•  391
    Distinguishing the commonsense senses
    with Roberto Casati and François Le Corre
    In Dustin Stokes (ed.), Perception and Its Modalities, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    This paper proposes a methodological strategy to investigate the question of the individuation of the senses both from a commonsensical and a scientific point of view. We start by discussing some traditional and recent criteria for distinguishing the senses and argue that none of them taken in isolation seems to be able to handle both points of views. We then pay close attention to the faculty of hearing which offers promising examples of the strategy we pursue of combining commonsense and scien…Read more
  •  33
    The book introduces Ramsey's main doctrines and assesses their contemporary significance. In particular, Jérôme Dokic and Pascal Engel are interested in Ramsey's thoughts on truth and belief, and his pragmatic thesis that the truth of one's beliefs guarantees the success of one's actions. From this, it is a short step to what may be called "Ramsey's principle": the content of a belief is constituted by the success of one's actions. This principle finds its current expression in the work of philo…Read more
  •  88
    This book provides a much-needed critical introduction to the main doctrines of Frank Ramsey's work and assesses their contemporary significance.
  •  38
    The Problem of Context for Similarity: An Insight from Analogical Cognition
    with Pauline Armary and Emmanuel Sander
    Philosophies 3 (4): 39--0. 2018.
    Similarity is central for the definition of concepts in several theories in cognitive psychology. However, similarity encounters several problems which were emphasized by Goodman in 1972. At the end of his article, Goodman banishes similarity from any serious philosophical or scientific investigations. If Goodman is right, theories of concepts based on similarity encounter a huge problem and should be revised entirely. In this paper, we would like to analyze the notion of similarity with some in…Read more
  •  9
    Book Reviews (review)
    with George Huxley, John J. Ansbro, Maeve Cooke, Piers Rawling, John Preston, Garin V. Dowd, John Bussanich, Flash Q. Fiasco, José Luis Bermúdez, Lucie A. Antoniol, João Branquinho, Peter König, Iseult Honohan, and Paul S. Miklowitz
    Humana Mente 3 (2): 346-382. 1995.
  •  23
    Introduction
    Dialectica 58 (4). 2004.
  •  64
    Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?
    Dialectica 69 (3): 271-292. 2015.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not.…Read more
  •  207
    Are emotions perceptions of value?
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2): 227-247. 2013.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from o…Read more
  •  148
    Situated minimalism versus free enrichment
    Synthese 184 (2): 179-198. 2012.
    In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thoug…Read more
  •  93
  •  37
    Fiction, Counterfactuals and Truth
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1): 117-123. 1993.
    An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions (sentences) across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular r…Read more
  •  8
    Fiction, Counterfactuals and Truth
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1): 117-123. 1993.
    An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions (sentences) across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular r…Read more
  •  292
    The Ockhamization of the event sources of sound
    Analysis 73 (3): 462-466. 2013.
    There is one character too many in the triad sound, event source, thing source. As there are neither phenomenological nor metaphysical grounds for distinguishing sounds and sound sources, we propose to identify them
  • Perception and space
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
  • The beautiful, the sublime and the self
    with Margherita Arcangeli and Marco Sperduti
    In Florian Cova & Sébastien Réhault (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics, Bloomsbury Academic. 2018.
  •  8
    Variations on familiarity in self-transcendent experiences
    Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 10 (1): 19-48. 2022.
  •  205
    The image of perception as openness to fact is best understood as the claim that the contents of perception are mind-independent facts. However, I argue against John McDowell that this claim, which he accepts, is incompatible with his conceptualism, namely the thesis that the contents of perception are fully conceptual. If we want to give justice to the image of perception as openness to facts, we have to acknwoledge that perception relates us to a non-conceptual world.
  •  7
    La conception naïve de l’expérience visuelle dépeint celle-ci comme une relation directe, primitive, entre le sujet voyant et l’objet vu. Elle repose sur une opposition entre la relation visuelle et la représentation mentale de l’objet vu dans l’imagination visuelle ou la vision des images. Le but de cet article est de suggérer que l’opposition naïve entre relation et représentation présente un intérêt philosophique et scientifique parfois sous-estimé. Deux théories philosophiques de la percepti…Read more
  •  1
    Penser en contexte: le phénomène de l'indexicalité
    with Eros Corazza and Jérôme Dokic
    Éditions de L’Éclat. 1993.
    Enth. zudem: Frege et les démonstratifs / par John Perry ; Comprendre les démonstratifs / par Gareth Evans.
  •  66
    At the Limits: What Drives Experiences of the Sublime
    British Journal of Aesthetics (2): 145-161. 2020.
    Aesthetics, both in its theoretical and empirical forms, has seen a renewed interest in the sublime, an aesthetic category dear to traditional philosophers, but quite neglected by contemporary philosophy. Our aim is to offer a novel perspective on the experience of the sublime. More precisely, our hypothesis is that the latter arises from ‘a radical limit-experience’, which is a metacognitve awareness of the limits of our cognitive capacities as we are confronted with something indefinitely grea…Read more
  •  64
    Awe and the Experience of the Sublime: A Complex Relationship
    with Margherita Arcangeli, Marco Sperduti, Amélie Jacquot, and Pascale Piolino
    Frontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.
    Awe seems to be a complex emotion or emotional construct characterized by a mix of positive (contentment, happiness), and negative affective components (fear and a sense of being smaller, humbler or insignificant). It is striking that the elicitors of awe correspond closely to what philosophical aesthetics, and especially Burke and Kant, have called “the sublime.” As a matter of fact, awe is almost absent from the philosophical agenda, while there are very few studies on the experience of the su…Read more
  •  19
    L’accointance, le sens de l’accointance, et la nature de la perception
    Les Etudes Philosophiques 130 (3): 441-457. 2019.
    Si l’accointance est définie comme une relation mentale entre un sujet et un fragment de réalité, le sens de l’accointance est le sentiment pour le sujet d’être en rapport direct avec un fragment de réalité. Pour de nombreux philosophes, le sens de l’accointance fait partie de l’essence de la perception consciente : voir une montagne, par exemple, implique le sentiment d’être en rapport direct avec elle, de l’avoir « en chair et en os » sous les yeux, plutôt que de la viser à travers une représe…Read more
  •  28
    Introspection, déploiement et simulation
    Philosophiques 32 (2): 383-397. 2005.
    On a cognitivist account of self-ascription, I can have direct, non-inferential knowledge about my own beliefs. This account makes traditionally appeal to the notion of introspection, conceived as an internal source of knowledge. At least since Wittgenstein, many philosophers have justly worried that such a notion makes it impossible to make sense of the ascription of a unified notion of belief, which can be shared with others. In this essay, I explore another method of self-ascription, which wa…Read more
  • Affective memory: a little help from our imagination
    In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, . pp. 139-156. 2018.
    When we remember a past situation, the emotional import of the latter often transpires in a modified form at the phenomenological level of our present memory. When it does, we experience what is sometimes called an “affective memory.” Theorists of memories have disagreed about the status of affective memories. Sceptics claim that the relationship between memory and emotion can only be of two types: either the memory is about a past emotion (the emotion is part of what is remembered), or it cause…Read more