• Being quasi-moved : a view from the lab
    In Florian Cova & Sébastien Réhault (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics, Bloomsbury Academic. 2018.
  • Being quasi-moved: a view from the lab
    In Réhault Sébastien & Cova Florian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics, Bloomsbury. pp. 123-141. 2019.
  •  13
    The general aim of this volume is to investigate the nature of the relation between pictorial experience and aesthetic appreciation. In particular, it is concerned with the character and intimacy of this relationship: is there a mere causal connection between pictorial experience and aesthetic appreciation, or are the two relata constitutively associated with one another? The essays in the book's first section investigate important conceptual issues related to the pictorial experience of paintin…Read more
  •  16
    I discuss two ways one may explain how we interpret the content of a fictional. In the first, the interpreter’s task aims at deciding what is true in a fictional story by figuring out the narrative intentions behind its production. Narrative interpretation is a matter of figuring out the story-telling intentions of the (implied) author of the work. This is Currie’s intentionalist model of narrative interpretation, a conception I present and discuss on the basis of experimental results in the psy…Read more
  • Pensées « de re » sans « res »
    Cahiers de Philosophie de L’Université de Caen 40 65. 2003.
  •  28
    Actualisme et fiction
    Dialogue 39 (1): 77-. 2000.
    The nonexistence of fictional entities does not seem incompatible with their possible existence. The aim of this paper is to give an account of the intuitive truth of statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names in an actualist framework. After having clarified the opposition between a possibilist and an actualist approach of possible wolds, I distinguish fictional individuals from fictional characters and the fictional use of fictional proper names from their metafictional …Read more
  • Reply to Varieties of Simulation
    In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
  •  18
    Analogical counterfactuals such as “If I were you, I would do so and so...” create a puzzle for philosophical semantics. Whereas the ‘received view' in philosophical semantics has it that the first person pronoun always refers to its utterer, one may wonder whether this is still the case when the first person pronoun is embedded in analogical counterfactuals such as “If I were you, I would stay away from me”. I suggest that the intelligibility of lies in the fact that the token of the expression…Read more
  •  48
    Vergil and dido
    Dialectica 57 (2). 2003.
    According to many realist philosophers of fiction, one needs to posit an ontology of existing fictional characters in order to give a correct account of discourse about fiction. The realists' claim is opposed by pretense theorists for whom discourse about fiction involves, as discourse in fiction, pretense. On that basis, pretense theorists claim that one does not need to embrace an ontology of fictional characters to give an account of discourse about fiction. The ontolog-ical dispute between r…Read more