•  2358
    The Limitations of the Open Mind
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people worki…Read more
  •  1184
    Evidence, pragmatics, and justification
    Philosophical Review 111 (1): 67-94. 2002.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejectin…Read more
  •  820
    Radical Knowledge Minimalism
    Logos and Episteme 14 (2): 223-227. 2023.
    We argue that knowledge doesn‘t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism.
  •  580
    Knowing-how and knowing-that
    Philosophy Compass 3 (3). 2008.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior bit of…Read more
  •  484
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
  •  431
    On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3): 558-589. 2007.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth‐related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge‐citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by gi…Read more
  •  370
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a prop…Read more
  •  290
    Knowledge in an uncertain world
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
  •  242
    Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1): 55-66. 2009.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chanc…Read more
  •  227
    Ryle’s regress defended
    Philosophical Studies 156 (1): 121-130. 2011.
  •  204
    Is metaethics morally neutral?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1). 2006.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument…Read more
  •  189
    Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity
    with Matthew McGrath
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3): 693-702. 2012.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
  •  182
    Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed
    with Matthew McGrath
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 473-490. 2012.
  •  180
    Knowledge How
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
  •  180
    Fake News vs. Echo Chambers
    Social Epistemology 35 (6): 645-659. 2021.
    I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening our beliefs. I resolve the tension by arguing again…Read more
  •  174
    Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity
    Metaphysica 17 (1): 87-108. 2016.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remai…Read more
  •  172
    An analysis of the a priori and a posteriori
    Acta Analytica 18 (1-2): 43-69. 2003.
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori solely depende…Read more
  •  150
    Modest Infinitism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4). 2003.
    Modest Infinitism Jeremy Fantl Abstract Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes…Read more
  •  135
    Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4): 371-383. 2003.
    We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.
  •  120
    Truth and Epistemology
    with Matthew McGrath
    In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer. pp. 127--145. 2013.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear enough grasp of what cor…Read more
  •  85
    Evidentialism as an Historical Theory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 778-791. 2020.
    According to time-slice epistemology, what attitudes you should have at a time supervenes on features of you—like your evidence or mental states—at that time. Evidentialism is commonly assumed to b...
  •  76
    What Is It to Be Happy That P?
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2. 2015.
    This paper offers a new argument that your reasons for believing or acting need not be true. It proceeds indirectly through an account of what it takes to be happy that p. To be happy that p is for p to be among your reasons for being happy. That’s because questions about why you’re happy and what you’re happy is the case are interchangeable. But, I argue, it is possible to be happy that p even when p is false. In cases in which you believe falsely that p and sincerely assert that you are happy …Read more
  •  70
    What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4): 834-834. 2020.
    In this excellent and well-argued book, Michael Hannon defends two primary claims: first, the function of knowledge-attributions is primarily that of flagging reliable informants; second, proper ep...
  •  62
    Guidance and mainstream epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 180 (7): 2191-2210. 2023.
    According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can’t provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, “the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices.” In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this “regulative” critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can…Read more
  •  53
    How We Should Teach Plantinga’s Possible Persons
    Teaching Philosophy 23 (4): 329-342. 2000.
    While it is often undesirable and difficult to introduce highly complex arguments in large introductory philosophy classes, it is important to do so at least once in the semester as it challenges students, shows how philosophical debates often go beyond one’s initial intuitions, and illustrates how meaningful answers often turn on close attention to logical minutiae. This paper provides an example of an advanced debate on the free-will response to the problem of evil that can be used in introduc…Read more
  •  50
    A Defense of Dogmatism
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 34-57. 2013.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matte…Read more
  •  42
    Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2): 157-160. 2012.
  •  41
    In Michael Williams' “What's So Special About Human knowledge?” he argues that the kind of knowledge characteristic of adult humans is distinctive in that it involves epistemic responsibility. In particular, when an adult human has knowledge, they have a certain kind of epistemic authority, and that to attribute knowledge to them is to grant them a certain kind of authority over the subject matter. I argue that, while it is true that when we attribute knowledge to adult humans, we typically also…Read more