Jeremy Shearmur

This book offers a distinctive treatment of Hayek's ideas as a "research program". It presents a detailed account of aspects of Hayek's intellectual development and of problems that arise within his work, and then offers some broad suggestions as to ways in which the program initiated in his work might be developed further. The book discusses how Popper and Lakatos' ideas about "research programs" might be applied within political theory. There then follows a distinctive presentation of Hayek's intellectual development up to The Road to Serfdom, together with critical engagement with his later ideas. The discussion draws on a full range of his writings, makes use of some neglected earlier work on social theory and law, and also draws on archival material. This book should appeal to anyone with an interest in Hayek's work, as well as to those with a concern for twentieth century intellectual history.

This paper addresses the intellectual motivation of some of those involved in the intelligent design movement. It identifies their concerns with the critique of the claim that Darwinism offers an adequate explanation of prima facie teleological features in biology, a critique of naturalism, and the concern on the part of some of these authors including Dembski, with the revival of 'Old Princeton' apologetics. It is argued that their work is interesting and is in principle intellectually legitimate. It is also suggested, however, that it needs to be appraised qua 'research programme' (after the fashion of the early work of Lakatos), and that, seen in that light, what needs to be accomplished might seem daunting.

In this long-awaited volume, Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner bring to light Popper's most important unpublished and uncollected writings from the time of The Open Society until his death in 1994. After The Open Society: Selected Social and Political Writings reveals the development of Popper's political and philosophical thought during and after the Second World War, from his early socialism through to the radical humanitarianism of The Open Society. The papers in this collection, many of which are available here for the first time, demonstrate the clarity and pertinence of Popper's thinking on such topics as religion, history, Plato and Aristotle, while revealing a lifetime of unwavering political commitment. After The Open Society illuminates the thought of one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers and is essential reading for anyone interested in the recent course of philosophy, politics, history and society

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that socialism is over. Be that as it may, it is now widely accepted that socialism, understood as involving the social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of markets, faces real and perhaps insuperable difficulties. For without both markets and individual ownership, it is difficult to see how problems of individual motivation and information transmission are to be tackled—to say nothing of Ludwig von Mises's underlying concern with how to make economic decisions about the utilization of resources within an economy.

Shearmur argues for the importance of Popper’s ideas about World 3, and against the idea that they should be re-interpreted in social terms. However, he also argues for the importance of Popper’s ideas about methodological rules—and that these may be given a partially social interpretation. The content of our ideas may in consequence differ from what we take it to be, as a consequence of our institutions and practices operating as methodological rules. He also explores related ideas about the interplay between World 3 and social factors in connection with Darnton’s ideas about the book and work that has built on it, and related issues about the public sphere and the problem of effective deliberative feedback on public policy.

Hayek's philosophy of law has Kantian features, but he offers indirect utilitarian arguments for them. Hayek's argument might be strengthened by considering that the utilitarian has an interest in issues of truth and falsity and thus in the individual as the bearer of critical judgments. Individuals might thus be accorded?dialogue rights?; upon a episte?mological basis, an idea which is further strengthened by the consideration that dialogue may be extended to the appraisal of the validity of utilitarianism. Moreover, such dialogue rights should be interpreted in large part as property rights

The later thought of Karl Popper—notably, his ideas about traditions and his “modified essentialism” in the philosophy of natural science— should lead to revisions in the political philosophy set out in The Open Society and Its Enemies. The structural approach allowed for by Popper's modified essentialism, and the delicate nature of traditions, buttress certain issues raised by Friedrich Hayek that pose serious problems for Popper's social‐democratic approach to politics. Fred Eidlin's review essay on my Political Thought of Karl Popper misses these problems, and in general underestimates the difficulties that unintended consequences pose for any non‐utopian theory of politics. Thus, Eidlin uncritically cites Popper's abstract political recognition of unintended consequences and his idealized view of the political process, as if that puts to rest the questions my book asks.

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma

Michelman's emphasis upon intersubjectivity is commendable; but a cognitive approach is required to generate rights. Michelman has raised a significant point against Shearmur's earlier paper: does it offer a rationale for according rights to every individual with whom our relationship may be remote? Michelman's suggestion that oppression might itself be a source of illumination should be declined, however, so it is tentatively suggested? with reference to Popper's ?world 3"? that we may value such people as cultural objects: as bearers and creators of culture.

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

Popper was also a critic of the idea that it was possible – or necessary – to give a positive response to the problem of induction. He was also a critic of many probabilistic theories of induction. He suggested that instead of seeking for a positive way of resolving the problem of induction – or, more generally, of trying to justify our claims that our ideas were true – we should, instead be concerned to make our claims open to criticism. All this, and its strengths and weaknesses, have been much discussed. But it seems to me that not enough attention has been paid to what is distinctive about Popper’s work – and to the question of how it addresses our various problem-situations today.

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma