After decades of being met with suspicion or even disdain the epistemic role of intuitions – and specifically the school of ethical intuitionism – has seen a revival. This revival has been undertaken by both leading moral philosophers such as Jonathan Dancy and Robert Audi and moral psychologists like Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene.See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Robert Audi, The Good in the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value…
Read moreAfter decades of being met with suspicion or even disdain the epistemic role of intuitions – and specifically the school of ethical intuitionism – has seen a revival. This revival has been undertaken by both leading moral philosophers such as Jonathan Dancy and Robert Audi and moral psychologists like Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene.See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Robert Audi, The Good in the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) and Joshua D. Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (2002): 517–523.Dancy, for example, has argued that moral principles play no substantive role in moral thought and judgement. Since it has traditionally been assumed that our particular moral judgements are justified on the basis of the more general moral principles from which they are derived, Dancy’s moral epistemology takes a diffe