Jennifer Kuzma

Historically, market regulation has played an important role in shaping the trajectory of scientific and technological innovation in food and agriculture. However, regulators’ traditional focus on safety and efficacy may be insufficient to address more complex ethical, legal, and social implications of novel products, such as the use of nanotechnology and nanomaterials in food and agriculture. One solution might be to implement the principles of responsible innovation to challenge innovators and policymakers to better anticipate risks further upstream and be responsive to societal desires and concerns, although substantial barriers to implementation persist. This paper presents stakeholder views on the relationship between regulation and RI in nano-agrifoods based on a broader U.S. stakeholder engagement study conducted in the fall of 2020. We found that participants raised key issues that incorporated all 4 pillars of RI. We also found that participants’ attitudes about the relationship between regulation and innovation informed their recommendations about the relationship between regulation and RI. These attitudes are represented in a spectrum of views, ranging from “regulation as barrier” to “regulation as driver” of innovation. We further identified implications for how each attitude might be used to operationalize RI in regulatory systems. Overall, these results suggest that just as regulation drove key innovations in the twentieth century, regulation may still have a role to play in helping to promote RI of nano-agrifoods in the twenty-first.

The growth of responsible innovation scholarship has been mirrored by a proliferation of RI definitions and practices, as well as a recognition of the importance of context for RI. This study investigates how researchers in the field of nanotechnology for food and agriculture define and practice RI, as well as what motivations they see for pursuing RI. We conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with nano-agrifood researchers from industry and academia in the USA, where we asked them to describe their RI definitions, practices, and motivations. We analyzed the emergent themes from these interviews, including how the themes aligned with four prominent RI principles. We found that nano-agrifood researchers largely focused their descriptions of RI definitions, practices, and motivations around a narrow envisioning of the RI principle of anticipation — emphasizing product safety, efficacy, and efficiency. We also found noteworthy tensions surrounding the less frequently mentioned RI principles. For example, some researchers envisioned inclusion as a way to align products with industry interests while others saw it as a way to align products with the public good. Concerning motivations for RI, some researchers viewed RI as a way to protect one’s reputation and avoid lawsuits while others viewed it as a way to improve human well-being and solve societal problems. Given these findings, future efforts to foster RI within nano-agrifoods should promote discussions among researchers concerning what it means to responsibly innovate and what practices this could entail, particularly beyond ensuring product safety, efficacy, and efficiency.

Environmental releases of gene edited (GEdOs) and gene drive organisms (GDOs) will likely occur under conditions of high uncertainty and in complex socioecological systems. Therefore, public deliberation is especially important to account for diverse interpretations of safety, risks, and benefits; to draw on experiential and public wisdom in areas of proposed release; to ameliorate dangers of technological optimism; and to increase the public legitimacy of decisions. Yet there is a “democratic deficit” in the United States' oversight system for GEdOs and GDOs, as unconflicted experts, publics, and skeptical stakeholders are most often excluded from decision‐making and unavailable to critically examine potential risks and benefits or raise broader concerns about socioeconomic or cultural impacts. This article argues for the need to open up decision‐making for GEdOs and GDOs, discusses the challenges for doing so within the current oversight framework, and finally, proposes institutional, policy, and attitudinal changes that are likely important for overcoming barriers to public deliberation.

For the purposes of conservation or suppression of species, gene drive technology has significant potential. Theoretically speaking, with the release of even relatively few animals with gene drive systems in an ecosystem, beneficial or harmful genes could be introduced into the entire wild-type population of that species. Given the profound impact that gene drives could have on species and ecosystems, their use is a highly contentious issue. Communities and groups have differing beliefs about nature and its conservation or preservation, as well as concerns about the ecological safety of the eradication, replacement or enhancement of particular species of animals by means of genetic engineering. For all those reasons, the rigorous regulation of insects and other animals with gene drive systems is crucial. In this paper, we consider the question of whether the United States Food and Drug Administration is prepared to effectively regulate insects and other animals with gene drives.

Novel targeted genetic modification (TagMo) techniques for plants have the potential to increase the speed and ease of genetic modification and fall outside existing regulatory authority. We conducted 31 interviews with expert-stakeholders to explore the differing visions they have for the future of plant TagMo environmental regulation. To guide our analysis we review the tenets of anticipatory governance in light of future studies literature on emerging technology, focusing on how to contribute to reflexivity by making explicit the assumptions within envisioned futures. Our findings reveal that the environmental regulation futures articulated by expert-stakeholders could be classified into three categories—optimistic, pragmatic, and critical—based on their differing underlying assumptions concerning what constitutes environmental risk and the adequacy of existing U.S. genetically modified plant regulations. By gathering these diverse perspectives on the future and studying how they differ, we hope to further the anticipatory governance-informed engagement with regulation and foster a more productive discussion of plant TagMo regulation.

