Jennifer Kling

Uncivil obedience, also sometimes called malicious compliance, has the potential to be a galvanizing force for political change. Historically, it played a key role in many 20th century labor movements, and is still used today by both individuals and more organized activist groups. Despite this, uncivil obedience is less often a topic of philosophical discussion than its more well-known cousin, civil disobedience. In particular, uncivil obedience’s relationship to violence is almost entirely unexplored. In this paper, I outline the necessary conditions for some act to count as uncivil obedience, discuss its relationship to violence, and then present the conditions that must be met for uncivil obedience to be justified. Like other forms of protest and resistance, uncivil obedience has normative limits; there are things we ought not do with it, even in the name of fighting for a better world.

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant to our contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges.

Can war be justified? Pacifists answer that it cannot; they oppose war and advocate for nonviolent alternatives to war. But defenders of just war theory argue that in some circumstances, when the effectiveness of nonviolence is limited, wars can be justified. In this book, two philosophers debate this question, drawing on contemporary scholarship and new developments in thinking about pacifism and just war theory. Andrew Fiala defends the pacifist position, while Jennifer Kling defends just war traditions. Fiala argues that pacifism follows from the awful reality of war and the nonviolent goal of building a more just and peaceful world. Kling argues that war is sometimes justified when it is a last-ditch, necessary effort to defend people and their communities from utter destruction and death. Pulling from global traditions and histories, their debate will captivate anyone who has wondered or worried about the morality of political violence and military force. Topics discussed include ethical questions of self-defense and other-defense, the great analogy between individuals and states, evolving technologies and methods of warfighting, moral injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, broader political and communal issues, and the problem of regional security in a globalizing world. The authors consider cultural and religious issues as well as the fundamental question of moral obligation in a world saturated in military conflict. The book was written in the aftermath of the war on terrorism and includes reflection on lessons learned from the past decades of war, as well as hopes for the future in light of emerging threats in Europe and elsewhere. The book is organized in a user-friendly fashion. Each author presents a self-contained argument, which is followed by a series of responses, replies, and counter-arguments. Throughout, the authors model civil discourse by emphasizing points of agreement and remaining areas of disagreement. The book includes reader-friendly summaries, a glossary of key concepts, and suggestions for further study. All of this will help students and scholars follow the authors’ dialogue so they may develop their own answer to the question of whether war can be justified.

This article—a tribute to philosopher Bat-Ami Bar On—argues that states have obligations to not only resettle refugees, but also to put into place laws, policies, and procedures that are likely to ameliorate exclusionary attitudes and socio-political stances of existing members toward refugees and other forcibly displaced persons. The article begins with a recollection of Bar On, who encouraged the author to pursue the well-being of refugees as a worthy philosophical topic. The article then argues that refugee camps do not serve the purpose of justice; therefore, resettlement must be sought. Resettlement, in turn, raises several questions that egalitarians must take more seriously. In the end, equitable resettlement of refugees requires a broad based ethics of inclusivity and equality that bolsters community willingness to share spaces and “live and let live” in the face of cultural differences.

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state

A discussion of José-Antonio Orosco’s new book, Star Trek’s Philosophy of Peace and Justice: A Global, Anti-Racist Approach. Orosco has been finding wisdom in Star Trek episodes since he watched late night reruns with his mother. Then, recently, in honor of the 50th anniversary of Star Trek’s debut, Orosco began to teach the series as source material for peace philosophy. Philosophical concepts can be brought to bear on Star Trek stories; but Orosco argues that the stories also assert philosophical meanings that are instructive to peace studies. Martin Luther King Jr. was a fan of the first season, famously encouraging the late Nichelle Nichols (1932-2022) to persist in the role of Nyota Uhura after she had decided to resign. In our book discussion, Orosco centers the importance of Critical Race Theory as a tool for exploring Star Trek’s presentation of peace and justice. Andrew Fiala questions Orosco about Star Trek’s militarism. Jennifer Kling asks how the treatment of refugees intersects with Starfleet’s Prime Directive, which commands noninterference with intergalactic populations.

