•  84
    How to see invisible objects
    Noûs. forthcoming.
  •  25
    Mind & Language, EarlyView.
  •  67
    Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations
    Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 228-240. 2019.
    Philosophical Issues, EarlyView.
  •  35
    The eye's mind: Perceptual process and epistemic norms
    Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1): 317-347. 2017.
  •  76
    Perceptual Skill And Social Structure
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1): 131-161. 2019.
    Visual perception relies on stored information and environmental associations to arrive at a determinate representation of the world. This opens up the disturbing possibility that our visual experiences could themselves be subject to a kind of racial bias, simply in virtue of accurately encoding previously encountered environmental regularities. This possibility raises the following question: what, if anything, is wrong with beliefs grounded upon these prejudicial experiences? They are consisten…Read more
  •  74
    Frege, fiction and force
    Synthese 194 (9): 3669-3692. 2017.
    Discussion of Frege’s theory of fiction has tended to focus on the problem of empty names, and has consequently missed the truly problematic aspect of the theory, Frege’s commitment to the view that even fictional sentences that contain no empty names fail to refer. That claim prima facie conflicts with his commitment to the cognitive transparency of sense, and the determination of reference by sense. Resolving this tension compels us to recognize that fiction for Frege is a special kind of forc…Read more
  •  58
    Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification
    Philosophical Topics 44 (2): 301-326. 2016.
    What kind of content must visual states have if they are to offer direct justification for our external world beliefs? How must they present that content if the degree of justification they provide is to reflect the nuance of our changing visual experiences? This paper offers an argument for the view that visual states comprise not only a content, but a confidence relation to that content. This confidence relation lets us explain how visual states can offer noninferential perceptual justificatio…Read more