Joachim Schulte

Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959) was one of the most gifted students and collaborators of Moritz Schlick. Accepted as a discussion partner by Wittgenstein from 1927 on, he functioned as spokesman for the latter’s ideas in the Schlick Circle, until Wittgenstein’s contact with this most faithful interpreter was broken off in 1935 and not renewed when exile took Waismann to Cambridge. Nonetheless, at Oxford, where he went in 1939, and eventually became Reader in Philosophy of Mathematics (changing later to Philosophy of Science), Waismann made important and independent contributions to analytic philosophy and philosophy of science (for example in relation to probability, causality and linguistic analysis). The full extent of these only became evident later when the larger (unpublished) part of his writings could be studied. His first posthumous work The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1965, 2nd edn.1997; German 1976) and his earlier Einführung in das mathematische Denken (1936) have recently proved of fresh interest to the scientific community. This late flowering and new understanding of Waismann’s position is connected with the fact that he somewhat unfairly fell under the shadow of Wittgenstein, his mentor and predecessor. Central to this book about a life and work familiar to few is unpublished and unknown works on causality and probability. These are commented on in this volume, which will also include a publication of new or previously scattered material and an overview of Waismann’s life.

A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Most of the sentences that go to make up the remarks of Philosophical Investigations can be found in manuscript passages written in June 1931. On 20 November of the same year Wittgenstein writes a letter in reply to a request from Schlick and complains, not only about his own sluggishness, but also about Waismann's inclination to misrepresent his own ideas. In fact, Spengler says a number of things about Weltanschauungen, and it may well be that several passages could be seen to fill the bill. In a way, nonfactual intermediate links, which begins by mentioning 'hypothetical' connecting links and says that they are merely supposed to draw attention to connections between facts. But an hypothetical connecting link should in this case do nothing but direct the attention to the similarity, the relatedness, of the facts.

Anhand eines Vergleichs mit den Stilbegriffen Spenglers und Goethes lassen sich in Wittgensteins Schriften wenigstens drei Bedeutungen des Wortes "Stil" auseinanderhalten: (1) Stil im Sinne einer individuellen, persönlichen Eigenart; (2) Stil im Sinnes des Geistes einer Kultur oder Epoche; (3) Stil im Sinne einer zeit- oder kulturtypischen Ausdrucksform, die zwar prägend, aber nicht zwingend verbindlich ist. Eine Erörterung des Stils in den Bedeutungen (2) und (3) zeigt, inwieweit dieser Begriff bei Wittgenstein "relativistisch" — d.h. kultur- und epochengebunden — aufgefaßt wird.

One way of identifying the beginning of the Investigations is by deciding to regard remark 1, and hence neither the motto nor the Preface but the famous quotation from Augustine, as the real starting point of Wittgenstein’s reflections as developed in this book. One point implicit in this decision is that the notion of a language-game is placed in the foreground of Wittgenstein’s discussion. In a way, the language-game of the builders is Wittgenstein’s paradigm of a language-game – but why is it treated differently from the shopkeeper scene in the sense that the latter is not given a separate number? This question appears particularly urgent in view of the fact that in earlier manuscript versions of the Investigations Wittgenstein did allot a separate number to the shopkeeper scene. Towards the end of this paper I make an attempt to answer that question. But in order to get down to this a number of additional questions are raised focussing on Wittgenstein’s use of central terms like “game”, “operate”, “sample” and drawing on distinctions elaborated in the literature, such as Benacerraf’s distinction between “transitive” and “intransitive” kinds of counting. This reading of the beginning of the Investigations is impregnated with the conviction that later parts of the book can fruitfully be seen as growing out of the remarks immediately following the quotation from Augustine.

Philosophical Superlatives: Machines as Symbols. – In this paper, my chief aim is to present a close reading of parts of a central sequence of remarks from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (191 – 197, cf. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, I, 121 – 130). The apparent theme of this sequence is the idea of a ‘machine as a symbol of its mode of operation’. Obviously, this idea requires a good deal of clarification, and the present paper attempts to elucidate relevant passages which, in their turn, are discussed in the hope of succeeding in spelling out some of the points Wittgenstein has in mind in appealing to the picture of a machine as a symbol of its mode of operation. What will serve as a kind of framework of these elucidations is the notion of a philosophical superlative appealed to by Wittgenstein in a number of remarks that can be seen as particularly characteristic of his later thought. In the course of developing the idea of a philosophical superlative six aspects, or types, of superlatives are distinguished, and the last of these is found to shade into the image of a machine as symbol in a way that allows us to draw on various superlatives in striving to clarify the train of thought underpinning the sequence PI 191 – 197 and related passages.

This paper is an attempt at bringing out various aesthetically relevant points alluded to by Wittgenstein in what I call ‘the Engelmann remark’ – a longish manuscript remark written by Wittgenstein in 1930 and painstakingly discussed by Michael Fried in the context of elucidating what is strikingly new in the work of a photographer like Jeff Wall. One part of this paper is dedicated to summarizing and briefly examining the account given by Fried while another part is meant to clarify some of Wittgenstein’s points by way of contrasting their import with the story told by Fried. In this second part Wittgenstein’s late observations on aspect change are used to show in which ways these observations may help us to gain a better understanding of the idea of a specific ‘perspective’ claimed to go with a given work of art.

INTRODUCTION The present volume unites contributions by the leading figure of the Vienna Circle and by two of his closest assoCiates, contributions that deal with an area of thought represented, indeed, in this Collection but certainly not the central one in the common picture ofthe Circle's activities. It is no accident that an interest in ethics and the philosophy of action was particularly marked in what Neurath was apt to call the right wing of the Circle. For them, as for Wittgenstein (the respected mentorofSchlickandWaismanninparticular),theadvancetobehoped for in philosophy consisted not solely in freeing natural science from a confused sense of dependence on speculative metaphysics but also in seeingthatotherareasoflanguageandaction hadto bethoughtaboutin theirownterms, whichwereneitherthoseofnaturalsciencenorthoseof philosophy as traditionally conceived. The scepticismofSchlick about theprogrammeofUnifiedSciencewaswellknown: EinheizwissenschaJt he called it, as it might be 'boozified science'. And in sober truth the programme sometimes masked a left-wing set of values taken (surely illogically) for granted, though the membersofthe Circle entertained a wide range ofpolitical views. Schlick's own contribution to the present volume is a section from thenotesforoneofhisfinal lectureseries,forsightofwhich wewarmly thanktheonlysurvivingcontributortoourvolume,DrJosephSchachter: Schlick'sgrandsonDra. M. H. vandeVeldehaskindlyconsentedtotheir publication. This section poses the problem we have outlined: there are questionsandaneedforclarificationinethics,butthesenomoredemand a metaphysical solution than does a similar situation in epistemology. Here, as in his earlier Problems of Ethics,l Schlick sets his face against thewholeprocess,mostobviousin Kant,ofmakingtheconceptofvalue absolute. One might say that for Schlick there is no unhypothetical imperative.