This dissertation approaches what the philosophical and psychological literature generally identifies as the ethic of care both critically and constructively. It begins by noting a trend in feminist critique of the ethic of care, one arguing that care ethics posits a moral stance that advocates subservience and self-sacrifice on the part of the caring agent. In essence, care is regarded as a moral perspective merely describing the historically sanctioned social position of women, a position of w…
Read moreThis dissertation approaches what the philosophical and psychological literature generally identifies as the ethic of care both critically and constructively. It begins by noting a trend in feminist critique of the ethic of care, one arguing that care ethics posits a moral stance that advocates subservience and self-sacrifice on the part of the caring agent. In essence, care is regarded as a moral perspective merely describing the historically sanctioned social position of women, a position of which feminists ought to be highly critical. ;In the course of examining the legitimacy of this critique, this dissertation explores the possible interaction of the moral emotions of empathy and shame and the consequences of the resulting dissonance on the moral lives of women. This dissertation argues that a care ethic based on an appropriate understanding of empathy escapes the criticism that it is necessarily a self-defeating perspective. Yet, it also takes seriously the fact that social pressures encourage women to strive after the kind of self-sacrificing model with which feminist critics of the care ethic are concerned. Because this model of ethical agency remains beyond the reach of most people, shame at failing to meet this ideal may color the attitudes of women trying to conform to such traditional expectations. Motivated to be self-sacrificing, yet recognizing the value of empathy, women are vulnerable to a kind of emotional dissonance, where the psychic pull of empathy draws the agent's attention outward and the psychic pull of shame draws the agent's emotional focus inward. ;If the self-censuring posture of shame is overwhelming, women may continue to strive after the very ideal which caused them shame initially. Any care perspective in which the agent acts from shame deserves the kind of criticism certain feminists bring against care theories. However, a caring agent need not remain caught in a cycle of shame, for a shame experience affords the moral agent the opportunity to evaluate her moral ideals. An ethic of care based upon a proper understanding of empathy can offer an alternative vision of moral agency
