• Penser En Contexte le Phénomène de L'Indexicalité
    with Eros Corazza
    éditions de l’éclat. 1993.
    Enth. zudem: Frege et les démonstratifs / par John Perry ; Comprendre les démonstratifs / par Gareth Evans.
  •  24
    At the Limits: What Drives Experiences of the Sublime
    British Journal of Aesthetics (2): 145-161. 2020.
    Aesthetics, both in its theoretical and empirical forms, has seen a renewed interest in the sublime, an aesthetic category dear to traditional philosophers, but quite neglected by contemporary philosophy. Our aim is to offer a novel perspective on the experience of the sublime. More precisely, our hypothesis is that the latter arises from ‘a radical limit-experience’, which is a metacognitve awareness of the limits of our cognitive capacities as we are confronted with something indefinitely grea…Read more
  •  18
    Awe and the Experience of the Sublime: A Complex Relationship
    with Margherita Arcangeli, Marco Sperduti, Amélie Jacquot, and Pascale Piolino
    Frontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.
    Awe seems to be a complex emotion or emotional construct characterized by a mix of positive (contentment, happiness), and negative affective components (fear and a sense of being smaller, humbler or insignificant). It is striking that the elicitors of awe correspond closely to what philosophical aesthetics, and especially Burke and Kant, have called “the sublime.” As a matter of fact, awe is almost absent from the philosophical agenda, while there are very few studies on the experience of the su…Read more
  •  24
    Introspection, d? ploiement et simulation
    Philosophiques 32 (2): 383-397. 2005.
    Selon une théorie cognitiviste de l’auto-attribution, je peux parvenir à la connaissance directe, non-inférentielle de mes propres croyances. Cette théorie a été traditionnellement associée à la notion d’introspection conçue comme source de connaissance interne. On sait que le recours à cette notion compromet l’application à soi-même d’un concept unifié de croyance, valable également pour autrui. Dans cet essai, j’explore une autre méthode d’auto-attribution, également envisagée par Wittgenstein…Read more
  •  25
    The Problem of Context for Similarity: An Insight from Analogical Cognition
    with Pauline Armary and Emmanuel Sander
    Philosophies 3 (4): 39--0. 2018.
    Similarity is central for the definition of concepts in several theories in cognitive psychology. However, similarity encounters several problems which were emphasized by Goodman in 1972. At the end of his article, Goodman banishes similarity from any serious philosophical or scientific investigations. If Goodman is right, theories of concepts based on similarity encounter a huge problem and should be revised entirely. In this paper, we would like to analyze the notion of similarity with some in…Read more
  • Affective memory: a little help from our imagination
    In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, . pp. 139-156. 2018.
    When we remember a past situation, the emotional import of the latter often transpires in a modified form at the phenomenological level of our present memory. When it does, we experience what is sometimes called an “affective memory.” Theorists of memories have disagreed about the status of affective memories. Sceptics claim that the relationship between memory and emotion can only be of two types: either the memory is about a past emotion (the emotion is part of what is remembered), or it cause…Read more
  •  2
    Shades and concepts
    with Lisabeth Pacherie
    Analysis 61 (3): 193-202. 2001.
  • European Review of Philosophy, 2: Cognitive Dynamics (edited book)
    Center for the Study of Language and Inf. 1996.
  •  31
    The framework of perception
    In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 347-356. 2015.
  •  102
    Pictures in the Flesh Presence and Appearance in Pictorial Experience
    British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (4): 391-405. 2012.
    This essay explores the prospects of grounding an account of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’ on a theory of presence in ordinary perception. Even though worldly objects can be perceptually recognized in a picture, they do not feel present as when they are perceived face to face. I defend a dual view of perceptual phenomenology according to which the sense of presence is dissociated from the contents of perception. On the one hand, the sense of presence is best conceived as a non-sensory feel…Read more
  •  69
    IV—Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1): 69-88. 2016.
  •  226
    The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content
    Erkenntnis 48 (2-3): 153-169. 1998.
    The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar, whereas perception as a mental state is not. This has profou…Read more
  •  123
    Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition
    WIREs Cognitive Science 3 533-543. 2012.
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perce…Read more
  •  100
    Seeds of self-knowledge: noetic feelings and metacognition
    In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 302--321. 2012.
  • La perception est au cœur de notre rapport au monde, mais son statut philosophique reste cependant difficile à cerner : laperception est-elle une forme de connaissance? A-t-elle un contenu conceptuel? Quel est son rapport à l’espace?
  •  237
    Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge
    with Paul Égré
    Synthese 166 (1): 1-20. 2009.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them i…Read more
  • Le corps en mouvement: les relations entre l'action, l'intention et le mouvement corporel
    Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 124 (3): 249-270. 1992.
  •  141
    Seeing Absence or Absence of Seeing?
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 117-125. 2013.
    Imagine that in entering a café, you are struck by the absence of Pierre, with whom you have an appointment. Or imagine that you realize that your keys are missing because they are not hanging from the usual ring-holder. What is the nature of these absence experiences? In this article, we discuss a recent view defended by Farennikova (2012) according to which we literally perceive absences of things in much the same way as we perceive present things. We criticize and reject the perceptual interp…Read more
  •  136
    Our utterances are typically if not always "situated," in the sense that they are true or false relative to unarticulated parameters of the extra-linguistic context. The problem is to explain how these parameters are determined, given that nothing in the uttered sentences indicates them. It is tempting to claim that they must be determined at the level of thought or intention. However, as many philosophers have observed, thoughts themselves are no less situated than utterances. Unarticulated par…Read more
  •  106
    Too much ado about belief
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
  •  330
    Shades and concepts
    Analysis 61 (3): 193-202. 2001.
    In this paper, we criticise the claim, made by J. McDowell and B. Brewer, that the contents of perceptual experience are purely conceptual
  •  33
    Perceptual recognition and the feeling of presence
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 33. 2010.