There is a “revolving door” between federal agencies and the industries regulated by them. Often, at the end of their industry tenure, key industry personnel seek employment in government regulatory entities and vice versa. The flow of workers between the two sectors could bring about good. Industry veterans might have specialized knowledge that could be useful to regulatory bodies and former government employees could help businesses become and remain compliant with regulations. But the “revolving door” also poses at least three ethical and policy challenges that have to do with public trust and fair representation. First, the presence of former key industry personnel on review boards could adversely impact the public’s confidence in regulatory decisions about new technology products, including agrifood biotechnologies. Second, the ‘‘revolving door’’ may result in policy decisions about technologies that are biased in favor of industry interests. And third, the ‘‘revolving door’’ virtually guarantees industry a voice in the policy-making process, even though other stakeholders have no assurance that their concerns will be addressed by regulatory agencies. We believe these three problems indicate a failure of regulatory review for new technologies. The review process lacks credibility because, at the very least, it is procedurally biased in favor of industry interests. We argue that prohibiting the flow of personnel between regulatory agencies and industry would not be a satisfactory solution to the three problems of public trust and just representation. To address them, regulatory entities must reject the traditional notion of objectivity. Instead they should adopt the conception of objectivity developed by Sandra Harding and re-configure their regulatory review on the basis of it. That will ensure that a heterogeneous group of stakeholders is at the decision-making table. The fair representation of interests of different constituencies in the review process could do much to inspire warranted public confidence in regulatory protocols and decisions

The emergence of nanotechnology, and specifically nanobiotechnology, raises major oversight challenges. In the United States, government, industry, and researchers are debating what oversight approaches are most appropriate. Among the federal agencies already embroiled in discussion of oversight approaches are the Food and Drug Administration , Environmental Protection Agency , Department of Agriculture , Occupational Safety and Health Administration , and National Institutes of Health . All can learn from assessment of the successes and failures of past oversight efforts aimed at emerging technologies. This article reports on work funded by the National Science Foundation aimed at learning the lessons of past oversight efforts. The article offers insights that emerge from comparing five oversight case studies that examine oversight of genetically engineered organisms in the food supply, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, chemicals in the workplace, and gene therapy. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis, the authors present a new way of evaluating oversight

Risk analysis and regulatory systems are usually evaluated according to utilitarian frameworks, as they are viewed to operate “objectively” by considering the health, environmental, and economic impacts of technological applications. Yet, the estimation of impacts during risk analysis and the decisions in regulatory review are affected by value choices of actors and stakeholders; attention to principles such as autonomy, justice, and integrity; and power relationships. In this article, case studies of biotechnology are used to illustrate how non-utilitarian principles are prominent in risk analysis and regulatory review and to argue that these relationships should be carefully considered as we consider nanotechnology oversight systems for its products. We argue that there are not distinct separations between “science-based” review systems, in which evaluations of the consequences of technological products are primarily considered, and principles of integrity, justice, non-maleficence, and autonomy. It should further be expected that, given research into fair treatment during decision-making processes, attention to ethics will affect how citizens assess emerging technologies. Finally, a more holistic approach for evaluating oversight systems for the products of nanotechnology is suggested, one which does not draw a sharp distinction between risk analysis, regulation, and respect for non-utilitarian values

U.S. approaches to oversight of research and technological products have developed over time in an effort to ensure safety to humans, animals, and the environment and to control use in a social context. In modern times, regulatory and oversight tools have evolved to include diverse approaches such as performance standards, tradable allowances, consultations between government and industry, and pre-market safety and efficacy reviews. The decision whether to impose an oversight system, the oversight elements, the level of oversight, the choice of approach, and its execution can profoundly affect technological development, individual and collective interests, and public confidence in technological products. Oversight is conducted by a range of institutions with various capabilities, cultures, and motives. Avenues for disputing oversight decisions are also important, and some argue that the U.S. operates in an adversarial regulatory culture in which Congress, the media, and stakeholders regularly contest the decisions of federal agencies.

Growing public concern and uncertainties surrounding emerging technologies suggest the need for socially-responsible behavior of companies in the development and implementation of oversight systems for them. In this paper, we argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an important aspect of nanotechnology oversight given the role of trust in shaping public attitudes about nanotechnology and the lack of data about the health and environmental risks of nanoproducts. We argue that CSR is strengthened by the adoption of stakeholder-driven models and attention to moral principles in policies and programs. In this context, we examine drivers of CSR, contextual and leadership factors that influence CSR, and strategies for CSR. To illustrate these concepts, we discuss existing cases of CSR-like behavior in nanotechnology companies, and then provide examples of how companies producing nanomedicines can exhibit morally-driven CSR behavior