Recent events have directed public attention to the issue of whether there should be so-called “statutes of limitations” on oppressive transgressions committed in the past. We ask: in such cases, is sociopolitical forgiveness (or “forgetfulness”) owed to transgressors? We detail two moral-political narratives that might help address this issue: one constructed around the values and perspectives of justice, rights, and autonomy-based views (the JRA approach), and another oriented around the values and perspectives of care ethics, virtue ethics, and relationality, drawing additionally on several non-Western traditions including Buddhist and Confucian thought (the CVR approach). We maintain that while each approach has strengths, their essential tenets lead to serious shortcomings, such that neither is able to provide a wholly satisfactory solution to this pressing sociopolitical question. The resulting stalemate should be taken as a call to action for new theorizing by social and political theorists. How should we, as a society, handle the fact that people can do oppressive things at one age and then either forget about them or sincerely regret them at another age? Is there another approach out there that might solve this problem?

I argue that the U.S. ought to reduce its military spending. I first address consequentialist political arguments regarding military spending that are focused on safety and security, and the economy. I then address a justice-oriented argument regarding military spending that is focused on domestic and international opportunity costs. Ultimately, whether the concern is about the consequences of decreasing military spending, or the justice of decreasing military spending, I conclude that we ought to decrease U.S. military spending.

Oppression makes me angry. So, I am angry almost all of the time, as oppression (of various kinds) is endemic to our socio-political world. However, there is a growing philosophical literature that argues against anger as a necessary, virtuous, or important response to wrongdoing. Martha Nussbaum, in particular, argues that “anger is always normatively problematic, whether in the personal or in the public realm.” It is certainly true that anger can have bad or problematic effects, and it may well be true that Nussbaum, and others who hold similar views, are on the right track in the moral realm. However, despite the serious moral worries surrounding anger (which I discuss in more detail below), I contend that maintaining an anti-anger position is mistaken in regard to the socio-political realm. In particular, I argue that anger is both an important, and a virtuous, response to the presence of oppression, that is, to the presence of widespread injustices that disproportionately negatively affect certain social groups, and their members, within and across societies. Anger, when in response to oppression, has the potential to be, not a vice, but a virtue.

The exponential expansion and advancement of wartime technology has the potential to wipe out ‘war’ as a meaningful category. Assuming that the creation of new wartime technologies continues to accelerate, it could soon be the case that there will no longer be wars, but rather mass killings, slaughters, or genocides. This is because the concept of ‘war’ entails that opposing sides either will, or are able to, fight back against one another to some recognizable degree. In fact, this is one of the differences between war and wholesale killing, slaughter, or genocide. With the asymmetric proliferation of killing and maiming wartime technologies, there may soon no longer be even the possibility of a fair, or somewhat fair, fight; there will only be scorched earth.

How much injustice and oppression must be tolerated before a revolution is justified? In theory, the United States’ political structure, by design, makes the question of revolution obsolete: by putting political power into the hands of the people via democratic mechanisms such as voting, the division of power among separate branches of government, and representative influence and control, there should be no need for revolution because everything the government does either has the consent of the people or is (relatively swiftly) checked by their dissent. In practice, the United States’ political structure has failed to bring about such democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when, if ever, a revolution in the United States would be justified. To begin answering this question, we first turn to three traditional theories of revolution prominent in Western political theory, all of which have serious theoretical and practical problems, many of which are exacerbated by the contemporary American context in which our discussion is situated. We conclude that, if the aim of revolution is to bring about justice more equally enjoyed by all, then classic Western justifications of revolution are deeply flawed and possibly untenable. We propose a Confucian-inspired account of revolution, which promises to provide criteria for engaging in revolution that are neither solely directly democratic nor completely rights-based. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables us to take into consideration not only the role of government, the nature of the ruler, and the nature of the governed, but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. We contend that our proposal provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when, and under what conditions, a revolution would be justified in the contemporary United States.

This chapter interrogates the intersections between wealth, violence, and justice by considering two very different cases: refugees who have had their wealth taken from them, and political activists who are considering using Robin-Hood-style tactics to protest economic injustice. Ordinarily, the involuntary loss of wealth that refugees suffer, while it is viewed as an injustice, is not considered a violent injustice. However, when the involuntary redistribution of wealth is brought up in the context of resolving long-standing economic injustices, opponents cry out that such redistribution would be, not only unjust, but an act of violence. This raises an interesting question: how should we view the involuntary loss, or redistribution, of wealth? Disregarding for the moment whether such involuntary losses of wealth are justified or unjustified—which might well depend on the circumstances and context—it is worth considering whether they are instances of violence. If they are, then refugees have suffered more violence than we normally recognize. If they are not, then Robin-Hood-style tactics (absent the bows and arrows) may be allowed for those who wish to engage in non-violent resistance against economic injustice in all its forms.

