Jing Iris Hu

In this chapter, I propose to use the layered structure of a Russian Doll Model initially used by Frans de Waal and some of the most recent and influential empirical studies to interpret ceyin zhi xin. At the core of ceyin zhi xin, I argue, lies the Perceptive-Affective-Motive Triplet that includes perceptive, affective and motivational aspects. The Russian Doll Model helps to illustrate the structure of ceyin zhi xin as containing both the multifaceted triplet as its inner layer and higher cognitive activities—such as long-term memory, taking perspectives other than one’s own, semantic processing and imagination—as its outer layers. These outer layer faculties make the normative and cultural development of ceyin zhi xin possible. The higher cognitive capacities are in close contact and constantly interacting with the triplet. I argue that this model is the best interpretative model for ceyin zhi xin because of its rich support from empirical studies, its emphasis on the interactions of the different aspects of ceyin zhi xin, as well as how it explains the normative and cultural potential of ceyin zhi xin.

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two-part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In this paper, Part 1, I stress the importance of holding an integrated view of the sprouts as consisting of three components: cognitive, affective, and motivational. Through examining scholarly accounts that do not adhere to such a view, I demonstrate why the integrative perspective is necessary for understanding the dynamic nature of human moral potential and the centrality of moral cultivation in Mencian ethics.

Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress.

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two-part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In Part 1, I presented an integrated view of the sprouts as including cognitive, affective, and motivational aspects. In Part 2, I discuss the cultivation and application of natural moral motivation. I illustrate how the sprouts inform moral deliberation and drive moral cultivation, while also being its subject. I also demonstrate how emotional responses are managed and regulated according to the sprouts and discuss why moral cultivation is sometimes unsuccessful.

Seeking an alternative metaphysical view to anthropocentrism, which problematically places humans at the center of nature, Brasovan brings together the Neo-Confucian Wang Fuzhi’s account with ecological humanism. He aims to contribute a view of humans and nature that consists of continuous, dynamic and complex systems. Through critically engaging Brasovan’s account, I discuss Wang’s anti-anthropocentric metaphysics, his qi monism, and the spiritual side of his philosophy. I then criticize Brasovan’s project on two accounts: his categorization of Wang’s qi monism as materialism (with provisos) and his lack of discussion of anthropocentric concepts in Wang’s philosophy. Lastly, I draw the reader’s attention to the rich resources presented by Wang, who witnesses and partakes in the interaction amongst the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions; I also emphasize the significance and promises brought by Brasovan’s approach of engaging Neo-Confucian thinkers with modern philosophical concerns such as the demand of ecological humanism.

This article challenges the pessimistic view that empathy and other fellow feelings are biased and erratic motivation for morality. By discussing Mencius’ account on how to develop empathy from its biased and erratic beginnings, I argue that empathy can be extended to less common objects, such as non-kin, the faraway, the unfamiliar, and the abstract. The extension facilitated by empathy in turn enhances one’s moral cognition toward the sufferings of less common objects; the extension also helps to include less common objects into one’s circle of care. I respond to critics of empathy such as Prinz by highlighting the dynamic cultivational process of empathy that they overlook, and further point out that empathy can be cultivated so as to provide a remedy for the biases that no emotion is immune to. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on moral cultivation in the Chinese philosophy community and the dispute over empathy’s role in morality in contemporary ethics.