Jimmy Plourde

This paper addresses the problem of providing a satisfying explanation of the Tractarian notions of state of affairs, fact and situation, an issue first raised by Frege and Russell. In order to do so, I first present what I consider to be the three main existing interpretations of these notions: the classic, the standard and Peter Simons’. I then present and defend an interpretation which is closer to the text than the classic and standard interpretations; one which is similar to Peter Simons’ but which differs from it concerning one important point with respect to the nature of situations. Accordingly, the above mentioned should be seen as three wholly distinct categories. States of affairs are to be understood as Russellian complexes, facts as the subsistence and non-subsistence of states of affairs and situations as possibilities of the subsistence and possibilities of the non-subsistence of states of affairs.

In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing and depicting, provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and deflationary accounts such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting or a misconception of depicting. Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality.

One of the main challenges faced by Russell's theory of judgement was to provide a satisfactory account of judgement that was not committed to the existence of true, false, or non-existent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article. I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell's theory of judgement find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in theNotebooksbetween a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible (non-existing) complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in theTractatus.

Un des enjeux les plus importants pour la compréhension des Recherches Logiques et pour l’unité de la pensée d’Edmund Husserl réside dans la question du caractère idéaliste ou réaliste du projet philosophique de l’ouvrage. Dans cet article, je me penche sur cette question et établis, à partir d’un commentaire de passages clefs du texte, que la philosophie du jeune Husserl est bel et bien réaliste, à la fois en ce qui concerne le réal et l’idéal. Je montre aussi ce qu’il y a d’erroné dans deux autres lectures de Husserl sur cette question, à savoir la lecture idéaliste et celle voulant qu’il adhère à une forme de neutralité métaphysique.One of the most important issues for the understanding of the Logical Investigations and for the unity of Edmund Husserl’s thought consists in the question of the realistic or idealistic character of its philosophical project. In this paper, I address this issue and establish on the basis of a close commentary of the text that the philosophy of the young Husserl is realistic both regarding the realm of the real and the one of the ideal. I also show what is wrong with two other readings of Husserl on this question : the idealistic and the neutral point of view readings

Théorie de l’objet et Présentation personnelle est la première traduction française jamais publiée d’Alexius Meinong. Pour cette première, Jean-François Courtine et Marc de Launay ont choisi de publier non pas un, mais bien deux ouvrages du philosophe de Graz, Über Gegenstandstheorie et Selbstdarstellung. Ces ouvrages sont, de plus, accompagnés d’une longue présentation rédigée par Courtine, dans laquelle il est question de l’état des travaux et de la recherche sur Meinong, du développement historique de la théorie de l’objet au sein de l’École de Brentano de même que de ses présumés antécédents dans l’histoire de la philosophie.

Jimmy Plourde | : Dans cet article, je défends la thèse qu’il ne peut pas y avoir de savoir intuitif sous la forme d’un état purement mental, car, contrairement aux états purement mentaux de connaissance, les intuitions rationnelles n’excluent pas la possibilité de la coexistence de connaissances aux contenus contradictoires. Je soutiens que cela trouve une double justification dans la non-factivité et la non-véridictivité des intuitions, et une explication dans l’idée que les intuitions sont des expériences d’« intellectual seemings ». Enfin, je soutiens que ces caractéristiques des intuitions pourraient constituer une difficulté pour la thèse évidentialiste et, par conséquent, pour la conception du savoir intutitif dans le cadre d’une théorie classique réformée de la connaissance. | : In this paper I argue that there cannot be intuitive knowledge if knowledge is conceived as a purely mental state. States of knowledge may not consist of rational intuitions because these do not, contrarily to purely mental states of knowledge, rule out the possibility of coexisting states of knowledge with contradictory contents. I defend the view that the justification for this incapacity lies in the non-factivity and the non-veridicity of intuitions. It is also argued that this non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions has its roots in the fact that intuitions are experiences of “intellectual seemings”. In the end, I consider the possibility that the non-factivity and non-veridicity of intuitions might constitute a problem for the thesis of evidentialism, thereby raising an issue for any conception of intuitive knowledge elaborated within the framework of a modified traditional conception of knowledge.

Dans cet article, je soutiens que Wittgenstein n’a pas de position de principe comparable à l’adhésion de Russell à un sens robuste de la réalité ou à l’absence chez Meinong de préjugé en faveur de la réalité, mais qu’il est plutôt pragmatique sur la question de son engagement ontologique : il y a ce qu’il y a et c’est le langage sensé qui, en tant que miroir de la réalité, nous indique ce qu’il y a. Ceci dit, ce pragmatisme s’accommode d’entités possibles et d’entités non concrètes dans la mesure où sa théorie de l’image l’engage à admettre des situations possibles et des faits négatifs. Contrairement à ce que soutiennent les partisans d’une lecture russellienne du Tractatus, il ne s’agit pas là d’une simple façon de parler, mais d’une thèse que Wittgenstein endosse et qui ne lui paraît nullement problématique.In this paper, I hold that Wittgenstein’s position on the issue of ontological commitment isn’t based on some fundamental principle such as Russell’s robust sense of reality or Meinong’s rejection of the prejudice in favour of reality, but is rather pragmatic : there is whatever there is and it is the meaningful language, qua miror of reality, which shows us what there is. This pragmatism goes together with a commitment to possible and non concrete entities, since his picture theory commits him to the existence of possible situations and negative facts. Contrarily to what friends of the Russellian lecture of the Tractatus believe, this commitment isn’t a mere façon de parler but is assumed by Wittgenstein and isn’t problematic