•  885
    The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity
    In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning, Oxford University Press. pp. 97-118. 2014.
    Some contextually sensitive expressions are such that their context independent conventional meanings need to be in some way supplemented in context for the expressions to secure semantic values in those contexts. As we’ll see, it is not clear that there is a paradigm here, but ‘he’ used demonstratively is a clear example of such an expression. Call expressions of this sort supplementives in order to highlight the fact that their context independent meanings need to be supplemented in context fo…Read more
  •  305
    Designating propositions
    Philosophical Review 111 (3): 341-371. 2002.
    Like many, though of course not all, philosophers, I believe in propositions. I take propositions to be structured, sentence-like entities whose structures are identical to the syntactic structures of the sentences that express them; and I have defended a particular version of such a view of propositions elsewhere. In the present work, I shall assume that the structures of propositions are at least very similar to the structures of the sentences that express them. Further, I shall assume that or…Read more
  •  268
  •  243
    What is a philosophical analysis?
    Philosophical Studies 90 (2): 155-179. 1998.
    It is common for philosophers to offer philosophical accounts or analyses, as they are sometimes called, of knowledge, autonomy, representation, (moral) goodness, reference, and even modesty. These philosophical analyses raise deep questions.What is it that is being analyzed (i.e. what sorts of things are the objects of analysis)? What sort of thing is the analysis itself (a proposition? sentence?)? Under what conditions is an analysis correct? How can a correct analysis be informative? How, if …Read more
  •  242
    In this paper, we defend a traditional approach to semantics, that holds that the outputs of compositional semantics are propositional, i.e. truth conditions. Though traditional, this view has been challenged on a number of fronts over the years. Since classic work of Lewis, arguments have been offered which purport to show that semantic composition requires values that are relativized, e.g. to times, or other parameters that render them no longer propositional. Focusing in recent variants of th…Read more
  •  228
    On fineness of grain
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 763-781. 2013.
    A central job for propositions is to be the objects of the attitudes. Propositions are the things we doubt, believe and suppose. Some philosophers have thought that propositions are sets of possible worlds. But many have become convinced that such an account individuates propositions too coarsely. This raises the question of how finely propositions should be individuated. An account of how finely propositions should be individuated on which they are individuated very finely is sketched. Objectio…Read more
  •  211
    Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?
    Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 71-93. 2013.
    At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of…Read more
  •  193
    Complex demonstratives, QI uses, and direct reference
    Philosophical Review 117 (1): 99-117. 2008.
    result from combining the determiners `this' or `that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases such as `woman' or `woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, `this woman', and `that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex …Read more
  •  193
    What in the world are the ways things might have been? (review)
    Philosophical Studies 133 (3). 2007.
    Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true in a…Read more
  •  187
    W(h)ither Semantics!(?)
    Noûs 52 (4): 772-795. 2017.
  •  179
    Structured propositions and sentence structure
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5). 1996.
    It is argued that taken together, two widely held claims ((i) sentences express structured propositions whose structures are functions of the structures of sentences expressing them; and (ii) sentences have underlying structures that are the input to semantic interpretation) suggest a simple, plausible theory of propositional structure. According to this theory, the structures of propositions are the same as the structures of the syntactic inputs to semantics they are expressed by. The theory is…Read more
  •  179
    The nature and structure of content
    Oxford University Press. 2007.
    Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with in…Read more
  •  163
    New Thinking About Propositions
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions--things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate
  •  154
    Acquaintance, singular thought and propositional constituency
    Philosophical Studies 172 (2): 543-560. 2015.
    In a recent paper, Armstrong and Stanley argue that despite being initially compelling, a Russellian account of singular thought has deep difficulties. I defend a certain sort of Russellian account of singular thought against their arguments. In the process, I spell out a notion of propositional constituency that is independently motivated and has many attractive features
  •  145
    Semantics for monists
    Mind 115 (460): 1023-1058. 2006.
    Assume that the only thing before you is a statue made of some alloy. Call those who think that there is one thing before you in such a case monists. Call those who think there are at least two things before you in such a case pluralists. The most common arguments for pluralism run as follows. The statue is claimed to have some property P that the piece of alloy lacks (or vice versa), and hence it is concluded that they are distinct. Most often, the predicates employed in such arguments to expre…Read more
  •  142
    Questions of Unity
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3): 257-277. 2009.
    In The Principles of Mathematics, Bertrand Russell famously puzzled over something he called the unity of the proposition. Echoing Russell, many philosophers have talked over the years about the question or problem of the unity of the proposition. In fact, I believe that there are a number of quite distinct though related questions all of which can plausibly be taken to be questions regarding the unity of propositions. I state three such questions and show how the theory of propositions defended…Read more
  •  136
    Complex demonstratives as quantifiers: objections and replies
    Philosophical Studies 141 (2): 209-242. 2008.
    In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work, I lay out these objections and respond to them.
  •  134
    The Metaphysics of Propositions
    Oxford Handbooks Online. 2017.
  •  127
  •  118
    Structured propositions
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  103
    Strong Contextual Felicity and Felicitous Underspecification
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 631-657. 2017.
  •  103
    Anaphora and operators
    Philosophical Perspectives 8 221-250. 1994.
  •  95
  •  94
    Are indefinite descriptions ambiguous?
    Philosophical Studies 53 (3). 1988.
  •  88
    Anaphora
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.