it suggests that beliefs, desires and other pro-attitudes that make up the higher mental life are not all equally substantial or real. Second, it conceives the elements of the lower mental life as entities that are inferred from concrete, observable events. A…Read more