Jennifer Marra Henrigillis

In 2014, Louis CK was unquestionably the philosopher king of comedy, a commercial, cultural, and creative icon who dared to explore the most vulnerable parts of society, culture, and himself. His jokes raised philosophical issues in epistemology and mirrored the philosophy of some of the greats: Quine, Augustine, Aristotle, Schopenhauer, and Buddha just to name a few. Then, with the revelation of sexual misconduct in 2017, CK was dethroned overnight. Many were shocked, confused, and angry that CK, whom they had come to know as an advocate for women, a loving father, and a thoughtful ally to the feminist movement, would abuse his position of power for sexual gratification. Many believed that CK’s actions forfeit his access to the cultural marketplace – the only way to truly show disgust and disapproval of CK would be to ban him from comedy clubs, remove him from creative roles, cancel the release of his films, and strip his work from streaming archives.There is stark disagreement on what has been, and ought to be, done with Louis CK. Some comedians and commentators have understood CK as a sexual predator whose continued presence in the comedy world would only serve to reinforce rape culture, effectively telling victims that they don’t matter and men that assault is forgivable. Other comedians and comedy audiences rejoice at the return of CK, believing that his comedy remains entertaining and worthwhile despite his behavior.There are several philosophical layers of this case to unravel, but after exploring the ways in which CK was the philosopher king of comedy before his fall, the present study focuses on the following two questions: (1) was the industry response to CK’s actions the correct one? and (2) should CK be allowed to return to comedy?

The aim of this dissertation is to offer a new theory of humor that takes seriously both the universality and power of humor in culture. In the first chapter, I summarize historical and contemporary theories, and show how each either 1) fails to give any definition of humor, 2) fails as a theory of humor, and/or 3) underappreciates, dismisses, or does not consider the power of humor in experience. The second chapter explains the failures of prior theories by understanding the problem in terms of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms. These forms of culture are perspectives through which we express and understand our world, and each presents its own unique perspectives through which we can understand ourselves and the world. In the third chapter, I argue that humor is one of these necessary and universal symbolic forms of culture. I argue that confusions in the philosophy of humor stem from approaches to humor that understand it as part of some other symbolic form rather than as a form itself. In the fourth chapter, I argue for the function of humor as that which reveals and exposes epistemic vices –laziness, arrogance, and closed-minded thinking about ourselves and the world. I support this argument by showing not only that all previous theories of humor have within them epistemic revelation as a consistent commonality, but also by showing that this revelation is necessary to the form of humor while it is, at best, accidental to other forms. In my final chapter, I suggest that we ought to approach humor objectively, and that the normativity of the symbolic forms guides us toward such an approach. I offer two objective questions to ask about a given instance of humor: 1) does the humor idealize a liberated end? and 2) does the humor fulfil the cultural function of the symbolic form it represents by disrupting epistemically vicious thinking? If the answer to both of these questions is affirmative, then it is likely that the humor in question is morally praiseworthy. I conclude by offering suggestions for further study.

In this paper, I seek to explore the increasing popular claim that the performance of philosophy and the performance of humor share similar features. I argue that the explanation lies in the function of humor—a function which can be a catalyst for philosophy. Following Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and utilizing insights from various philosophical and scientific perspectives on the nature and origins of humor, I argue that the function of humor is to reveal faulty belief or error in judgment. Once such errors are revealed the mind demands resolution, and this is the work of philosophy. But philosophy cannot solve a problem unless it recognizes that there is a problem to solve. That is, the move from ignorance to philosophy requires a mediating step. Humor can act as that step, and, as such, humor can serve as a catalyst for philosophy while being necessarily distinct from it.