•  256
    Marxism and retribution
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (3): 217-243. 1973.
  •  228
  •  203
    Forgiveness and Resentment
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1): 503-516. 1982.
  •  163
    In this revised edition, two distinguished philosophers have extended and strengthened the most authoritative text available on the philosophy of law and jurisprudence. While retaining their comprehensive coverage of classical and modern theory, Murphy and Coleman have added new discussions of the Critical Legal Studies movement and feminist jurisprudence, and they have strengthened their treatment of natural law theory, criminalization, and the law of torts. The chapter on law and economics rem…Read more
  •  131
    Rationality and the Fear of Death
    The Monist 59 (2): 187-203. 1976.
  •  120
    Hume and Kant on the social contract
    Philosophical Studies 33 (1). 1978.
    The central or dominant intellectual model which provided the structure of social and political thought in the 18th century was the "social contract". Both hume and kant felt obliged to assess it carefully-Hume coming out an opponent and kant a supporter of the model. This opposition is particularly interesting for the following reason: hume's attack on social contract theory is directed primarily against hobbes and locke, And it is interesting to see if post-Humean social contract theories (esp…Read more
  •  116
    Legal moralism and retribution revisited
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1): 5-20. 2007.
    This is a slightly revised text of Jeffrie G. Murphy’s Presidential Address delivered to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in March 2006. In the essay the author reconsiders two positions he had previously defended—the liberal attack on legal moralism and robust versions of the retributive theory of punishment—and now finds these positions much more vulnerable to legitimate attack than he had previously realized. In the first part of the essay, he argues that the us…Read more
  •  112
    Jealousy, shame, and the rival
    Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2). 2002.
    This essay is a critique of the two chapters on jealousy in Jerome Neu's book A Tear is an Intellectual Thing. The rival — as anobject of both fear and hatred — is of central importance in romantic jealousy, but it is here argued that the role of the rival cannot be fully understood in Neu's account of jealousy and that shame (not noted by Neu) must be seen as central to the concept of jealousy if the role of the rival is to be fully understood.
  •  103
    Justifying departures from equal treatment
    Journal of Philosophy 81 (10): 587-593. 1984.
  •  99
    Getting Even: The Role of the Victim: JEFFRIE G. MURPHY
    Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2): 209-225. 1990.
    Achilles is vindictive; he wants to get even with Agamemnon. Being so disposed, he sounds rather like many current crime victims who angrily complain that the American system of criminal justice will not allow them the satisfactions they rightfully seek. These victims often feel that their particular injuries are ignored while the system addresses itself to some abstract injury to the state or to the rule of law itself – a focus that appears to result in wrongdoers being treated with much greate…Read more
  •  91
    The Killing of the Innocent
    The Monist 57 (4): 527-550. 1973.
    Introduction. Murder, some may suggest, is to be defined as the intentional and uncoerced killing of the innocent; and it is true by definition that murder is wrong. Yet wars, particularly modern wars, seem to require the killing of the innocent, e.g. through anti-morale terror bombing. Therefore war must be wrong.
  •  71
    Jean Hampton on immorality, self-hatred, and self-forgiveness
    Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3): 215-236. 1998.
  •  71
    Mercy and Legal Justice*: JEFFRIE G. MURPHY
    Social Philosophy and Policy 4 (1): 1-14. 1986.
    Internal and External Questions. The most profound questions in ethics, social philosophy, and the philosophy of law are foundational; i.e., they are questions that call the entire framework of our ordinary evaluations into doubt in order to determine to what degree, if at all, that framework can be rationally defended. Such questions, called “external” by Rudolf Carnap, are currently dominating my own philosophical reflections and are forcing me to rethink a variety of positions I have in the p…Read more
  •  69
    The unhappy immoralist
    Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1). 2004.
  •  64
    Kant’s Concept of a Right Action
    The Monist 51 (4): 574-598. 1967.
    Introduction. For the most part, Kant’s moral philosophy is no longer taught. What is taught instead is a parody of Kant’s moral philosophy. His views, generally used as a foil for some other view like utilitarianism, are summed up in a few popular cliches which have achieved the status of interpretive dogma. Small wonder that undergraduates go away thinking that Kant is, at worst, a moral fanatic or, at best, a well-intentioned bungler who allowed his right-wing political views and Pietist upbr…Read more
  •  59
    The essays in this collection explore, from philosophical and religious perspectives, a variety of moral emotions and their relationship to punishment and condemnation or to decisions to lessen punishment or condemnation.
  •  57
    Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry
    The Monist 63 (2): 156-171. 1980.
    Most of us are inclined to believe that blackmail is clearly immoral and are thus quite content that it be criminalized. Justifying this belief, however, turns out to be more of a problem than it might at first seem. In particular, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish cases of blackmail from other hard economic transactions.
  •  43
    Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands
    Faith and Philosophy 4 (3): 276-281. 1987.
    James Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant’s sense) could not consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues (a) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent’sresponsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the best moral reasons available to an agent
  •  42
    [Book review] forgiveness and mercy (review)
    with Jean Hampton
    Ethics 100 (2): 413-415. 1990.
    This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy …Read more
  •  42
    We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties…Read more
  •  41
    Before Forgiving: Cautionary Views of Forgiveness in Psychotherapy (edited book)
    with Sharon Lamb and Jeffrie G. Murphy
    Oup Usa. 2002.
    Psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. Chapters by both psychologists and philosophers ask: Why is forgiveness so popular now? What exactly does it entail? When might it be appropriate for a therapist not to advise forgiveness? When is forgiveness in fact harmful?