This essay extends Robin DiAngelo’s concept of white fragility in two directions. First, we outline an additional cause of white fragility. The lack of proper terminology available to discuss race-based situations creates a semantic false dichotomy, which often results in an inability to discuss issues of racism in a way that is likely to have positive consequences, either for interpersonal relationships or for social and political change. Second, we argue that white fragility, with its semantic foundations, has serious consequences for racial justice. It perpetuates the mass incarceration of black Americans, and undergirds the knowledge gap and subsequent wealth gap. The result of these racial injustices, which are maintained partially through white fragility, is that black Americans do not live in a democracy; they neither occupy positions of social and political power, nor have the ability to obtain power or directly impact who does obtain power.

Court D. Lewis, author of Repentance and the Right to Forgiveness, presents a rights-based theory of ethics grounded in eirenéism, a needs-based theory of rights (inspired by Nicholas Wolterstorff) that seeks peaceful flourishing for all moral agents. This approach creates a moral relationship between victims and wrongdoers such that wrongdoers owe victims compensatory obligations. However, one further result is that wrongdoers may be owed forgiveness by victims. This leads to the “repugnant implication” that victims may be wrongdoers who do not forgive. Author Lewis addresses the “repugnant implication” by showing that victims are obligated to work toward forgiveness, if not forgiveness itself. Critic Gregory L. Bock argues that victims are not the only ones who can forgive, that the personal dimensions of forgiveness are overlooked, and that the force of the “repugnancy implication” may be questioned. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock supports a virtue ethics framework. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock encourages virtue ethics. Critic David Boersema raises questions about the binding nature of relationships, the dependency of flourishing upon forgiveness, and the nature of needs or rights. Boersema also questions the wisdom of a rights-based approach to forgiveness. Critic Jennifer Kling asks whether a rights-based approach is necessary to ground obligations to meet the needs of others: why not an ethics of care? If a rights-based approach is taken, perhaps a wrongdoer is obligated to not make forgiveness a life good. By disengaging this obligation, we avoid constraining a victim’s work toward forgiveness, especially when the wrongdoing is oppressive. Author Lewis responds to these objections.

This chapter examines whether, as Jeff McMahan argues, we should not integrate what he refers to as the “deep morality” of war into our military and international public policies and laws, because of the possible negative consequences of doing so. On the basis of feminist epistemology, I argue that McMahan is wrong to think that publicizing and legalizing the deep morality of war will have the negative consequences that he claims. Through a comparison with the Women's Suffrage Movement in the United States, I argue that McMahan's argument is epistemically biased, in that it reflects and incorporates stereotypical views of poor people as stupid, thoughtless, and brutish. We would do better to think hard about how we conceptualize combatants, and to recognize in our arguments that the abilities to reason well and to act morally are not restricted to the upper echelons of society.

We argue that violent political protest is justified in a generally just society when violence is required to send a message about the nature of the injustice at issue, and when it is not ruled out by moral or pragmatic considerations. Focusing on protest as a mode of public address, we argue that its communicative function can sometimes justify or require the use of violence. The injustice at the heart of the Baltimore protests—police brutality against black Americans —is a paradigmatic case of this sort, because of the relationship of the police to the injustice and the protests against it.

We tend to think that mass atrocities and attempted genocides call for humanitarian intervention by other states. (Nonviolent intervention if possible, military intervention if need be.) In this chapter, I discuss these two related claims in turn. What, if anything, justifies humanitarian intervention in certain states by other states? Ought such interventions, if justified, be pacifist in nature, or is it legitimate in some cases to intervene violently? To discuss these questions, I draw primarily on principles and arguments found in just war theory, pacifism, international relations, and analytic political philosophy more generally.

The suffering of war refugees is often regarded as a wrong-less harm. Although war refugees have been made worse off in severe ways, they have not been wronged, because no one intentionally caused their suffering. In military parlance, war refugees are collateral damage. As such, nothing is owed to them as a matter of justice, because their suffering is not the result of intentional wrongdoing; rather, it is the regrettable and unintended result of necessary and proportionate wartime actions. So, while the warring national or extra-national groups might help war refugees, such aid is regarded as humanitarian, not as justice.I challenge the view that war refugees are harmed but not wronged when those harms directly result from necessary and proportionate wartime actions. War refugees are innocent bystanders, and so are an exception to the principle that permits defense by any necessary and proportionate means. Just as an individual may not kill or seriously harm an innocent bystander to save herself, so too national or extra-national groups may not create refugees to win a war. If such groups do create war refugees during the legitimate pursuit of military goals, they have wronged those refugees, and so owe them recompense.