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3Fortuitous Data and Conspiracy TheoriesJournal of the Philosophy of Social Sciences 40 (4): 567-578. 2010.We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking.We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call “fortuitous data”—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1).We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3).
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229Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous DataPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4): 567-578. 2010.We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3)
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42I have argued for the conclusion that nonfallacious ’ad hominem’ arguments are desirable and to commit them is to commit acts of intellectual responsibility. Arguing against a person, when legitimate, is the prerogative of any rational being. Hume commits himself to the argument and commits himself to it only as a judicious inquisitor responsible for the veracity of his own beliefs. The desirability of nonfallacious ’ad hominem’ ’attacks’ is clear from their extensive use and rhetorical power in…Read more
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30Re-thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of TestimonyEpisteme 2 (2): 129-134. 2006.Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.
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13The Problem of Hell: A Philosophical Anthology (edited book)Ashgate. 2010.How can a perfectly good God justifiably damn anyone to hell? This is one version of the problem of hell. The problem of hell has become one of the most widely discussed topics in contemporary philosophy of religion. This anthology brings together contributions by contemporary philosophers whose work shapes the current debate.
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59An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge ClaimsSocial Epistemology 24 (2): 99-104. 2010.Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.
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86Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of TestimonyEpisteme 2 (2): 43-48. 2005.Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Normative Ethics |