•  158
    Overcoming Luck: Two Trends in Legal Philosophy
    Analysis 78 (2): 335-347. 2018.
    © The Author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model...Philosophy of law was until recently dominated by abstract investigation into the nature of law, a pursuit known as ‘general jurisprudence’. In this way, it resembled a branch of metaphysics or mid-twent…Read more
  •  89
    The Apologetic Stance
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (2): 75-108. 2015.
  •  50
    Accepting Forgiveness
    The Journal of Ethics 26 (1): 1-25. 2020.
    Forgiving wrongdoers who neither apologized, nor sought to make amends in any way, is controversial. Even defenders of the practice agree with critics that such “unilateral” forgiveness involves giving up on the meaningful redress that victims otherwise justifiably demand from their wrongdoers: apology, reparations, repentance, and so on. Against that view, I argue here that when a victim of wrongdoing sets out to grant forgiveness to her offender, and he in turn accepts her forgiveness, he ther…Read more
  •  26
    Legal Rights and Joint Commitment
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2): 518-524. 2023.
  •  19
    The Bounds of Morality
    ProtoSociology 35 217-234. 2018.
    Margaret Gilbert’s ‘Three Dogmas about Promising’ is a paradigm-shifting contribution to the literature, not only for its account of promissory obligation based on joint commitment, but for its equally important focus on two properties of such obligation, which her account uniquely and elegantly captures: first, that the duty to keep a promise is necessary—the obligation stands regardless of the content or morality of the promise—and, second, that it is directed, with the promisee having unique …Read more
  •  6
    Taking a Stance: An Account for Persons and Institutions
    In Alessandro Capone, Marco Carapezza & Franco Lo Piparo (eds.), Further Advances in Pragmatics and Philosophy: Part 2 Theories and Applications, Springer Verlag. pp. 513-534. 2019.
    Certain commissive speech acts, such as “I forgive you,” “I’m in favor,” “Thank you” and “Sorry,” are often characterized as “expressives,” utterances whose primary function is to express a psychological state. In contrast, I argue here that such utterances are stance-takings: speech acts that commit the speaker to behave towards others in light of a normative position she accepts. I argue that stance-taking, as developed here, makes better sense of these utterances than the standard expressivis…Read more
  • A jurisprudential puzzle as old as the Talmud
    In Samuel Lebens, Dani Rabinowitz & Aaron Segal (eds.), Jewish Philosophy in an Analytic Age, Oxford University Press, Usa. 2019.