University of Alberta
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2011
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Normative Ethics
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Normative Ethics
  •  111
    Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data
    with Jason Taylor
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4): 567-578. 2010.
    We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3)
  •  31
    I have argued for the conclusion that nonfallacious ’ad hominem’ arguments are desirable and to commit them is to commit acts of intellectual responsibility. Arguing against a person, when legitimate, is the prerogative of any rational being. Hume commits himself to the argument and commits himself to it only as a judicious inquisitor responsible for the veracity of his own beliefs. The desirability of nonfallacious ’ad hominem’ ’attacks’ is clear from their extensive use and rhetorical power in…Read more
  •  36
    An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims
    Social Epistemology 24 (2): 99-104. 2010.
    Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
  • The Problem of Hell (edited book)
    Ashgate. 2010.
  •  3
    Fortuitous Data and Conspiracy Theories
    Journal of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. forthcoming.
  •  50
    Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony
    Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2): 43-48. 2005.
    Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony
  •  17
    Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.