Jonathan Wolff

My paper ‘Hobbes and the Motivations of Social Contract Theory’ was published in this journal in 1994. In this contribution I explain the background that led me to write that paper at an early stage of my career, relating the explanation to my education as a student at UCL, and, briefly, at Harvard and contrasting the methodological approaches I experienced in the two departments. The Hobbes paper itself offers a type of ‘rational reconstruction’ of Hobbes, drawing on the logic of different social contract arguments, and while there is much in the paper I still agree with, it assumes an approach to Philosophy that I would not adopt now.

The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM), especially the canonical three volume Foundations of Measurement by Krantz et al., is a landmark accomplishment in our understanding of measurement. Despite this, it has been far from easy to pinpoint what exactly we can learn about measurement from RTM, and who the target audience for RTM’s formal results should be. In what sense does RTM provide foundations of measurement, and what is the philosophical significance of such foundations? I argue that RTM provides semantic foundations of measurement, and that their philosophical significance lies in a shift towards structural representation.

ABSTRACT Avner de-Shalit has devised a methodology for coming closer to a settled view in political philosophy which he calls ‘public reflective equilibrium’, extending ideas of John Rawls and Michael Walzer. De-Shalit proposes that the philosopher should come to an understanding of views outside the academy through extended interaction with members of the public. These discussions can and do lead to changes in the philosophical theory, from the introduction of new concepts, to new framings of issues or even novel research questions. De-Shalit and I used this approach in our work Disadvantage. Reflecting on our work, I raise five questions: Who speaks for the public? How do you know you are asking the right questions? How should the theorist respond to judgements based on false empirical beliefs? What should be done when the public do not speak with one voice? Is equilibrium a reasonable aspiration?

This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy.

The concept of the ‘benefit cheat’ plays a critical role in political rhetoric and public policy and it has been deployed to justify changes to the benefit system that have had a very negative impact on well being and justice. The authors argue that the concept is dangerous, adding to the existing burdens of poverty and exclusion and that it must be eradicated by a reorganisation of the welfare system. Dignity and a spirit of equality must be the starting point for any system of welfare that aims to promote universal well being.

All parties involved in researching, developing, manufacturing, and distributing COVID-19 vaccines need guidance on their ethical obligations. We focus on pharmaceutical companies' obligations because their capacities to research, develop, manufacture, and distribute vaccines make them uniquely placed for stemming the pandemic. We argue that an ethical approach to COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution should satisfy four uncontroversial principles: optimising vaccine production, including development, testing, and manufacturing; fair distribution; sustainability; and accountability. All parties' obligations should be coordinated and mutually consistent. For instance, companies should not be obligated to provide host countries with additional booster shots at the expense of fulfilling bilateral contracts with countries in which there are surges. Finally, any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. This assurance enables countries, pharmaceutical companies, global organisations, and others to verify compliance with the chosen approach and protect ethically compliant stakeholders from being unfairly exploited by unethical behaviour of others.

The regulation of drugs presents a challenge for liberalism: how can punishing a person for an action that harms only himself or herself be justified? For public policy a related difficulty is to justify the differential treatment of drugs and alcohol. Philosophical arguments suggest that current regulations are unjustified, and that some currently illegal drugs should be treated no more harshly than alcohol. However, such arguments make little or no impact in public policy discussions. This generates a further problem: to understand the different perspectives of philosophical reasoning and public policy so that philosophical arguments can have a greater role in public policy debates.